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SUMMARY 
The thesis aims to justify liberal democracy on the cultivation of autonomy amongst its 
citizens. The potential of deliberative democracy and associational democracy to 
achieve this cultivation are then critically evaluated It is suggested that autonomy has 
intrinsic value and an intrinsic connection to democracy, particularly in Western 
democracies. 
Deliberative democracy is justified as the most suitable model of decision-making to 
cultivate autonomy due to its enhancement of public reason, speaker and hearer 
autonomy. All three factors therefore encourage reflective preference transformation. 
which is the defining mark of deliberative democracy. 
A perfectionist case of deliberative democracy is further presented and associations in 
civil society are evaluated as a location of deliberative democracy. It is argued that the 
associations can achieve this by fulfilling four functions: they can be venues for 
subsidiarity; provide information and representation; be schools of democracy; and 
locations for governance. The fulfilment of these functions enables the 
institutionalisation of deliberative democracy to overcome some of the threats of 
complexity, pluralism, size and inequality. However, not all associations can achieve all 
four functions and in order to do so, they must be internally democratic. 
The associations also need to pursue a dualist strategy in relation to the state. This 
involves a critical public sphere with informal networks of communication based upon 
the norms of deliberative democracy. The public sphere should then set the agenda for 
legislation through the `outside access model'. The second strand of the dualist strategy 
is to gain access to legislative arenas. Associational mediating forums with power 
devolved from the state, again based on the norms of deliberative democracy, are 
advocated as a suitable method by which to achieve this. 
This associational model differs from the neo-pluralist model of interest groups because 
it is based upon the norms of deliberative democracy and can therefore promote the 
common good and avoid the `mischief of factionalism'. 
Finally, a case study of the Stanage Forum is considered I suggest that it approximates 
the associational mediating forums and highlights where trade-offs between the ideal 
and practice need to be, can be, should be and will be made. 
ACKNOWl, 1; 1NPF, NIFN rS 
I would firstly like to thank my two supcrvisors, Dr Matthew 1-cstcnstcin and Mr 
Anthony Arblastcr, for their invaluable advice, experience and support ovcr the ycars. 
Many thanks must go to the cntirc Department of i'otitics, cspc cially Sarah Cooke 
whose help made the submission process as stress-frcc as thcsc things can be. 
Thanks too to all those who participated at the Stanagc Forum, particularly Matthew 
Croncy and Stcvc Smith. 
I would also like to thank all my friends and family for thcir support and cncouragcmcnt 
- you know who you arcl Two pcoplc dcscrvc an cxtca spccial acknowlcdg; cmcnt - 
Lindscy and my mothcr Marprct, without whom this thcsis would ncithcr havc bccn 
possibic or probablc. 
MIN ýlr LF, N'tls' 
VOLUME ONE 
page 1 
INTRODUCflON 
1: AUTONOMY: TILE NORMATIVE CORE 
OF DEMOCRACY 
1.0 Introduction 
page l' 
i'nbc 8 
1.1 Autonomy and Dcmocracy 
1.2 Liberal Dcmocracy and Autonomy 
page 14 
age e 
220 1.3 The Value of Autonomy 
page 
a 
4 
1.4 The Requirements of Autonomy 
page 
1.5 The Conflict Between Autonomy and Authority 
Page 60 
1.6 Conclusion 
page 85 
2: DLLIBERAT1VI DEMOCRACY ANI) 
AUTONOMOUS i)ECISION-MAKING 
2.0 Introduction 
pagc 
88 8 
2.1 Defining Dclibcrativc Dcmocracy 
page 
page 93 
2.2 Dclibcrativc Democracy and Autonomy page 103 
2.3 Challenges page 137 
2.4 Conclusion 
3: AUTONOMY ANI) DELIBERATIVELY DEMOCRATIC 
ASSOCIATIONS 
3.0 Introduction 
paSe 139 
aa 
3.1 The Institutional Rcquircmcnts ofDclibcrativc 
Dcmocrncy pagc 
c1 
14? 
3.2 Mining Associations 
3.3 Vcnucs for Subsidiarity 
pagc 153 
"c 163 
3.4 Provision of Infonnation and Group Rcprescntation 
bC 
170 
3.5 Schools of Dcmocracy 177 
3.6 Locations of Govcrnnncc 
Abc 
pagc 
I177 
3,7 Conclusion 
VOLilnt1: 't WO 
4. ASSOCIATIONS AND IN fERNAL DEMOCRACY 
4.0 Introduction page 
194 
4.1 Exit and Voicc pa1; c 
198 
4.2 Frccdom of Association page 
201 
4.3 The Iron Law of Oligarchy page 
208 
4.4 Empirical Restrictions page 
212 
4.5 Conclusion page 
214 
S. A DUALIST MODEL OF ASSOCIATIVE DEMOCRACY 
5.0 Introduction page 
2t5 
5.1 Justifications of Dualism page 
218 
5.2 External Relations and the Public Sphere page 
233 
5.3 Mediating Forums page 
249 
5.4 Towards a Dualist Model of Associative Democracy page 
271 
5.5 Conclusion page 
293 
6. AVOIDING TIl MISCHIEF OF I'ACTIONAl. ISt1i 
6.0 introduction page 
295 
6.1 The Republican Model and the Common Good page 
297 
6.2 Deliberative Democracy and the Common Good page 
304 
6.3 Associationalism Versus Nco-Libcral Pluralism page 
310 
6.4 Conclusion page 
322 
7. 'I11E STANAGE FORUM: ASSO ' IA'ilONAL NMEI)IA'i7NG FORUMS 
IN PRACTICE. ' 
7.0 Introduction page 
325 
7.1 About Stanagc and the Purposc of the Forum page 
327 
7.2 Approximation of the Associational Mcdiating Forums page 
330 
7.3 Critical Appraisal of the Results and Dccisions page 
353 
3f, 2 
7.4 Conclusion page 
CONCLUSION parc 
364 
APPENDIX 1 page 
371 
11111LIOCILU'llY r' 
372. 
l N"i'ir,,,, O DI ff"T I ON 
Over the last ten to fiflccn years, deliberative democracy has become an increasingly 
dominant strand ofdcntocratic theory (Dryrck, 2000, p. 1). This thesis intends to add to 
this literature on both justification and institutionalisation. The justification is that it is 
the most suitable model ofdemocratic dccision"making to cultivate citizens' autonomy. 
In terms of institutionalisation, voluntary associations in civil society arc analysed as 
suitable locations for deliberative democracy. This then links the current litcraturc on 
deliberative democracy with the recently rcjuvcnatcd ideas of civil society, ollen termed 
nco-tocqucvillianism or the second wave of civil society. 'This popularity is not 
restricted to political theory although Lester Salamon and Anhcicr inform us that the 
world is undergoing `a major reappraisal of the whole state' (Salamon and Anhcicr, 
1996, p. 1) and that this is being countered by `a global associational revolution' 
(Salamon and Anhcicr, 1996, p. 81). The most dominant stream of the thesis however 
is how to cultivate autonomy, and the thesis investigates to what extent deliberative and 
associational democracy can achieve this. The approach is predominantly theoretical 
and normative, and the thesis should be seen as an attempt to contribute to three areas of 
literature on autonomy, dclibcrativc democracy and associationalism. In doing so, the 
thesis tries to address and add substance to several key issues that the present literature 
on these areas has failed to consider in explicit detail. 
The analysis of these topics can also be sccn as a series of suggestions for democratic 
deepening. According to John Dryzck there arc three dimensions through which 
democracy can be deepened. the first is the expansion of the franchise where more 
pcoplc participate in collective decision; the second is scope,, where more issues and 
topics are opened to democratic decision-making; and the third is 'authenticity of 
control', which requires 'the effective participation ofautonomous and comment actors 
(Dryzck, 2000, p. 29). It is this third method that the thesis focuses upon; arguing that 
deliberative democracy can lead to more authentic preferences, and believing more 
autonomous preferences arc more authentic. For Dryr. ck authenticity is `thc degree to 
which democratic control is cnggcd through communication that encourages rctlcction 
upon preferences without coercion' (Uryak, 2000, p. 8). 
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Chapter One presents the case that the cultivation of the value of autonomy is the 
normative core of democracy. It is suggested that autonomy and democracy both aim to 
make their agents sclf-determining and so the relationship between them is implicit. I 
argue that autonomy is an intrinsic value for its own sake, especially in western literal 
democracies, as both the theory and practice of liberal democracy have assumed its 
citizens to be autonomous. However, the argument here is that autonomous citiicns 
cannot be assumed, because the right conditions need to be in place to cultivate this 
autonomy. I outline the core elements of autonomy as free choice based upon rationally 
formed preferences and then defend the possibility of autonomy as defined against 
several challenges that maintain the impossibility of justifying democracy upon 
autonomy. These arc that it is not a political value, that pcoplc arc dctcrrnincd so cannot 
be autonomous, that autonomy inevitably leads to perfectionism or paternalism and that 
autonomy is incompatible with authority. Although there is already a vast literature on 
autonomy, which I use as the basis of my arguments, the thesis maintains key elements 
of originality as the chapter looks specifically at cultivating autonomy in decision- 
making. 
In Chapter Two, l argue that the model of deliberative democracy is the best decision- 
making method to cultivate the autonomy of all participants equally. This argument 
accepts Robert Dahl's argument, that `democracy cannot be justified merely as a system 
for translating the raw, uninformed will or a popular majority into public policy' (Dahl, 
1994, p. 30). For preferences to be authentic, they must be cnlig htcned, and as Dahl 
asserts this requires education, discussion and public debate (Dahl, 1994, p. 31). From 
this Dahl concludes that 'alternative procedures for making decisions ought to be 
evaluated according to the opportunities they furnish citizens for acquiring an 
understanding of means and ends, of one's interests and the expected consequences or 
policies for interests, not only for oneself but for all other relevant persons as well' 
(Dahl, 1994, p. 31). A comparison of purely aggrcgativc mechanisms of decision- 
making highlights the three reasons why deliberative democracy is particularly suitable 
to cultivate participants' autonomy: it generates public reason, information is increased 
and thcrcforc hearer autonomy is enlmnccd, and finally that it ensures speaker autonomy 
by ensuring participants have control over the expression of their preferences. 'dare 
popular challenges to these justifications for deliberative democracy arc also considcrcd 
and refuted: the social choice critique that a popular will cannot be identified; a 
3 
challcngc from dii%rcncc democracy that deliberative democracy is inevitably biased 
against historically disadvantaged groups; and finally that dclitx rntivc democracy 
requires special obligations among citizens that it cannot itself ground. Again this 
chapter builds on well-established arguments, but is distinctive in the manner that it 
explicitly justifies deliberative democracy by its potential to cultivate autonomy. 
The remaining chapters can be seen as an attempt to address 'the Problem of bringing 
democratic theory down to earth, of giving it practical import, of making it somcthing 
real' (I3laug, 1996, p. 49). They also accept John Rawls' argument that normative 
theory must engage with `the art of the possible', and so must be `feasible" and 
`realistic' (Rawls, 1993, pp. xvxviii). Although the thesis is normative, it attempts to 
ensure that the normative vision can be 'reconciled with the institutional requirements 
of modern society' (Cohen and Anito, 1992, p. 8). In this sense the thesis attempts to 
avoid the criticism of the public choice theorists that normative political theory lucks 
analytical reasoning and that feasibility is absent. tlo%%tvcr, this does not mean that I 
accept public choice theorists' suggestion that their approach is 'political science 
properly understood', and that normative theory has nothing to add (Brennan and 
Lomasky, 1993, p. 6). 'T'his thesis accepts this 'new realism' and therefore the 
institutional discussion will be centred within the present institutional structures of 
liberal democracy. As American activist Brian O'Conncl, has argued, civil society 
should be seen as a supplement and not replacement of current representative 
institutions (Nv vw. dcmocraticciialort, c. orcJrr rt2lrcrxrrt2l htm. (I910312003), p. 2). 
Consequently, the arguments here, for an associational democracy, should be taken in 
this context. As Young has appreciated 'alternative institutions cannot be made out of 
air. Both imagining and external alternative institutions must Ix-gin with some elements 
of existing social life' (Young; 1995, p. 207). 1lo%ti, cvcr, an associational democracy fits 
these requirements because as Jean Cohen and Andrew Arum have famously argued 
'the concept of civil society indicates a terrain in the Wiest that is cndanl crcd by the 
logic of administrative and economic mechanisms but is also the primary locus for the 
potential expansion of democracy under "really existing" liberal regimes' (Cohen and 
Arato, 1992, p. viii). 
With an intcnt to achicvc this, the third chaptcr follows William Nclson, in the sense 
that it acccpts that such a theory must dcmonstratc why democracy is dcsirnblc and it 
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should dehne its democratic institutions, and how they should function, and how they 
will function (Nelson, 2000, p. 181) and therefore attempts to do exactly this. It is 
furthermore an attempt to address another key challenge levelled against dclibcrntivc 
democracy, as Scyla Bcnhabib notes, that it is irrelevantly utopian, because it cannot be 
institutionalised (I3cnhabib, 1996, p. 81; sec also IJlakclcy, 2000, p. 2). The chapter 
therefore tries to expand upon and provide greater detail to the already existing 
literature that connects the ideal of deliberative democracy with voluntary associations 
because as James Fcaron suggests a call for widespread democratic deliberation `is 
simply meaningless without specific recommendations about how the broader 
discussion would be institutionally structured and an analysis of how these institutions 
would condition the discussion that resulted (rcaron, 1998, p. 64; sec also Johnson, 
1998, p. 175). The argument is then based upon an initial premise of John Dryzck, that 
the present institutional framework of liberal democracy is inappropriate for the 
effective institutionalisation of deliberative democracy (Dryzck, 2000, p. 3). It is argued 
that associations can aid in the cultivation of autonomy and the institutionalisation of 
deliberative democracy bccausc they provide venues for subsidiarity, provide 
information and rcprcscntation, arc schools for democracy which can provide l roundint; 
for deliberative obligations and act as locations for governance. All these aspects also 
help overcome the threats of complexity, namely siiic, pluralism and inequality. Social 
policy is taken as a specific example to highlight these normative claims. 
Jamcs Johnson argucs that the current work connccting associational dcmocracy and 
dclibcrativcly democratic dccision"making is incomplctc in two main ways. Firstly, it 
lacks detail on the form and operation thcsc associations would take in respect to state 
institutions. Secondly, there needs to be a clearer account of how dclibcmtivc 
procedures will operate in thcsc associations and in 'more formal political institutions' 
(Johnson, 1998, pp. 17S"176). Chapters Four and Fivc will attempt to build upon the 
present literature that links deliberative dcmocracy with associations by providing more 
detail about thcsc two key aspects. 
The fourth chapter rcinforccs claims made in Chapter'th roc, that in order to fulfil its 
potential democratic functions, associations in an associational dcznocr-acy must 
thcrosclvcs be intcn ally dcmocratic. The desirability of this is dcfcndcd against two 
claims, that whcrc costs of exit arc low the internal structure of the association is 
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irrclcvant and that it would underminc the csscntiat libcn l dcmocratic right to uiccdom 
of association. The possibility of it is dcfcndcd against Michcis' famous 'iron law of 
oligarchy' and the empirical restrictions of size, gcographic dispersion and time 
(Miclicls, 1959). 
Michael Saward contends that `further cnlightcnmcnt on the issue of the appropriate 
siting of deliberation awaits the blending of ag rcgativc, statist understandings of 
democracy and the insights of the deliberative 'model' within a larger realist theory of 
democracy that takes inevitable trade-olTs and dilutions of democratic practice fully on 
board' (Saward, 1998, p. 526). Chapter rive tries to provide some enlightenment on 
these issues by reviewing the potential relationship between associations and the state. 
It advocates a dualist strategy for associations and particularly focuses on the public 
sphere and its networks and their potential to foster deliberative communication 
between associations and bctwccn associations and the state. Mediating forums with 
devolved powers where representatives from associations would gather to make 
decisions based on the norms of deliberative democracy. It accepts however, that this is 
dependent upon the state devolving territorial and functional powers to these forums. 
This involves a consideration ofthc relationship between representation and deliberative 
democracy. The chapter also makes some tentative considerations on the potential role 
of the state in moving liberal democracies towards this dualist model. 
Chapter Six defends associational democracy against one of its most famous criticisms, 
Madison's `mischief of factionalism' (Madison, 1966). The chapter suggests that a truly 
democratic conception of the common good must be formed through deliberative 
democracy. 11ow4vver, it further distinguishes betwccn the consensus and agonistic 
models ofdeliberative democracy. I argue in favour of the agnostic model as a common 
good cannot always be presumed, dill'crcncc is an csscntial resource so should not 
always be eliminated and a focus upon the common good can allow dominant social 
groups to disguise their particular arguments. Finally t demonstrate how the 
associational model of deliberative democracy outlined differs comprehensively from 
nco-pluralist intcrcst groups. 
The seventh and final chapter is a further attempt to ground the nonnative claims of the 
thesis with practical reality. A case study of the Stnnagc Forum is used, and 
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cxpcricnccs from empirical rescarch into this case 1uavc infonncd the tihcorctical claim s 
made throughout the thesis. It is argued that the Stanagc Forum is an approximation of 
the dclibcrativcly democratic mediating forums advocated and hence frorn the 
investigation into it some light can be shed on to where the ncccssary tnadc-offs 
between the theory and practice of deliberative democracy need to be made. 
Despite the attempt of the thesis to provide some detail to the discussions on the 
institutionalisation of deliberative democracy in associations, I acknowledge the 
importance of ensuring that a blue-print for institutionalisation is not put forward and 
hope that this has been avoided l lowever, 'the critique of deliberative democracy as 
blueprint does place the onus on defenders of deliberative democracy to demonstrate 
how and to what extent deliberative democracy ... might be successfully 
institutionalised' (Eckcrslcy, 2000, pp. 123-124). 'Mc thesis firstly defends deliberative 
democracy upon the value ofautonomy and then sechs to present one possibility of how 
this institutionalisation might be achieved. 
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CHAPTER ONE: AUTONOMMY: Farr; NORMATIVE COKE OEf DO-1OCKACY 
1,0 introduction 
There are many alternative justifications of democracy, most or which we egalitarian 
justifications. Democracy is therefore justified because it promotes equal dignity, it 
promotes the happiness of all equally and it is essential to ensure and develop humanity 
equally. In this first chapter, however, I will consider the value of autonomy as a 
justification of democracy and present the case that the best justification of democracy 
is that it cultivates autonomy more equally than any other form of government. In 
particular I will argue that it is autonomy that has been the prime theoretical and 
practical aim of liberal democracy, and therefore it is fair to judge liberal democracies 
by how well they enhance their citizens' autonomy. In order to complctcly establish 
autonomy as the normative core of democracy, it would be ncccssary to directly 
compare it with the alternative justifications, and demonstrate that it captures this 
normative core, more accurately than these other justifications. h owtitiwver, this would 
entail a thesis in itself. As the assertion that autonomy is the normative core of 
democracy, is just the first stage in my argument to justify deliberative democracy, and 
consider the possibility of institutionalising it as associational democracy, I will instead 
try to present as convincing a case as possible, for the argument that the cultivation of 
autonomy is the best justification of democracy. 
Democracy is a form of political organisation through which collective decisions arc 
made, and it is the form of decision-making that is my concern fiere, not the cxtcnt or 
scope of decisions (although this is undoubtedly a vital concern to autonomy), bccausc 
this is a connected, but distinct issue to the one i am concerned with; which is that of 
how decisions arc made, and how democratic decisions need to be co-ordinatcd and 
organised in order to cnhancc the autonomy of the participants. To highlight the 
problems and indicate the solutions of how to enhance autonomy in dccision"making, I 
will use a hypothetical example of five friends, Andrea, Bob, Chris, Diane and Emily. 
therefore forming an easily identifiable constituency, and needing to make a decision 
about going out. Although thcrc are, broadly, only two things that need to be decided 
upon i. c. when to go out and where, thcrc are a plurality of possibilities involved in both 
ofthcsc, as well as practical implications such as how to Let therc, cost etc. 'thhc distinct 
yet important factor here, which will make it similar to decisions made in a democratic 
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arrangement is that the dccision will be a coercive and obligatory one, meaning that all 
will have to go out where and when the group decide. ' 
In section 1.1, following the discussion of the connection bct%ven autonomy and 
democracy and autonomy and liberal democracy in section 1.2,1 will consider the 
challenge of Giovanni Sartori that autonomy is not a political value. In section 1.3,1 
will then suggest autonomy is important because it is an intrinsic value. The next step, 
in section 1.4, will be to define autonomy (and all its facets) and consider the 
implications of a political system that aims at achieving equal autonomy for all. My 
conception of autonomy will be a rationalistic one based upon revisions of }: ant's 
theory of autonomy. These will be considered with regard to the essential aspects of 
autonomy, which I wilt argue arc free choice and rationality, this argument will have to 
be defended from communitarian critics who argue that autonomy is impossible because 
people arc not atomistic, but embedded, so that choice and rationality arc impossible. 
After establishing wiiat it is to be autonomous I will address the tensions between 
autonomy and authority that is present in all democracies in section 1.5. This will 
include considering how minorities can ever be autonomous and whether paternalism 
and perfectionism can ever be justified. 
I. I. Autonomy and Dcmocrac 
The concept of autonomy has a long political linage. In ancient times it manifested 
itself in 'autarchy', which is the sovcrcignty of the city-state. In the medieval period it 
was used to distinguish bct«ven the 'sovereignty' of the church and state. i towevcr, it is 
in modern times, at (cast since the emergence or ninctccnth-century imperialism. with 
the emergence of litacral democracy that it has been applied to individuals (Clarke, 
1999, p. 2; Young, 1.986, p. 6; Wall, 1998, p. 131; Lakofr, ' 1996, p. 99). 
Drian Darry, (1991, pp. 29-31), provides a comparable hypo hctical cumple of passcngm in an isolated 
train carriage, having to decide if smoking should be permitted. The key difference with my example is 
that there is only one issue under consideration tctc, with only two altcrnatitcs to choose from i-C. 
smoking or non-smoking. I lowcver, he develops the example to summt that tic passengers might etw 
want to decide whcthcr to pemit the use of transistor radios. 2 Sanford Lakoff (1996) distinguishes bctwccn throe differing conaVions of autorxxny. Communal 
autonomy, which derives from the original use of the word where it applied to the Greek city-state. A 
city was considered autonomous when its citizens made the laws, and they were not nude by an catcxnal 
power. Plural autonomy, the rrquircmcrit for all social groups to have equal political rower and is a 
remnant otRoman Republicanism. However. it is the third sense of individual autonomy that will be or 
central concern here. 
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Autonomy is a vastly contested concept howcvcr. Originally 'autos' meant sctf, and 
`nomos' meant rule (Lakot% 1996, p. 37; Young, 1986, p. 5). In this simple sense 
autonomy means to be self governing', and can be applied to any single unit i. c. 
church, state, city, region, nation, organisation or person. When applied to the 
individual person, the essential idea behind the principle of autonomy is that the 
individual should, at least to a certain extent, be in control of their own life, that they 
should make their own choices and their own decisions in all areas of their life i. e. 
home, work, social life and in society, and all definitions of autonomy need to 
incorporate this (Clarke, 1999, p. 210). Howcvcr, it is not that simple as there arc many 
different ideas on what it means to be self-governing, how we can be seif governing and 
to what extent we can be self governing, as ww, e shall sec. 
A classic example of the modern individualist definition of autonomy is supplied by 
Steven Lukcs, in his discussion on Individualism (1973). It cncompcisscs two important 
levels. The first is that of the individual and self-determination over beliefs and desires, 
the second level involves the individual having control over the norms and laws, which 
control her life: 
'The notion of autonomy, or sclf-dºrcction, according to which an individual's thought tnd action 
is his own, and not determined by agencies or causes outside his control. In particular, an 
individual is autonomous (at the social level) to the degree to which he subjects the pressures and 
norms with which he is confronted to conscious and critical evaluation. and forms intentions and 
reaches practical decisions as the rmlt of independent and rational redo ton' (Cokes 1973, p. 
32)' Ru provides a similar conception (Rar, 1986, p. 369,370 and 408). 
Laws form authority, bccausc law is the authorisation of coercion, it sets the standards 
and conditions for legitimate coercion. I iowever, Jurg, cn I tabcrmas in his modcrn 
classic, I ctwccn Facts and Norms (1995), appccciatcs the fact that `morally motivated 
obcdicncc to the law, cannot be brought about by coercion' (1labcxmas, 1996a, p. 29). 
For law to be obeyed due to moral responsibility and not coercion, it seems that it must 
be vicwcd as legitimate by those it is to coerce, and according to David Held in 
Mtnnmmy and the )Irrhai 4rdct. (1995), autonomy and legitimacy have a necessary 
connection: `The principle of autonomy seeks to articulate the basis on which public 
power can be justified; it should be thought of as a principle of political legitimacy' 
(held, 1995, p. 153). In this scnsc political power is legitimate to the cxtcnt that it 
3 lt is important to note luge the importance Lutes places on rational and critical reflection on values. laws and norms in terms of the agent being autonomous. This connection will be c%plored in nxuc detail later in the chapter. 
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dcrivcs from the collcctivc autonomous choices of citizcns, or cnlanccs citircn 
autonomy. 
Ilcld's 'principlc of autonomy' incorporates the pcrson's having control over their 
controlling conditions and the idea Out cvcryonc's autonomy is cqually important: 
'Persons should enjoy equal rights and accordingly equal obligations in the specification of the 
political framework which generates and limits the opportunities available to them, that is, they 
should be free and equal in the determination of the conditions of their uwn lh cs, so long as they 
do not deploy this framework to negate the rights of others' (tick!, 1995. p. 147; Sec also 
Dodson, 1997. p. 100). 
There arc three main themes within this principle. Firstly we scc that people should 
participate in the process to determine the laws, which demarcate the structure of power 
and the limits of behaviour. The second idea is that the collective power of the people 
should be limited to guarantee the freedom and autonomy of all. The third idea is that 
autonomy and democracy arc compatible, hand only if the autonomy of each is vice-. 'Cd 
equally (Warren, 2001, p. 62). 
John Dunn believes that `the rower and appeal of democracy conics from the idea of 
autonomy, of choosing freely for oneself (Dunn in Lakoff, 1996, p. 33). Democracy is 
the only political arrangement that gains its power and legitimacy from the rule of the 
people. Central to the very idea of democracy then is the principle that mcmbcrs of an 
association should be able to determine the conditions of that association, through free 
choices: 
'If democracy means 'rule by the people', the determination of public decision-making by 
equally free members of the political community, then the basis of its justification tics in the 
promotion and enhancement of autonomy, both for individuals as citizens and for the 
collectivity' (Held. 1995, pp. 145-46). 
If this is the case then autonomy is the fundamental democratic idea because thcy 
implicitly aim for the samc thing, the promotion or sclf-dctcrmination (Warrai, 2001. 
pp. 60-69; Dahl, 1989, Chaptcr 7; LakofT, 1996, p. 64; Graham, 1986, p. 3; 1 labcrmas, 
1996a). It sccros that democracy preserves autonomy by ensuring all have an equal 
opportunity to participate in the decision-making process, and thcrcforc cqual power to 
determine the laws of society. We sec thcsc aspects in David t3cctham's definition of 
democracy in `Liberal Democracy and the Limits of Democratisation' (1993): 
'Democracy is a model or decision-making about collectively binding tulci and politics ems' 
which people exercise control. and the trist democratic utangcment to tic that what all 
members or the collectivity cnjar cffcctivc equal rights to take part in such decision-making 
dircaly' (Dedham, 1993, p. 40). 
If we consider other forms of political organisation then it is apparent that no other aims 
at, nor can achieve, the 'equal' tight to take part in decision-making directly. 
Autocracies by their very nature only have person making the decisions, and certainly 
do not allow all to participate in making laws. Totalitarian regimes destroy the 
opportunities for autonomous action even further as not only do they not allow Pcopic to 
participate in making decisions, but they have no restriction or state rower whereby an 
individual might be free from the state to make private decisions. Referring to our 
example, these systems would be the equivalent of Andrea appointing herself to make 
the decisions of where and when to go out and then imposing this decision upon the 
others through the threat or use of force/ sanctions. In this situation only Andrea is in 
any sense self-determining. In contrast a dcmocrntic arrangement would be where oll 
five participate in some way in making the decision, the most democratic being where 
they each exercised equal control, hence all of them arc as self-determining as the 
others. Hence Nobcrto Bobbio argues that it is the preservation of autonomy that is the 
primary justification of democracy. - 
'Democratic forms of government are those in which the laws arc made by the same people to 
whom they apply (and for that reason they are autonomous norms), v%hilc in sutocntic forms of 
government the law. =kcrs are different from those to whom the laves arc addressed (and are 
therefore heteronomous norms)' (13obbio in Post, 1993, p. 659). 
If people are not autonomous when ruled by others, then they must rule themselves 
collectively and so become 'both law givers and law. obcycrs', then they can combine 
'the benefits of government with the blessings of freedom' (Wolff. 1976, p. 21). It 
seems then that democracy, as a social order where people have the sower, is the only 
mechanism to reconcile autonomy with authority. however. as Hobert Post appreciates 
in 'Managing Deliberation' (1993). 'what it means for lass to be "made" by the "same 
people to whom they apply" is not easy to understand' (Post, 1993, p. 659). This 
chapter will consider what this does involve, but following I ectham's definition of 
democracy. we can make some preliminary assertions. 
4 Wacnn (2001. p. 60) provides a similar definition. 
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For dcmocracy to achicvc its aim or cultivating autonomy, citizcn participation is sccn 
as an csscntial and hence representative bovcrnnlcnt is a movC away from the principle 
of self-government: 
'Participation in this Icgislativc activity is an ccscntial clcmcnt imvlvcd with mcmtx: nhip in the 
tcalm of ends, as it is a rc quircmcnt of moral autonomy, In the abscncc of ouch participation, om 
is tcduccd to a state of hctcronomy, subject to laws that are not of one's own making' (1)odwn 
1997 p. 98; Sec also Lakol' 1996 p. 327; Kclscn, 1949. p. 285). 
Such consideration led Jcan-Jacqucs Rousseau in the classic Spcial -Contmct 
(1968, 
first published in 1762) to make many now famous assertions on the necessity or 
participatory democracy including: 'A people since it is subjcct to laws, ought to be the 
author of them. '; 'Legislative power belongs and can only belong to the people. '; 
'Sovereignty cannot be represented' (Rousseau, 1968, p. 83,101 & 141). Participation 
is defined in general terms by Geraint Parry, G Moyscr and N Day in Politickil 
Patticipation__and Democracy in i3ritain (1992). as, 'taking part in the process or 
formulation, passage and implementation of public policies' (Parry, Moyscr and Day, 
1992, p. 16). However, in modem complex societies it is assumed that representative 
government is essential (Lak off, 1996, p. 176). 1 agree that some 1cvcl of representation 
is necessary, which raises a problem for the preservation ofautonomy: 
'T 'he requirements for participation and for authority in political lire air to stand in 
contradiction with each other. Participation requires the full exercise of the agency of each of the 
participants in making decisions, whereas authority seems to connote that some individuals have 
the right to exercise power over others and to nuke decisions far them, to these others are bound' 
(Gould, 1988, p. 215). 
There is thcn always a tcnsion bct%kccn the agcncy of the represented and the autlK)tity 
of the rcprcscntativcs, and how this authority can be made compatible with Cqual 
autonomy. llowevcr, Andrew Dobson, in 'Rcprescntativc Democracy and the 
Environment' (1996), argues that direct participation and rcprcscntation still share the 
same commitment in principle to autonomous decision-making. It is more'nuanccd' in 
rcprcscntativc dcmocracy, but citizcns can still autonomously select thcir representative 
(Dobson, 1996, p. 127). $ 
It sccros cvidcnt that having, and using, an opportunity to patticipatc will cnsurc that I 
am mors; autonomous than if I did not have this opportunity, providing my participation 
This is only the case to a certain extent, for example thctc might be a tack of chaicc of tcpscacntativc% from which to choose, The connection bctwecn representation and autonomy will be explored in greater detail in Chapter Five. 
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affects at least one decision. Furthennore, I have autonomy over my participation 
providing I get to choose the nature of the participation and the ends I hone to achieve. 
However, it is not evident that the act of participation is a protection of my autonomy, 
because it still does not ensure that the decision will reflect my decision in any %%Iy, 
particularly as the results of the decisions may actually turn out to restrict my autonomy 
by reducing my legal scope of action. This problem will be taken up again in section 
1.5.3. Next though I shall consider a criticism ofthc above argument which claims that 
autonomy is not a political value and so cannot be the justification ofdcmocracy. 
I. I. I. Is Autonomy a Political Value? 
In The Theory of Democracy Revisited (1987), Giovani Sartori is sceptical that 
autonomy is a political value, and therefore is critical of any political justification based 
on it. Sartori's conception of'frccdom to' has three interpretations: I may, as in 'one 
has consented to'; I can as in 'I have the capability'; and I have the power to', which as 
Sartori correctly notes, includes having the necessary conditions and resources (Sartori, 
1987, p. 300). According to Sartori's analysis 'I may' corresponds to the 'external 
sphere' and 'I can' to the 'internal sphere of freedom': 'When we arc interested in the 
externalisation of liberty, that is in free action, freedom takes the form of permission. 
When on the other hand the problem is not of external freedom, thcn tiwc arc concerned 
with freedom as ability' (Sartori, 1987, p. 301). IIc associates 'I may' with Berlin's 
sense of negative liberty, claiming it is 'independence' or 'protection'. 'I can' is 
associated with autonomy as it is referred to as "self realisation" or 'will'. Armed with 
this distinction, and borrowing from Bobbio the idea that freedom in the negative sense 
denotes the area of action, whereas autonomy has to do with will, Sartori argues that 
autonomy is not a political concept, as political freedom is associatcd with action not 
will. Therefore autonomy is not a good concept to base a political system around, but 
alternatively negative liberty is. Consequently he dcfincs political freedom as 'freedom 
from not freedom to i. c. negative, dcfcnsivc or protective frccdom... ', this is not 
freedom from all restrictions but, 'protection against arbitrary and limitless (absolute) 
powwer' (Sartori, 1987, pp. 301.302). Sartori tries to demonstrate this to us further by 
looking at the opposites of liberty and autonomy. The contrary of liberty is claimed to 
be coercion. The contrary to autonomy is said to be lictcronomy ("passivity. 
characterlcssness'), which also deals with the 'inner-dircctcd responsible seit'. 
Essentially this means that, 'liberty from and freedom as autonomy cannot be 
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substituted for each other nor is autonomy positive liberty because it is not a political 
freedom at all' (Sartori, 1987, p. 320). 
There are many faults with Sartori's argument, the most vital being his definition of 
autonomy as simply internal will6 Autonomy is a complicated concept, as the 
discussion so far should have indicated, and although it is certainly connected with 
internal will, it involves much more beside. Heteronomy is the contrary of autonomy, 
but heteronomy means being ruled by or subject to an external law. Autonomy means 
being ruled by laws that have come from one-self. This involves forming an 
independent will away from manipulation, but also the opportunity to have one's will 
put into action. Autonomy then is certainly a political concept and does deal with 
action. Providing conditions for people to be autonomous is promoting a value, but this 
is inevitable. Those who do not value autonomy cannot be forced to do so, because we 
value autonomy; however, we must provide them with the opportunities to be 
autonomous whether they use them or not. It is no contradiction though to say people 
need opportunities to be autonomous in order to choose what style of heteronomous life 
they want. Being autonomous is to be self-governing and is therefore a political value 
that can be used to justify democracy, but we need to establish what is involved in this. 
The next stage of my argument is to establish a particularly strong link between liberal 
democracy and autonomy. 
1.2. Liberal Democracy and Autonomy 
The concept of autonomy is central to liberal thought and to its conceptions of 
democracy, freedom, and the individual self.? William Galston has argued in `Two 
Concepts of Liberalism' (1995) that there are principally two dominant strands of 
liberal thought. One aims at the promotion of individual autonomy, the other is 
tolerance of diversity. Robert Young in Personal Autonomy (1986) takes a stronger line 
and argues that any adequate defence of liberal democracy requires a conception of 
autonomy (Young, 1986, p. 3). Despite thinking that autonomy is impossible because it 
6 It will be demonstrated in section 1.4. that Sartori has made a conceptually false use of the distinction between negative and positive liberty. 
Despite the arguments made here, many thinkers dispute this claim. For example, C. ß Macpherson 
argues that the aim of liberal democracy is the same as the communist and third world forms of 
democracy which is the provision of the `conditions for the full and free development and the essential 
human capacities of all the members of the society' (Macpherson, 1966, pp. 36-37). This argument could 
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presupposes people have a will of their own, which is impossible, x Erich Fromm, in The 
Sane Society (1955) does argue that liberal democracy is based upon the idea of 
autonomous individuals (Fromm, 1955, p. 185). Robyn Eckersicy in Greening Liberal 
Democracy (1996) likewise proposes that liberal democracy is based upon the, 
`fundamental respect for the inherent dignity and autonomy of each and every 
individual' (Eckersley, 1996, p. 222). I suggest that the connection between autonomy 
and liberal democracy can be demonstrated by a review of some key thinkers in the 
liberal tradition and by observing actions in civil society that have fought for 
institutional change in liberal societies. 
Liberal democracy has always aimed to create the appropriate circumstances for 
individuals to select their own actions and goals. As Lukes asserts, `Autonomy is a 
value that has always been central to liberalism' (Lukes, 1973, p. 56). This aim has 
orientated itself through two processes, choosing between political alternatives, and the 
limitation of scope and degree of political power. We can see this in the theories of 
John Locke in his classical statement Two Treatises of Government (1988, first 
published 1690). 9 He proposed that individuals could and should determine and justify 
their own actions, and enter into self-determined relations. He also advocated the 
necessity of autonomous spheres of action, which include religious, social, political and 
economic affairs, to ensure individual autonomy and freedom. In all these spheres, 
people must be free from arbitrary power in order to choose and form opinions, and 
regulate and co-ordinate their own actions. For Locke the source of political obligation 
lies in individual consent, express or tacit. Political authority therefore is to be 
distinguished from paternalism, by being derived from the people. This is to be 
achieved through the rule of law, to prevent the arbitrary use of power (Locke, 1988). 
Another classic thinker from the liberal tradition, J. S. Mill also thought it essential to 
base legitimate state authority upon a concept of individual autonomy. He was reluctant 
be countered by arguing that it is autonomy that is the essential human capacity, but this is not 
Macpherson's argument. 
This argument will be considered later in its communitarian variant. 
Whether Locke is considered a liberal theorist or not is dependent upon one's view as to when 
liberalism first emerged as an ideology. The two most popular theories on this are that liberalism 
emerged as an ideology following the French Revolution of 178 or alternatively that this process began in 
17' century England. In this latter thesis Locke would be considered one of the first primary liberal 
thinkers. In the former theory Locke pre-dates the emergence of the liberal ideology, but would still be 
considered a significant precursor to the liberal ideology. See Macpherson (1962). 
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to use the term autonomy in his most famous work On Liberty (1993, first published in 
1859), but his work is still closely associated with the concept to the extent that Young 
refers to this essay as, `one of the most powerful defences of the value of individual 
autonomy' (Young, 1986, p. 44). Mill argued that individuals should be `sovereign' 
and free from state interference when choosing and pursuing their own ends, providing 
they did not harm others and limit their autonomy. The individual can legitimately limit 
the sovereignty of the state providing it goes against their own will e. g. conscientious 
objectors. In turn the state must have good reason to interfere with individuals, and for 
Mill interference could only be permitted to prevent the individual limiting another's 
autonomy. Despite accepting that it is `common-place' to assume Mill thought it the 
role of the state to promote autonomy, Brian Barry in Culture and Equality (2001) uses 
Mill's arguments against state intervention to argue that `it is clearly a travesty of Mill's 
position to identify him with any such view of the role of the state' (Barry, 2001, p. 
120). This is not to say that liberalism cannot be justified by reference to the value of 
autonomy, but that it is not the role of the state to ensure it. He further suggests that 
liberal values and institutions can be defended upon other concepts other than autonomy 
and his favoured conception is equal freedom (Barry, 2001, pp. 121-122). Despite his 
disagreement with it Barry does accept that `autonomy-promoting liberalism' is a `bona 
fide form of liberalism' (Barry, 2001, p. 123). 
A commitment to autonomy is also evident in more modem liberal thinkers such as 
Joseph Raz in The Morality of Freedom (1986). He argues that state authority is morally 
justified if it is based on the autonomous consent of individuals. Therefore the state has 
a moral duty to create the necessary conditions for autonomy (Ra z, 1986, p. 425). This 
is because the cultivation of autonomy will not arrive `naturally', as the goals available 
for individuals to pursue are dependent upon social forms i. e. `on forms of behaviour 
which are in fact widely practised in his society' and institutions within society (Raz, 
1986, p. 308). In modem Western liberal societies the social forms i. e. the social, 
economic and political institutions require individuals to be autonomous. For those who 
have been socialised and raised in Western liberal democracies, the value of autonomy 
is undeniable, they can abandon the value only by incurring social and personal costs as 
Joseph Raz explains: `Since we live in a society whose social forms are to a 
considerable extent based on individual choice, and since our options are limited by 
what is available in our society, we can prosper only if we can be successfully 
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autonomous' (Raz, 1986, p. 394). Bhikhu Parekh in his discussion of Raz in Rethinking 
Multiculturalism (2000) rightly recognises that even in Western societies not all people 
do value autonomy, but this is not Raz's point, he only claims that the social forms of 
Western liberal democracies require it. A more poignant point made by Parekh is that 
just because people in Western societies do value autonomy does not mean that they 
should continue to do so, if it is possible for them to reject it (Parekh, 2000, p. 92-93). 1° 
Steven Wall in Liberalism. Perfectionism and Restraint (1999) provides some detail to 
Raz's claims about modern Western societies. He outlines six features of Western 
societies that distinguish it from others and make autonomy an essential value in these 
societies: 
Geographic, familial and social mobility, Technological and economic innovation: The 
greater mobility in Western societies means that citizens in such societies need to be 
able to form and revise their aims and make regular decisions about how their nature 
and talents can be best employed and to adjust to the continuous economic and 
technological changes. 
Pluralism and secularisation: Due to pluralism and secularisation Western citizens 
cannot rely upon authoritatively enforced religions to act as guides for action. The 
pluralism of worldviews and religions encourages citizens to form ideas and beliefs of 
their own to follow and to choose between these competing views and religions. " 
Human Rights: The commitment to human rights in Western societies is based upon the 
idea of the individual and provides protections for the individual to be self-governing in 
many areas of life (Wall, 1998, pp. 166-169). 
Parekh rejects the argument that autonomy is a functional requirement for Western 
societies, arguing that there are many Asian immigrants in Britain that do not value 
autonomy, but have achieved significant material success precisely because they do not 
value autonomy. Instead they, `draw on the ample resources of a flourishing and tightly 
knit community with its readily available network of social support' (Parekh, 2000, 
p. 93). I think Parekh's argument is mistaken as he has conflated autonomy with 
independence, which will be argued later is not what autonomy is. Consequently, there 
to We must then provide other reasons as to why they should continue to value autonomy and why it is 
better than a heteronomous life, something which will be undertaken in section 1.3. 11 See also Berger, (1991) pp. 138-139. 
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is nothing necessarily inconsistent with drawing upon a network of social support and 
being autonomous. Moreover, Asian cultures in modern Western societies may have 
benefited from the presence of many of the social forms e. g. social mobility, pluralism, 
secularisation and human rights that not only encourage autonomy, but provide 
supporting conditions as well (Wall, 1998, p. 171). 
In Political Liberalism (1993), John Rawls labels autonomy a `political not a 
metaphysical' concept, distinguishing it from the more `comprehensive' ideal of 
autonomy formulated by Mill and Kant (Rawls, 1993, p. 10). For a concept to be 
political in Rawls's theory its justifications must be drawn from `intuitive ideas' that are 
embedded in society in an `overlapping consensus' that can involve a range of ideas 
from alternative philosophical, moral and religious doctrines. If a concept is derived 
from this consensus then it is a principle latent in political culture. If a concept is 
`implicit' it tends to derive from the `background culture of civil society' (Rawls, 1993, 
p. 14) and is found in the culture of everyday life of that society. Autonomy is then 
limited to the political sphere. Rawls' commitment to autonomy is clearly demonstrated 
when he asserts: 
`Citizens' rational autonomy is modelled in the original position by the way the parties deliberate 
as their representatives. By contrasts citizens' full autonomy is modelled by the structural aspects 
of the original position, that is by how the parties are situated with respect to one another and by 
the limits of information to which their deliberations are subject' (Rawls, 1993, p. 77). 
Held takes this idea of Rawls's to argue that autonomy is such a concept, and is 
embedded in the public political culture of Western liberal democratic societies. It is 
important to note that "`embedded" connotes in this context that the principle has 
developed as part of, and has been constructed upon, the conceptual and institutional 
resources of Western democratic culture in a manner that could, in principle, be 
understood and fully acknowledged by all citizens' (Held, 1995, p. 148-149). To 
provide evidence of this, Held highlights the way in which it has been the pursuit for 
equal autonomy in society that has been the motor of which has `reconstituted the shape 
of modem Western politics', (although he does not mention in which era this has 
occurred). This has been activated most prominently through social movements e. g. 
women, race, social class movements. These movements have won rights in liberal 
democracies; such as freedom of speech, expression, belief and association; freedom for 
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women in and beyond marriage, free and equal voting in elections and universal 
suffrage. These rights aid in the cultivation of autonomy for citizens in modern 
democracies by limiting the power of the state and providing citizens with equal powers 
of participation in the decision-making process (Held, 1995, pp. 149-150). Elsewhere 
in `Citizenship and Autonomy' (1989), Held argues that 'the slow but progressive 
achievement of civil rights was a prerequisite to the secure establishment of the liberty 
of the subject' (Held, 1989, pp. 191-192). In his analysis of Tu Marshall, Held 
eulogises about how the organised working classes achieved welfare and social gains as 
rights. For Held this `search for citizenship became the search for the conditions under 
which individuals could enjoy a sense of equal worth and equal opportunity' (Held, 
1989, p. 192). By gaining these rights the labour movement gained more control of 
their life and their autonomy began to be recognised as of equal worth and worthy of 
equal respect as the capitalists: `Accordingly, the study of rights can be thought of as 
the study of the domains in which citizens have sought to pursue their own activities 
within the constraints of community. ' The early battles to establish citizenship centred 
around achieving autonomy, `from the locale in which one was born' and within the 
workplace. Later it was seen as essential to have rights of freedom of speech, 
expression, belief and association to achieve autonomy. Women themselves realised 
that to achieve their autonomy specific rights both in the home and workplace were 
required (Held, 1989, p. 201). According to Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato in Civil 
Society and Political Theory (1992), it was the desire to achieve equal autonomy that 
encouraged the feminist movement to enter the `cultural space' created by the New Left 
in 1968 and the abortion issue was seen to perfectly characterise the demands for 
autonomy as self-determination (Cohen and Arato, 1992, pp. 554-555). 
Will Kymlicka, in both Liberalism. Community and Culture (1989) and Multicultural 
Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (1995) argues that all human beings 
wish to be autonomous because it is essential to the good life. Kymlicka's conception 
of autonomy is grounding for liberal democracy because he argues that civil and 
personal rights, freedom of conscience, association, speech and constitutional 
government are necessary to ensure autonomy. For Kymlicka, the cultivation of 
autonomy is then the central liberal value (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 85). 
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From the discussion of liberal democracy, I have tried to demonstrate that autonomy has 
been a central concept to liberal thinkers throughout its history by discussing the ideas 
of Locke, Mill, Raz, Rawls and Kymlicka, and furthermore, that many of the social 
forms require autonomous citizens. However, there appears to be a presumption in 
liberal theory that all human beings have autonomy, certainly in relation to ethics, as 
people are seen to be responsible for their own moral choices and law as people are 
punished for failing to obey it and even success, as it is believed people deserve either 
their rewards or plight. However, this is a grand assumption. We have already 
established that autonomy requires certain conditions and how certain groups have had 
to fight for these conditions to achieve more autonomy. Furthermore, if you can have 
more or less autonomy it is not enough to presume autonomy for all, as it needs to be 
established the extent of people's autonomy, how equal autonomy is and if and how the 
autonomy could be increased for all. However, if we cannot presume autonomy, then 
this cannot be the foundation of liberal democratic government, but must be created by 
it. Paul Clarke in his enlightening study Autonomy Unbound (1999), claims such a 
conclusion `is radical not to say revolutionary for it implies that this base or laissez faire 
liberalism is both incoherent and fails to meet its own goals. It can be done only by 
political action. Liberal governments are therefore, bound to intervene to produce their 
own conditions. Liberalism is not a self-contained text but must step outside itself and 
outside its own justifications in order to produce the conditions within which it can 
justify itself (Clarke, 1999, p. 33). We can therefore judge liberal democracy and its 
institutional arrangements on its ability to guarantee autonomy for their citizens. Just 
because the cultivation of autonomy has been the principal concept behind the practice 
and theory of liberal democracy, does not mean that present liberal democracies meet 
the standard of ensuring that citizens are, `free and equal in the determination of the 
conditions of their lives' (Held, 1987, p. 271; Doyle, 1990, p. 81). Firstly, we need to 
establish in more detail why autonomy is desirable. 
1.3. The Value of Autonomy 
According to Roland Pennock in The justification ofDemocracy (1989), people want to 
be autonomous because autonomy is an intrinsic good: `An individual capable of 
autonomous behaviour and aware of that fact, possesses something of great intrinsic 
value. It is good in and of itself' Pennock, *1989, p. 21; See also Hurka, 1987). This is 
to say that we value our own choices, decisions and will. We also value the opportunity 
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to act'upon them pursuing our own goals and forming our own relations. People want 
to be acknowledged as the kind of people who are capable of being self-determining. In 
this sense, `the autonomous person gives meaning to his life' (Dworkin, 1988, p. 31). 
As Wall discusses, autonomy can be conceived as being intrinsic in two main ways. It 
can either be valuable `in itself or valued `for its own sake'. This is based upon a 
distinction made by Chrsitine Korsgaard in The Sources of Normativity (1996). In the 
former meaning autonomy would derive its value from itself and itself alone, and 
therefore is to do with the source of value. In the latter conception autonomy is valuable 
for its own sake and `in virtue of its intrinsic properties' and not valuable because it 
leads to other valuable consequences, and so deals with the way in which it is valued 
(Korsgaard, 1996, p. 111). 12 I agree with Wall and Lindley that autonomy is an intrinsic 
good more in line with this latter conception. In this sense autonomy is not valuable as 
an end, but rather a condition we value (Wall, 1998, p. 145). If autonomy was to be an 
intrinsic value `in itself, we would have to conclude following Moore that autonomy 
would be valuable even in complete isolation (Moore in Lindley, 1986, pp. 27-28). 
13 If 
we accepted this latter argument it would mean that autonomy would be valued without 
an agent to value it, and this seems an untenable idea. M. Beardsley, in `Intrinsic 
Value' (1965, p. 11), thinks this problem can be avoided by appealing to a hypothetical 
and ideal observer, however, even in this conception there is an agent, all be it a 
hypothetical agent, to value autonomy. 
The distinction between the two ways something can have intrinsic value is important in 
order to distinguish the position held here, from the libertarian perspective where 
autonomy is valued `for its own sake' and therefore can be experienced in isolation. The 
libertarian position must be rejected because autonomy requires structures, as an agent 
needs to be autonomous in relation to something. By this Clarke means that autonomy 
is a social value, it must be exercised in a social setting. In this sense a pre-social 
12 In The Republic 1, Plato thought that a just soul was intrinsically valuable, for its own sake. 
13 There is a further issue as to whether it is necessary to experience autonomy in order to value it, or if it 
would be valued if it were to be experienced. This is essentially a debate between objectivism and 
subjectivism, which I do not think is necessary for me to resolve. However, for a discussion of these 
positions see Lindley (1986, p. 28-29). For an account of the subjectivist proposal see Von Wright. 
(1963). For a defence of the objectivist position see Brandt (1959). 
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individual could not be autonomous; autonomy then requires society if it is to be 
achieved and valued (Clarke 1999 p43). 14 
Gerald Dworkin, in The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (1988) realises that as well 
as intrinsic value, autonomy could also have instrumental value. When one is 
autonomous and chooses which values and goals to pursue and how to pursue them, it is 
more likely that such a life will be satisfying and bring about contentment than if others 
(even benevolent others) make these choices and decisions for them. Consequently 
people tend to resist and dislike external control, whether it is benign or not (Dworkin, 
1988, p. 111). 15 Mill, who perceived autonomy as necessary for happiness and Raz who 
suggests that, `a person's well-being depends to a large extent on success in socially 
defined and determined pursuits and activities', shares such a view (Raz, 1986, p. 309). 
Although such instrumental claims about autonomy are most certainly true in most 
normal circumstances, what of circumstances where people are manipulated to be 
happy, and so are happy despite being heteronomous, such as in Aldous Huxley's Brave 
New World (1994)? 16 Robert Nozick, in Anarchy. State and Utopia (1974, pp. 42-45), 
makes a similar point with reference to `an experience machine', which would create a 
virtual reality and provide people with any experience that they wanted. Therefore I 
think it is important to establish autonomy as an intrinsic value. Intrinsic values focus 
upon `agent evaluation' and instrumental values upon `act evaluation' (Lindley, 1986, 
p. 21). 
In order to establish `autonomy' as an intrinsic good, Thomas Hurka realises in `Why 
Value Autonomy' (1987), that it cannot be due to instrumental reasons. Although he 
does not deny that there is a connection in most cases, in some cases autonomy would 
not be required to achieve contentment because we can envisage circumstances when an 
agent may only have one choice, but it is the option she would select given ten good 
options. He concludes therefore that to prove autonomy as an intrinsic good it is 
14 This argument will be explored further in section 1.4.3, where the communitarian critique of autonomy 
as a justification of democracy is considered. 
15 Here again we see how it is autonomy that gives value to democracy, by enabling people to participate 
in setting their own laws and have control over their life people avoid external control. 16 Christman (1988, p. 120) points out that a sophisticated utilitarian might argue that happiness is 
satisfaction of autonomously formed goals, which exempts them from such Brave New World criticisms, 
of a manipulated feeling of happiness. Such an approach is employed by J. S. Mill (1993). 
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necessary to show that the latter circumstance is better than the former. For Hurka the 
answer is efficacy and agency: 
`The ideal of agency is one of causal efficacy, of making a causal impact on the world and 
determining facts about it. And the autonomous agent, just in virtue of her autonomy, more fully 
realises this ideal. When she chooses among options she has two effects: realising some options 
and blocking others, and this gives her a larger efficacy than someone whose only effect is the 
first' (Hurka, 1987, p. 366). 
Robert Young pursues such a line of thought and concludes the value of autonomy must 
be intrinsic and is due to the relation between human agency and self-esteem: 
`Autonomy... is the means to our working out our projects in the world. In exercising 
it, in being self-directing we make our lives... our own, and this is conducive to self- 
esteem' (Young, 1986, p. 43; see also Lindley, 1986, p. 25, who invokes a very similar 
argument). By `conducive' we must assume that Young means being autonomous is 
part (of the value of) having self-esteem. Hence autonomy is constitutive of self-esteem 
otherwise it is not an intrinsic value, but instrumental. This is certainly the case that 
Hurka presents. 
Just because autonomy is an intrinsic good does not mean that it is all that is required 
for `a good life' (Wall, 1988 p. 130). It is apparent that there are (other) things of value 
other than autonomy. Bruce Ackerman suggests that it is, `not necessary for autonomy 
to be the only good thing; it suffices for it to be the best thing there is' (Ackerman in 
Sher, 1997, p. 58). George Sher, in his enlightening Beyond Neutrality (1997), proposes 
that there is an internal connection between autonomy and other values, which elevates 
autonomy as the most important value, although lie neither attempts to endorse or 
criticise this perspective. It is essentially an existentialist argument and suggests that 
other values can only be realised if they are autonomously chosen: 
`On this account, the values of family ties, culture, community, and the rest will not be 
competitors to autonomy, but rather will presuppose it; for lives involving close family tics, 
culture, and community will be valuable only when (or only to the extent that) they are adopted 
for the reasons provided by their value' (Sher, 1997, p. 58; See also Sartre, 1948, p. 32; 
Haworth, 1986, p. 208; Hurka, 1987, p. 378). 17 
Agents then make choices based upon a potential value, but that potentiality is only 
realised if then autonomously chosen. It is agency that makes autonomy an intrinsic 
value. Geoffrey Brennan and Lauren Lomasky in Democracy and Decisions (1993), 
make this suggestion with the example that someone may consider arranged marriages 
17 Joshua Cohen (1998, pp. 215-217) locates a similar theory in Dworkin, (1989) and Locke, (1955) p. 34. 
24 
to be more successfully in the long-term, but still prefer that people choose their own 
mates due to a desire to be self-governing (Brennan and Lomasky, 1993, p. 168). 
Whether or not autonomy is an important value in societies that do not value it is 
another matter and raises a question as to the universability of the arguments here. 
However, as already argued, autonomy is certainly valued in Western democratic 
societies. 
Now because autonomy is an intrinsic value I think we need to maximise it in the sense 
of maximising the number of autonomous people and maximising the cultivation of 
autonomy in each individual compatible with equal autonomy for all. There will offen 
be conflicts between these two maximising principles and where there is it should be the 
autonomy of the most people that should be maximised, rather than the autonomy of 
certain individuals that should be maximised. Wall criticises this argument claiming that 
not all people will want to maximise the development of their autonomy because 
autonomy is not the only thing with value (Wall, 1998, pp. 184-185). 1 have accepted 
that there are other important values, but the mistake that Wall has made is to assume 
that autonomy is incompatible with these other values when this is not the case. 
Following Sher's argument I have argued quite the opposite that the potential value of 
other things can only be realised if autonomously chosen. The maximisation of 
autonomy will then potentially achieve a greater realisation of other values. We must 
now turn to a discussion on what is required to be autonomous. 
1.4. The Requirements of Autonomy 
Due to its link with agency outlined in the section above, autonomy requires an 
identifiable agent. Therefore agency is always linked with autonomy whether that 
individual is a person, state, group or organisation, but it is mainly the autonomy of the 
individual person that I will concentrate upon here (Clarke, 1999, p. 210). Once there is 
an agent to be autonomous I argue that two further conditions must be met for that agent 
to achieve autonomy: 
1.4.1. Free choice 
1.4.2. Rationality 
These will be considered in turn. 
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1.4.1 Free choice 
An essential condition necessary for autonomy is to be able to make free choices. 
Immanuel Kant argued that if people are responsible for their actions (which I believe it 
is assumed by most people they are) then they are metaphysically free, which in turn 
implies that they are capable of choosing between courses of actions' 19. Robert Wolffs 
`In Defence of Anarchism' (1976), much influenced by Kant, does not see autonomy 
just as a valuable principle but believes it is an obligation as well: `Every man who 
possesses both free will and reason has an obligation to take responsibility for his 
actions. ' This responsibility derives from `his ability for choice' and as a result, `he 
cannot give it up or put it aside. He can refuse to acknowledge it, however, either 
deliberately or by simply failing to recognise his moral condition' (Wolff, 1976, p. 13 
and p. 14; Lindsay, 1929, p. 11 makes a similar argument). This again is an existentialist 
point; the idea that people are responsible for themselves assumes that existence comes 
before essence, which is the central principle of existentialism. It also assumes that 
people are capable of choice, which is why people are responsible (Sartre, 1948, pp. 26- 
29). Lucas states that to be autonomous is to take responsibility for one's own actions: 
`I, and I alone am ultimately responsible for the decisions I make, and am in that sense 
autonomous' (Lucas in Dworkin, 1988, p. 6). The key point is that without choice 
people are not responsible for their actions and therefore not autonomous. This is based 
upon the premise that people are thought responsible for their actions if they caused 
them. However, if it is thought that the person had little or no choice in the matter i. e. if 
it was unavoidable then this is thought of as a good reason for not blaming the person. 
Such excuses are often used in court. But the question does arise whether there is such 
a thing as a free and open choice, people are always constrained when choices are being 
made, often an agents' choice is constrained by previous choices they have made or 
choices that others have made. In such cases the person is in a structure that constrains 
their choices. Again such excuses are also made as defence for actions in court i. e. 
mitigating circumstances. But if this is the case then it raises a serious query over 
whether anyone can ever make an autonomous choice. Surely all agents' choices arc 
18 Political autonomy, which is our concern here, is distinct although related to the concept of moral 
autonomy. Moral autonomy was important for Kant, who believed people should form their own moral 
principles to pursue, but Kant believed these should be rationally constructed and universalisable. 
Political autonomy is simply the capacity to determine their own lives, and so is only a part of the 
doctrine of moral autonomy. 
19 Clarke traces this notion of people taking responsibility for their own actions back to St. Paul and his 
concept of conscientia (Clarke, 1999, p. 84). 
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constrained by their previous choices and by others. What we need then is a theory of 
what is required for a choice to be an autonomous one. When choices are constrained 
through such factors as background and environment etc it is acknowledged that the 
agent's autonomy is restricted, but only partially. What it really does is indicate, is why 
a person made the decision they did. It demonstrates for what reasons they did the 
action, and therefore brings meaning. Therefore, constraints on choices do not show 
that autonomy is not possible, but rather helps interpret the context in which free will 
was exercised. It helps us to see to what extent the action or decision was an 
autonomous one. 
As Raz suggests an autonomous choice requires two factors; firstly, the agent must have 
the mental capacities to be able to exercise a choice and secondly, the external structural 
requirements to be able to make a choice. Such structural requirements include the 
range of choice and the extent of possibilities to choose from. Clarke claims liberals 
like Raz put too much emphasis on the formal requirements of autonomy. These are the 
empirical circumstances necessary for people to make autonomous choices. The 
empirical conditions are right if the agent is free from external constraints and has a 
`variety of acceptable options to choose from' and an awareness of these options. 
However, lacks of external restraints are necessary so a person's options are not 
reduced, and to ensure that peoples' formation of preferences and goals is not perverted 
(Raz, 1986, pp. 372-378). The connection between an acceptable range of choices and 
autonomy is apparent if we consider our friends deciding where to go for a night out. If 
the only options were restaurants then there would not be a sufficient variety of choices 
as none of the five may want to eat out. What they need are a plurality of options 
including restaurants, bars, cinema, theatre, clubs, gigs, bowling, snooker hall etc. 
Moreover, if the friends are unaware of these choices i. e. they were ignorant of the fact 
that there were any forthcoming gigs then this does not count as a choice. Knowledge 
about the options is therefore a further condition for autonomy (Hurka, 1987, p. 367). 
Clarke argues that liberal theorists such as Raz do not place much emphasis on the 
enabling conditions, to enable people to be autonomous, but presume that all adults are 
capable of rational free choice and are therefore capable of autonomy. It is certainly the 
case that there is a gap between having the formal rights and conditions free from 
interference to make autonomous decisions, and being able to actually make use of 
27 
these opportunities and rights. Clarke attributes the concentration on formal autonomy 
within the liberal tradition to the disconnection between autonomy and self-realisation 
identified in Raz. He uses an example of a person being free to choose to live in a 
cardboard box just as a person is free to choose to live in a palace. There are no formal 
constraints to either, but this ignores the lack of substance in the freedom as the 
homeless person who inhabits the box is substantially unable to live in a palace: 
`It demonstrates that merely formal autonomy is not necessarily life enhancing, that there is a 
real difference between autonomy and substantive autonomy and that the disconnection betwccn 
autonomy and seif-realisation matters. Such a disconnection matters for it legitimatesý or tends to 
legitimate, wide and established inequalities of opportunity for meaningful self-realisation. If 
autonomy and self-realisation are, as I have suggested, connected, this effectively restricts or 
limits autonomy' (Clarke, 1999, p. 221). 
This point, raised by Clarke is an important one, but this criticism cannot be directed at 
Raz as he demands an acceptable range of options, and if one has no resources and is 
forced to choose to live in a cardboard box, it seems apparent that there is not an 
acceptable range of options from which to choose. Nevertheless, the point still remains 
that the agent must be able to substantively act upon the range of available options for 
them to be considered `acceptable. ' If we again return to our friends planning a night 
out, it is not enough that there may be a range of choices of where to go out, but these 
must be realistic options. If the snooker hall were a hundred miles away, this is not an 
acceptable option. Likewise if Bob is unemployed, a theatre ticket for £30 would not be 
an acceptable choice for him. When making individual or collective decisions it is 
necessary that there is an `acceptable' range of options and the decision makers must be 
aware of them, otherwise the decision will not meet the standards of autonomy. 
However, this is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition as the choices made may be 
based upon coercion, seduction or manipulation. 
For Jon Elster in Solomonic Judgements (1989), seduction, coercion and manipulation 
are `intrinsically morally objectionable' because they inhibit an individual's autonomy: 
`Coercion takes place when an individual prefers x over y, and continues to do so even 
when someone (physically) coerces him into doing y' (Elster, 1989, p. 82) i. e. being 
forced into taking an action we would otherwise not choose. Seduction occurs, `when 
an individual initially prefers x over y, but comes to prefer y over x once he has been 
coerced into doing y' (Elster, 1989, p. 82) This is obviously not how the term is usually 
used, but again the important difference with coercion is the person changes their 
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perspectives having been forced into an action; an example of dissonance reduction. 
For Elster manipulation is similar to persuasion and occurs when, `an individual is led 
by a sequence of short-term improvements into preferring y over x, even if initially he 
preferred x over y' (Elster, 1989, p. 83). In all these instances autonomy is violated 
because the agent is not in control over their preferences, and is not making their own 
rational choices but are being constrained by an outside force. Coercion diminishes 
autonomy by reducing the options available for pursuit by forcing people to take a 
certain option therefore taking away their control. Manipulation does not necessarily 
affect options available, but interferes in the choice of option a person will take. In the 
cases of coercion and manipulation the actions of the person have not derived from 
them completely, to a certain degree they are attributable to another. Sher accepts that 
preferences cannot be seduced or manipulated and still be autonomous. However, he 
does argue that an agent can be coerced and still be autonomous, so a person can be 
threatened with a mugging and `autonomously' submit their money although he accepts 
that they are unfree. It appears that Sher only acknowledges positive freedom, and not 
negative freedom, as a requirement for autonomy (Sher, 1997, p. 50). 20.21 
Freedom and autonomy are inherently linked, but different values. S. t. Benn and W. L. 
Weinstein in `Being a Free Act, and Being a Free Man' (1971), argue that, `the concept 
of man presupposed by the concept of freedom of action is that of the free autonomous 
chooser. Not to have this freedom is to be defective' (Benn and Weinstein, 1971, p. 
210; See also Sher, 1997, pp. 45-46). It has been traditionally thought that there are two 
senses of political freedom (which is what we are concerned with here in teams of free 
20 Schumpeter (1974) has argued that it is possible for individuals to be free from manipulation in the 
market place and in their private life, but thought it impossible in the political sphere. If this is the case 
then autonomy could not be the justification for democracy and the requirement for legitimate decisions. 
In fact no theory of legitimation would be required; as the political system would manufacture the 
conditions for its own legitimacy (Held, 1996, p. 182). 
21 Sher, providing an argument in favour of perfectionism, points out that even when a government 
employs methods of coercion, seduction and manipulation to motivate citizens to adopt a certain way of 
life this is undoubtedly a violation of autonomy, but this does not rule out that the citizens will 
autonomously adopt this way of life later for good reasons, and therefore be autonomous (Sher, 1997, pp- 
62-65). However, this is only the case if the citizens can still choose not to follow this way of life which 
would involve an absence of government coercion, seduction and manipulation, because there is no 
guarantee that citizens will autonomously go on to select this way of life. Sher does not seem to 
appreciate this, but that is probably because he does not think choice is necessary for autonomy, a claim 
that has been contended earlier. Moreover, Sher's argument does not support the perfectionism he aims 
at unless the government is not elitist or else seduction, coercion and manipulation would have to be ruled 
out, not on the grounds that it restricts the citizen's autonomy, but because it would promote the 
autonomy of government elites above that of citizens, because they will be making the decisions and 
citizens will be excluded and there seems no justification for this. 
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choice). Isaiah Berlin famously outlined `Two Concepts of Liberty' (1984), which he 
believed to be `in direct conflict together' because they have contrasting aims (Berlin, 
1984, p. 23). In the negative sense of liberty, `I am normally said to be free to the 
degree to which no man or body of men interferes with my activity. Political liberty in 
this sense is simply the area within which a man can act unobstructed by others' (Berlin, 
1984, pp. 15-16): 
`The "positive" sense of the word "liberty" derives from the wish on the part of the individual to 
be his own master. I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself; not on external forces 
whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of other men's acts of will' (Berlin, 
1984, pp. 22-23). 
Now on first consideration, it appears that it is positive liberty, which embodies 
autonomy the best as it appeals to principles of self-government, u but negative liberty 
is vital as well. 23 To be autonomous involves both liberties, in order for actions and 
decisions to derive from the person positive liberty is necessary and to ensure the agent 
is not coerced, manipulated or seduced into actions or decisions negative liberty is 
required. 24 Does this mean that Berlin is wrong to claim that these two concepts of 
liberty are in direct conflict with each other? 
Charles Taylor, in his excellent discussion `What's Wrong With Negative Liberty? ' 
(1997) understands positive liberty as an exercise concept and negative liberty as an 
opportunity concept (Taylor, 1997, p. 419). If being free is being able to pursue one's 
22 Kant certainly interpreted autonomy and positive freedom in this way as does Young (Kant, 1964; 
Young, 1986, p. 6). 
23 Some interpretations of Kant's 'Groundwork' interpret negative and positive freedom as equivalent. 
For example see Beck (1960). 
24 This is in accordance with Gerald McCallum's analysis of freedom in 'Negative and Positive Freedom' 
(1967). MacCallurn feels that it is misleading to talk of positive and negative freedom, because the 
distinction between 'freedom from... ' and 'freedom to... ' is not a clear or useful one. MacCallum argues 
that every instance of freedom consists of a triadic relationship between the agent, the absence of 
constraining conditions and ability to become something. This is set out as `X is (is not) free from Y to 
do (not do, become, not become) Z, " X ranges over agents, Y ranges over such "preventing conditions" as 
constraints, restrictions, interferences and barriers and Z ranges over actions or conditions of character or 
circumstance (MacCallum, 1967, p. 314). MacCallum acknowledges the use of freedom in the style of 
`the sky is now free of clouds' or 'she is free from any vice' but this really means 'rid of or 'without' 
(MacCallum, 1967, p. 315). To be free one should not be prevented from making ones own decisions and 
pursuing them in ones chosen way. It is also necessary that the agent directs ones own life and has the 
relevant opportunities to do so. As Carol Gould realises MacCallum's joining of the enabling conditions 
would be classified as `what one is free from the absence or lack of. ' And this is 'an oblique and strained 
way of referring to the positive conditions. ' Furthermore this definition of freedom makes no distinction 
between lack of interference from others and the provision of enabling conditions: `To ignore this 
distinction would be to conflate forbearance from action with action' (Gould, 1988, p. 381). We must 
then either accept Berlin's argument that the two conceptions of liberty are in conflict or find an 
alternative method of linking them to MacCallum's. 
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own goals without being constrained, William Connolly in The Terms of Political 
Discourse (1993), is right to observe that `a person could increase his freedom simply 
by scaling down his desires to match the opportunities available to him' (Connolly, 
1993, p. 148). Berlin is aware of and agrees with this view. This is an example of 
Elster's adaptive preferences (i. e. changes preferences to reduce dissonance) that he 
outlines in `Sour Grapes' (1991). Now adaptive preference change is not an 
autonomous change, so the satisfaction of these preferences would not achieve freedom 
or autonomy. However, if I purposively change my preferences and desires so I can 
achieve more of them, then this is an autonomous change. Consequently Elster defines 
freedom as being `free to do all the things that one autonomously wants to do' (Elster, 
1991, p. 228). The question that immediately arises is; `what arc the conditions for 
autonomous wants', Elster does not have the answer to this, admitting he can only say 
what things make `wants' heteronomous. 23 
Connolly supports Elster, arguing correctly I think, that people can face constraints and 
coercion when formulating their goals, not just on the pursuit and realisation of them. 
As John Christman perceptively points out in `Constructing the Inner Citadel' (1988), 
`no matter how rich a conception of restraint one works out in this context (that one 
must be "free from" when one acts), it will always be a further question whether the 
desire a person is acting on is autonomous or not' (Christman, 1988, p. 111). A person 
can face no constraint while being motivated by heteronomous desires. A person acting 
upon such desires is, by Berlin's conception, free, but this surely shows the inadequacy 
of negative freedom as a concept if used alone. For example, in countries with state run 
media, people only receive limited perspectives and information, constraining their 
ability to form certain aims. For the same reasons brain washing or other forms of 
behavioural control prevent autonomous choices and the formation of autonomous 
values. Likewise commercial advertising is seen as a method for changing peoples' 
desires, but this does not always mean that they lead to autonomous desires and certain 
advertising methods e. g. subliminal clips are banned for this very reason. Choice is not 
autonomous if the preferences one bases their choices upon have been manipulated. 
23 Elster further notes that if you are free to do what you want to do then your desires are not shaped by 
the available options, so your preferences are not adaptive. This though depends on people being aware 
of this freedom, but moreover on there being no limits to freedom, or else how will we know that it is not 
dissonance reduction that has formed our wants. As having no restriction on freedom is impossible, then 
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Certain forms of conditioning can be objectionable in the sense of manipulating an 
agent's preferences. The classical example being a person forced into slavery for 
considerable time, is then offered the opportunity for freedom, but chooses to remain in 
servitude (Slier, 1997, p. 47). Autonomy is important to democratic theory because 
surely it is important to have an account of how the opinions and beliefs upon which 
people will be motivated to act and participate, have been formed. Autonomy indicates 
how authentic such beliefs will be to the person. 
As Anthony Giddens argues, `only if the individual is recognised as an autonomous 
agent does it become reasonable to regard that individual as politically responsible' 
(Giddens in Held, 1989, p. 192). For a collective to be self-determining it will be argued 
that it is important for the preferences to be authentic, and not just sufficient that the 
people make the decisions. Brennan and Lomasky use an example of an election where 
all citizens voted by pulling levers, and the more a lever was pulled the greatest chance 
that policy option would have of winning the election. However, if the voters were 
entirely ignorant of what lever stood for which option, such an arrangement would not 
be democratic because the preferences that motivated the vote would not be authentic 
(Brennan and Lomasky, 1993, p. 170). For John Dryzek in Deliberative Democracy 
and Beyond (2000), authenticity is `the degree to which democratic control is engaged 
through communication that encourages reflection upon preferences without coercion' 
(Dryzek, 2000, p. 8). 
The concept of negative liberty appears totally oblivious to the idea that someone's 
desires might have been manipulated or `unduly' influenced by an outside source. Such 
an idea seriously discredits the concept of negative freedom because if I am not 
constrained and act upon desires that are not my own, how can it be said that I am free? 
I have not been restrained from doing the act, but I was still not in control of what I was 
doing. I was also unrestrained from doing other actions, but due to manipulation was 
unable to choose these. I really had no choice. The conditions of autonomy do require 
choice, and conditions to ensure people can act upon and exercise their decisions. 
However, choice is not enough. The right conditions need to be in place for people to 
we cannot avoid facing the difficult question of what criteria is necessary to make preferences 
autonomous. 
32 
form autonomous preferences on which a choice will be made (Levine, 1993, p. 160). 
Freedom therefore, cannot just be an opportunity concept (Taylor, 1997, p. 419). 
Taylor locates the view of negative liberty as nothing more than an opportunity concept 
from the Hobbesian and Benthamite traditions (Taylor, 1997). Supporters of such an 
entirely negative conception of freedom assume that people are already autonomous in 
this sense providing they are free from external influence. This is not true, and 
democratic society needs to ensure that the conditions for participation in decision- 
making processes develop autonomous preferences within its citizens: `Thus a 
commitment to negative liberty, conceived as an absence of political or social 
interferences in the pursuit of one's ends, leads inexorably to a notion of autonomy, 
understood as the ability, again so far as this ability is socially conditioned, to set 
(achievable) ends before oneself (Levine, 1993, p. 160). If one is coerced and 
manipulated then one is prevented from freely determining one's own will or one's 
goals and is therefore not autonomous. However, as Taylor acknowledges, we must be 
careful not to caricature the negative view of liberty, as those from the Millian tradition 
defend negative liberty as an exercise concept (Taylor, 1997, p. 419). Once an exercise 
justification of freedom is adopted, `then `being able to do what one wants can no 
longer be accepted as a sufficient condition of being free. For this view puts certain 
conditions of being free' (Taylor, 1997, p. 420). 
Some constraints in society are inevitable and if one cannot participate in determining 
what these constraints are, then autonomy is impossible. Furthermore, if one does not 
have the conditions (e. g. knowledge, education and information) to rationally form and 
choose one's goals in allegiance with one's will, one is not autonomous. Both freedoms 
then are vital to achieving autonomy. Raz succinctly sums up this argument when he 
states that, `positive freedom derives its value from its contribution to personal 
autonomy. Positive freedom is intrinsically valuable because it is an essential 
ingredient and a necessary condition of the autonomous life. It is a capacity whose 
value derives from its exercise. One's positive freedom is enhanced by whatever 
enhances one's ability to lead an autonomous life' (Raz, 1986, p. 409). Negative liberty, 
alone is therefore not sufficient because, `negative freedom, freedom from coercive 
interferences, is valuable inasmuch as it serves positive freedom and autonomy. 
Coercing another may express contempt or at any rate disrespect for his autonomy... it 
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reduces his options and therefore may be to his disadvantage ... In 
judging the value of 
negative freedom one should never forget that it derives from its contribution to 
autonomy' (Rnz, 1986, p. 410; See also Young, 1986, pp. 8-9). Here we sec evidence 
that Raz accepts that both positive and negative liberty, are essential to autonomy and so 
Berlin is wrong to define them as opposing values and Levine agrees with Raz (Levine, 
1993, p. 160). 
Consequently, the government should act to promote autonomy by providing 
conditions, which protect individual autonomy by protecting her from others and 
protecting her from excessive coercion from the state. Human and civil rights are 
usually used in modem democracies to ensure this individual, negative freedom. To 
promote positive freedom the government needs to provide enabling conditions so that 
everyone has the opportunities for education and access to information to be able to 
form rational claims and rational arguments to support these claims. Also required are 
opportunities of participation in the decision-making processes of the state, including 
rights of freedom of speech, conviction and association. We have seen then the 
conditions that are necessary for people to exercise autonomy in collective decisions, 
and they require free choice. A choice is free if there is an acceptable range of options, 
there is knowledge of these options, the choice is not coerced and the preferences this 
choice is based upon are not the result of manipulation and seduction. A free choice 
must be free in the negative and in the positive sense to be autonomous. 
Free choice then is a necessary condition to be autonomous, but it is not enough as Benn 
appreciated. `To be a chooser is not enough for autonomy, for a competent chooser 
may still be a slave to convention, choosing by standards he has accepted quite 
uncritically from his milieu' (Benn, S. L, 1976, p. 123). The critical input of rationality 
is therefore also required as a condition for autonomy. 
1.4.2 Rationality 
1.4.2.1 Between Kant and Hume 
Benn distinguishes between 'autarchy' and `autonomy'. The autan hical person being 
one who makes their own choices, but to be autonomous one must have reasons for a 
choice. One of the most prominent advocates of this type of relationship between 
autonomy and rationality is Immanuel Kant in Critique of Practical Reason (1993, first 
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published 1781), whose theory argued that to be autonomous was to live life in 
accordance with self imposed maxims, which have been developed through reason. He 
argued that people could be morally autonomous precisely because they are capable of 
reason (Lakoff, 1996, p. 157). Alternatively David Hume in the classic sentimentalist 
text A Treatise of Human Nature (1978, first published in 1740) believed `that reason 
alone can never be a motive to any action of the will... ' and `can never oppose passion 
in the direction of the will' (Hume, 1978, p. 413). The central dispute here for the 
relevance for autonomy is whether preferences, desires and passions can be formed 
through reason and should play a part in our decision-making processes, Kant argues 
reason can and Hume says reason cannot. Bernard Williams, in `Internal and External 
Reasons' (1981), differentiates between two forms of reasons. Internal reason being the 
Hume approach where an agent has a reason for an action, if they have a motive for that 
action, and the external approach follows Kant where an agent has a reason for action, 
even if they do not possess that motive. These two contrasting views and their 
implications for autonomy will be reviewed in turn. 
Richard Lindley, in Autonomy (1986), warns against using Kant's requirements for 
rationality. Kant insisted that the self-imposed maxims must be universalisable, and 
therefore are independent of context. Furthermore, Kant's conception of rationality was 
to be divorced of all desire and inclination. Although rationality is antithetical to such 
traits, Lindley is right I think to claim that this is an excessively stringent requirement 
for rationality. Therefore Lindley argues in favour of, `active theoretical rationality', 
which requires the agent deliberating over preferences, desires and beliefs (Lindley, 
1986, pp. 21-70). The argument that the categorical imperative is context insensitive is 
based on the traditional Hegelian critique. Hebel believed consciousness was inter- 
subjectively developed. Hegel further suggested that Kant's categorical imperative took 
no account of contextually based reason, but instead depended on pure reason. It is 
Kant's concept of pure reason that is not context-sensitive, but interpreted as universal 
and applies to issues such as consistency in beliefs. However, Clarke defends Kant, 
discarding the Hegelian critique as a misreading of Kant. He argues that the Categorical 
Imperative should not be seen as a generator of action, but a test of actions to see if they 
meet the requirements of autonomy and morality. Consequently, it is always 
contextual, because it is dependent on the context in which the person wishes to test a 
possible action (Clarke, 1999, p. 181). Nevertheless, I would suggest that pure 
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rationality is too stringent a requirement for autonomy as it still requires agents to 
disregard their particular interests and desires, in this sense Kant's pure rationality is not 
sufficiently contextual especially for democratic decision making between interested 
citizens. 
Despite his defence of Kant, Clarke still remains critical of Kant's rationality 
requirements for autonomy. Clarke accepts that to be autonomous one requires a wide 
range of reasons (Clarke, 1999, p. 181). However, he thinks Kant's conception of 
`autonomy' as an act motivated by reason is an oversimplification, due to the fact that it 
takes no account of the role of desire. This is in accord with Williams' critique of 
external reason statements, because `no external reason statement could by itself offer 
an explanation of anyone's action (Williams, 1981, p. 100). For Clarke, acts that are 
motivated by desire and passion can still be autonomous. It is whimsy and wanton that 
must be avoided if autonomy is to be preserved. However, the standard Kantian 
argument disregards actions based on desire as heteronomous, because desires are 
subject to causal processes, which means actions are determined. The question remains 
as to what protocols an agent should invoke when rationally criticising their 
preferences. A proposal for the necessity for critical rational enquiry to ensure 
autonomous opinions came from J. S. Mill. As already established opinions, to be 
autonomous, must be based upon good reasons, but Mill appreciated that this process 
also involved the consideration of alternative opinions and their justificatory reasons. In 
contrast to Kant who claimed that rationality must be separated from inclinations to 
achieve autonomy, Mill claims that the inclinations should be based upon rational 
critique. 
In contrast Hume, who preceded Kant, perceived reason to be purely instrumental in 
achieving goals dictated by preferences and desires, summed up in Hume's adage that 
`Reason is, and ought only be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any 
other office than to serve and obey them' (Hume, 1978, p. 415). This means that it is 
passion that is the motivator of action, but requires rationality in order to achieve its 
goals, with the more intense the passion, the greater the reason for acting upon it. In 
this sense passion uses reason, rather than passion being subordinate to reason, as Kant 
perceived the relationship. Clarke is critical of the Humean view, favouring Kant's 
conception: 
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`Passion can use reason to serve its, ends but passion cannot judge itself Passion is feeling, it is 
motive, it is a mover but it is not a final self-judge. That no one should be a judge in his own 
cause was an imperative invoked by Locke to justify the shift from a natural to a civil condition. 
And that passion should not be a judge in its own cause is an imperative that justifies the 
appropriate and reflective shift between reason and passion' (Clarke, 1999, p. 195). 
The categorical imperative is a way of testing these passions, not of generating them, it 
subjects them to reason, to test the validity of these passions separate from the passion 
itself. Hume is right that passions, not reason are the motivator of action. He is also 
right to point out that the content of passion can be good or bad, moral or amoral etc, in 
other words passion has no objective content. From here though he concludes that 
preferences are not susceptible to rational critique unless they are based upon false 
supposition (Hume, 1978, p. 416). Hume did not explicitly refer to autonomy, but 
rather to liberty, which for him was the ability to choose and act upon that choice. 
Young argues that we can substitute liberty for autonomy to have a Humean view of 
autonomy (Young, 1986, p. 33). It is a very minimal conception of autonomy, but its 
strength over the Kantian view is that it accepts the connection between preferences and 
autonomy. However, its weakness is that an agent can be autonomous without having 
autonomous preferences. This seems to be based on an inadequate conception of the 
role of deliberation. The Humean view of internal reason only thinks that desires can be 
subtracted from the agent when proved false, but not added. However, I think 
Williams' approach to internal reason is more accurate when he asserts that through 
deliberation 
`an agent can come to see that he has reason to do something which he did not see had reason to 
do at all. In this way, the deliberative process can add new actions for which there are internal 
reasons, just as it can also add new internal reasons for given actions' (Williams, 1981, p. 104). 
We can accept this without having to align ourselves with a Kantian external approach 
to reason, which suggests an agent can gain a reason for action fro ma motivation that 
she does not have (Williams, 1981, p. 109). 
I think though that it must be pointed out that passion can deflect from autonomy, by 
blinding people to reason if they are over passionate about something (Hurka, 1987, p. 
367). As Sartre has argued, the existentialist believes people are responsible for their 
passions (Sartre, 1948, p. 34). Sartre provides an example to demonstrate this. He says 
that one may claim that they love a friend enough to give them a certain amount of 
money, but this is only proved if it is done. The measuring of the strength of a feeling 
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can only be judged if it is acted upon, but we cannot therefore justify an action upon this 
feeling without being drawn into a vicious circle. For Sartre and the existentialist 
position, feelings are formed by action rather than act as a guide to action (Sartre, 1948, 
p. 37). 
Both Danny Scoccia in `Paternalism and Respect for Autonomy' (1990) and Jon Elster 
claim `economic rationality' is the most appropriate conception of rationality, and 
therefore follow in the Humean tradition. For Elster being rational brings about the 
desired ends, which requires selecting the most efficient method to achieve the end. For 
a choice to be `economically rational' it must be, `likely (in light of what the chooser 
does or can know at the time he makes it) to maximize (within the bounds permitted by 
his moral principles) the satisfaction of his presently held desires' (Scoccia, 1990, p. 
320). Economic rationality is simply choosing the best method to achieve one's goal, 
but as already argued, the formation of these goals must be rational as well 2.6 For 
example, if I did have the desire to cut off my ear, then through economic rationality I 
would be contemplating the best method to sever my ear from my head, and the best 
method would be dependent on my other desires like `Do I want it done quickly? ' `Do I 
want it done the least painful way? T 'Did I want the severed ear whole? ' There is no 
falsity of belief here so it is autonomous by Humean standards, but it seems apparent 
there is further reason required to justify the desire. However this takes no account of 
the fact that the desire to have my ear cut off is not a rational one and there are unlikely 
to be good reasons for wanting to do it. It is likely to be some strange desire possibly 
arising from anger or passion that I would come to regret later. In short the rationality 
required for autonomy requires more than just the satisfaction of whatever desires one 
may happen to have, but the efficient satisfaction of rationally formed desires. For 
goals to be minimally autonomous, they must have been `critically scrutinised'. This 
means before a goal or value is selected it must have had its strengths and weaknesses 
evaluated and considered, which requires the consideration of available information 
about the options and their possible consequences. 
Young provides a possible defence of the Humean view. He agrees that an agent's 
preferences, desires and passions can be irrational, and therefore they may have no good 
26 This conception of rationality also closely resembles Schumpeter's model of instrumental rationality (1974). 
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reason to act upon the desire to cut off their car, but suggests that it is not irrational to 
have the desire as it is just a feeling, and so, `when beliefs and decisions to act are 
stripped away from inclinations, there is nothing left about the inclination to be 
irrational' (Young, 1986, p. 39 & p. 41). If this is the case though, the Ilumean 
connection between desire, reason and action is broken. This is because as well as 
having reasons to do something, we can also have reasons not to do something and there 
are many good reasons why someone should not cut off their ear. They could have the 
desire to cut off their ear and not act upon it because they have good reasons not to. In 
this sense desires, preferences and passions can conflict, but the Humean conception of 
rationality never offers us an account of how this conflict should be resolved even if it is 
adapted to accept the existence of the irrationality of acting upon certain desires. If we 
follow Hume then we should simply act upon the strongest desires, but that is not 
always possible to determine, moreover the Humean view denies the possibility of the 
individual being able to distance themselves from desires and critically evaluate them 
(Young, 1986, p. 42). 
The case being made here is that rationality provides the connection between `will' and 
`choice'. There is no objective set of rational preferences as Kant suggests, but it is the 
individual and their deliberation that provides the motivation of judgement behind 
rationality's critical appraisal, which then determines whether someone finds a reason 
convincing or not. Korsgaard appreciated this when she claimed `autonomy is 
commanding yourself to do what you think it would be a good idea to do, but that in 
turn depends on who you think you are' (Korsgaard, 1996, p. 107). John Dewey 
certainly believed in the necessity of rational thought when choosing what goals to 
pursue and actions to take, if the chooser is to be free. As he states in Experience and 
Education (1950): `Impulses and desires that are not ordered by intelligence are under 
the control of accidental circumstances. It may be a loss rather than a gain to escape 
from the control of another person only to find one's conduct dictated by immediate 
whim and caprice; that is at the mercy of impulses whose formation intelligent 
judgement has not entered. A person whose conduct is controlled in this way has at 
most only the illusion of freedom' (Dewey, 1950, pp. 75-6; See also Wolff, 1976, p. 
12). This is congruent with Kant's analysis as he suggested that practical reason was 
necessary to influence one's will, which in turn would dictate behaviour instead of 
inclination, which is not rationally based (Young, 1986, p. 17). 
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Connolly (1993) borrows a useful example from Fyodor Dostoevski's The Brothers 
Karamazov (1945) to demonstrate the weakness in the Humean connection between 
autonomy and rationality. The character Father Zossima mocks the definition of 
freedom as, `the multiplication and rapid satisfaction of desires... ' lt is not freedom to 
act and follow whatever `senseless and foolish desires and habits and ridiculous fancies 
are fostered in them' (Dostoevski, 1945, pp. 328-329). This is a similar view to the one 
expressed by Socrates in Plato's `Protagoras', who argued against hedonism being an 
act of freedom, but rather suggested that the hedonist is a slave to her pleasures. To be 
ruled by pleasure was ignorance, to be one's own master was wisdom (Plato, 1956, 
353c 358c). An important distinction is made here, between freedom being `doing 
whatever one pleases or desires' (the freedom of the hedonist), and freedom `to do what 
one chooses through thought and reflection. ' Benn and Weinstein seem to share this 
view as they maintain, `it is apposite to discuss whether he is free to do it only if it is a 
possible object of reasonable choice; cutting off one's ears is not the sort of thing 
anyone in a standard range of conditions would reasonably do' (Benn and Weinstein, 
1971, p. 195). The full weakness of the Humean view is captured if we refer back to 
Huxley's `Brave New World'. The citizens here do choose and can employ 
instrumental rationality to achieve their preferences, but we would surely not want to 
term them autonomous as in no way have they contributed to the rational formation of 
these preferences. Hume's view of autonomy does not therefore encompass a proper 
conception of agency, which I have suggested is what makes autonomy an intrinsic 
value in the first place. 
On consideration of two of the most dominant traditions in the connection between 
rationality and autonomy we must reject and accept elements of both Kant's and 
Hume's approach. From Kant we accept his argument that rationality and not 
inclination must be dominant to achieve autonomy. However, Kant goes too far and 
does not acknowledge the relevance of particular desires and interests. Hume rightly 
accepts the relevance of desire and preferences but does not think that these preferences 
can be rationally formed, therefore he thinks only instrumental reason is sufficient for 
autonomy. 
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1.4.2.2 Dworkin's Hierarchical Approval and Infinite Regress 
Neither the Kantian nor Humean conception of rationality seems satisfactory to provide 
the connection to autonomy. The question still remains as to `what form of rationality is 
required for people to form autonomous values and make autonomous choices? ' One 
possible theory is provided by Gerald Dworkin in his influential The Theory and 
Practice of Autonomy (1988). 
Dworkin states that the `idea of autonomy is not merely an evaluative or reflective 
notion, but includes as well some ability both to alter one's preferences and to make 
them effective in one's actions and indeed to make them effective because one has 
reflected upon them and adopted as one's own' (Dworkin, 1988, p. 17). Later on he 
defines autonomy as, `the capacity to reflect upon one's motivational structure and to 
make changes in that structure' and involves `... the ability to alter one's preferences 
and make them effective in action' (Dworkin, 1988, p. 108). Dworkin calls these 
preferences `second order preferences' because they have been formed through the 
critical scrutiny and reformation of `first order preferences' in accordance with one's 
will. It seems that autonomy requires people to change their preferences in light of 
information and rational scrutiny. Christman is wary of Dworkin's requirement to alter 
preferences, as he says some preferences are too deeply `entrenched' into his 
personality by previous methods of self-development, and he has accepted them as his 
own (Christman, 1991, p. 6). 1 do not think this contradicts Dworlý-in's requirements 
for autonomy. By `altering one's preferences' Dworkin does not mean that all 
preferences a person holds must be changed, but that each preference has been critically 
scrutinised and evaluated in terms of internal will and compared to her preferences to 
ensure compatibility, and subsequently changed if they do not meet this standard. 
Lower order desires are attributable to actions, for example the desire to smoke a 
cigarette. Higher order desires deal with lower order desires in this example, `the desire 
to smoke a cigarette'. Dworkin expects an agent to `identify' with some, but by no 
means all, lower order desires in an `important way'. It is this identification from 
higher to lower order desires that is the key to autonomy for Dworkin. Identification 
occurs following a process of rational reflection, whereby the agent considers their 
lower order desires to be the sort of desires they want to have, and perceives them as 
being in accordance with their higher order beliefs and principles. In agreement with 
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Christman (1988, p. 213), I think it is clear that Dworkin sees the process of 
identification as being one of endorsement and not just realisation. This means the 
agent is not just appreciating the fact that they have these desires and seeing them as 
part of them, but approving of them. If then we agree with Dworkin's suggestion that 
autonomy is identification of higher with lower desires then is it possible to have a 
desire that one disapproves of? What if a person lives a heteronomous life, but 
identifies with this? 
In this sense we should also see that there are not just second order preferences, as there 
are no limits to the levels of preferences we might hold because you can have a third 
order preference about a second order preference and ad inf nitum. This though is not a 
serious challenge to the theory of Dworkin because we can take Young's view that 
autonomy is determined by the highest order preference (Young, 1986, p. 66). A much 
more serious weakness is that Dworkin has overlooked the key fact that people are 
socialised and manipulated when forming higher order as well as lower order desires. 
Hence the higher order preferences may be as heteronomous as the lower order ones and 
therefore identification will occur, but the person is still being motivated by desires that 
are not rationally grounded. Consequently, Dworkin's argument descends into an 
infinite regress, which any model that links rationality and autonomy must address. 
Influenced by Thalberg, Christman summarises this problem: `For either a desire 
descended to the agent without her awareness or approval (which seems a troublesome 
basis for the rationality of action), or the agent was able to judge whether or not this 
desire was acceptable. If the latter is the case (as must be on hierarchical approval 
models), then the judgement about the desire will have to be based on (other) desires of 
the agent. Then the question arises about these new desires of the agent and their being 
approved or not by the agent, from which flows the infinite regress of desires' 
(Christman, 1991, p. 8). This is not to say that Dworkin's distinction between higher 
and lower order preferences is useless and meaningless. It is quite possible to perceive 
that people do have different levels of preferences. People certainly have preferences 
about their preferences, and have overarching desires about their life. However, 
Dworkin has not said what conditions are required to ensure these higher order 
preferences are autonomous (Christman, 1988, p. 113-114). 
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Developing Dworkin's ideas, John Christman presents alternative requirements that 
must be met to be autonomous in `Autonomy and Personal History' (1991). It is the 
process of preference formation that is key, but in Christman's case a preference is 
autonomous if the person is aware of and approves of the process whereby they form or 
accept a preference: `The motivating idea behind the theory is that autonomy is 
achieved when an agent is in a position to be aware of the changes and development of 
her character and of why these changes come about' (Christman, 1991, p. 11). 
Three conditions are required for this acceptance to be adequately achieved: 
A- That the development of the preference was not resisted or would not be resisted. 
For this requirement to be met, 'all that must be true is that the agent would not resist- 
that is take action to counteract- the process, were she to understand it' (Christman, 
1991, p. 13). 
B- That this lack of resistance was not due to factors that inhibited self-reflection. 
C- That the self-reflection involved in `A' was rationally motivated and did not involve 
self-deception (Christman, 1991, p. 11). 
This model is able to avoid the regress, which infects Dworkin's model because it does 
not involve conditions of self-appraisal. Nevertheless, a choice is still involved when 
the agent is developing a desire, and a choice is motivated/ informed by other desires, 
we must then ask `is this latter desire an autonomous one? ' Christman's theory avoids 
this regress though by not depending upon any self-appraisal based on other 
preferences. Instead the agent appraises the process of desire formation, and providing 
this appraisal is rational and devoid of self-deception and manipulation, then the 
acceptance of the desire is autonomous. The regress is avoided because there is no 
other level of desire, which is used to evaluate the development of the new desire 
(Christman, 1991, p. 18-19). However, surely at some point people do need to re- 
evaluate already obtained desires and beliefs. Supposing I autonomously (i. e. do not 
reject the process by which 1) gain a new belief in the benefits to my health that can be 
brought about by drinking red wine. This belief will then be used to evaluate other 
desires. It may mean I start to drink red wine more regularly and other drinks like white 
wine I may desire, and therefore consume, less. However, because the desire to have 
more red wine was autonomously gained when it is used to re-evaluate other desires on 
other beverages, I know that this will be an autonomous process. If people change their 
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preferences, we need to ask why this change has occurred, as it is not the case that any 
transformation in preferences automatically makes them more autonomous. Changes 
can be engineered through coercion and manipulation, habituation and resignation and 
through learning. For Elster it is informed preferences that are of most importance 
because they are `grounded in experience' and have greater stability. 
Preference changes will not meet Christman's criteria if they are adaptive preferences, 
as they do not meet the second criterion of being based upon self-reflection. Adaptive 
preferences change in accordance with two principal factors; the reduction of 
dissonance and adjustment to available possibilities. In `Sour Grapes' (1991) Elster 
defines adaptive preference change as, `a causal process taking place "behind my back", 
not the intentional shaping of desires advocated by the Stoic, Buddhist or Spinozistic 
philosophies, by psychological theories of self control or the economic theory of 
`egonomics' (Elster, 1991, p. 224). He goes on to give a good example to demonstrate 
the difference between a deliberate and autonomous preference change and an adaptive 
one: 
`The psychological state of wanting to do a great many things that you cannot possibly achieve is 
very hard to live with. If the escape from this tension takes place by some causal mechanism, 
such as Festinger's "reduction of cognitive dissonance", we may speak of adaptive preference 
change. The process then is regulated by something like a drive, not by a conscious want or 
desire. If, by contrast, I perceive or change my wants so as to be able to fulfil a larger part of 
them, I then act on a second-order desire, not on a drive' (Elster, 1991, p. 224). 
Here we see that adaptive preference changes are not rationally motivated, but are in 
fact examples of self-deception. For preferences to be autonomous the process through 
which they are formed must then be conscious, rational and accepted by the agent in 
question. This though does still not tell us what type of rationality is required. Two 
types offer different solutions, intemalist rationality and externalist rationality. 
1.4.2.3 'Internalist Rationality' Versus ExternalLxt Rationality' 
As can already been seen, despite the extensive number of theorists who have made a 
connection between rationality and autonomy, the relationship is far from uniform and a 
variety of stipulations that must be met for the agent to be sufficiently rational have 
been proposed. Christman further distinguishes between `internalist rationalists' who 
require an agent's preferences to be consistent (i. e. transitive) and `extemalist' 
rationalists' who require the agent to have sufficient and objectively correct evidence 
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(Christman, 1991, p. 13-14). Christman personally believes the `internal' requirements 
are most apt. If it were the case that external rationality was required, and the more 
information a person has the more autonomous they were, then `the property of being 
autonomous would be open ended and vague. ' It would be difficult to say when a 
person was sufficiently autonomous. In contrast the internalist approach argues that to 
be autonomous the person must have rationally consistent means to form desires and 
that the resulting desires must also be consistent. Therefore an autonomous person must 
not be, `guided by manifestly inconsistent desires or beliefs' and that `... the final ends 
and purpose that an agent has must also be consistent with the rest of the judgements, 
values and beliefs to which she has committed herself' Christman, 1991, p. 15). 
Elster has also acknowledges the practical problems that arise from the externalist 
approach to rationality. He gives an example of a mushroom gatherer. She obviously 
needs to seek out a good place to pick mushrooms, but should not spend too much time 
comparing places as this will reduce the time available to pick mushrooms. She then 
does need information to make her decision more rational and autonomous in the sense 
she will increase her chances of achieving her end of picking lots of mushrooms, but it 
is hard to know how much information is enough. We could answer this only if we 
knew what the effect of the extra information would have on the mushroom picker's 
decision, but we do not know this until she receives this information. This is why 
Habermas warns us that all `rational reconstructions' have only a `hypothetical status', 
as people will change their decisions and beliefs in light of new information, or that they 
rest on falsities which deflect attention from `correct intuitions', or based on 
generalisations from specific cases (Habermas, 1990, p. 32). Information is then always 
contingent and limited, but an agent can still attain available information. By `available 
information' here I mean it in the weaker sense of people considering information that 
they can personally attain, which excludes information that others have and would 
provide given the chance. It is hard to define what is the minimum amount of available 
information required, as it will vary depending on the decision being made. However, 
what we can say is that the more relevant information considered the more autonomous 
the decision is likely to be, but as Elster realises there is inevitably a trade-off between 
gathering information to form preferences, and pursuing the fulfilment of the 
preferences. It is not clear, however, where this trade-off should be made. 
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Christman acknowledges, but fails to confront some of the serious implications that 
arise from rejecting the externalist requirement of rationality. A person could have 
consistent preferences, but have several or even all of these preferences based on 
misinformation and/or manipulation, whereby access to information is controlled and 
limited by another source. In fact the rejection of the externalist rationality requirement 
is inconsistent with his own proclamation that autonomy requires accepting the process 
by which one gains one's beliefs and desires. The person may accept the process by 
which they have formed their beliefs and desires, but be unaware that such manipulation 
has taken place. For I believe that most people would not accept their preferences if they 
were to learn that they had been based on limited information that could have been 
available. Surely they would want to know what that information was in case it did 
have an effect upon their preferences? The only way to find out if it would affect their 
preferences is for them to receive it. If told that their access to information has been 
manipulated, but the person is still happy with the method of forming their desires and 
beliefs, then that person has failed to meet Christman's first condition, as they cannot 
fully understand the manipulation, and therefore the preference formation process, 
without knowing what information they have been excluded from having. If they say 
they, are, then surely there is an element of self-deception here which means 
Christman's second condition has not been met. By Christman's own definition, to 
avoid self-deception, one's motivating beliefs and desires must be transparent to the 
self: `If the "self' doing the "governing" is dissociated, fragmented, or insufficiently 
transparent to itself, then the process of self-determination sought for in a concept of 
autonomy is absent or incomplete' (Christman, 1991, p. 17). This then is different 
from invoking someone else's acceptance or rejection of beliefs and preferences 
because the agent is still deciding for herself based upon her own analysis of that 
information. Just because she is exposed to the information or belief does not 
necessarily mean she will accept it, but the exposure will increase that chances of this 
acceptance. 
Now what could be the motivating desire behind not wanting information that you know 
has been purposely kept from you? The two most likely thoughts involved in such a 
decision are that you feel you already have sufficient information, but surely there is a 
lack of self-awareness here as how can one know that they do not need this information 
and know that this information will not significantly affect their beliefs and desires? 
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The second reason might be that the person is simply not bothered about the issue and 
not bothered whether their preferences are autonomous. This is perfectly acceptable in 
most areas, but not when it comes to collective decision-making. As already argued, it 
is preferable that citizen's preferences are autonomous if they are to participate in 
decision-making, and for that participation to be authentic. 
Furthermore the manipulation could be the very cause, which makes the person think 
that they have adequate information to form autonomous desires and beliefs. Christman 
himself notes that manipulating factors inhibit an agent's `reflexive capabilities' of 
minimal rationality and self-awareness, which are necessary for autonomy. 
Manipulation will mean the person is less able to make judgements `from her own point 
of view', meaning they are unable to autonomously appraise the acceptance of desires 
and beliefs. Christman's examples of such manipulation include hypnosis, drugs and 
certain educational techniques (Christman, 1991, p. 19). Now surely the latter is an 
example of manipulation because it can present the agent with one-sided information. 
One-sided information surely upsets an agent's capacity for rationality and self- 
awareness. If someone is prevented from reflecting upon a certain piece of information 
then, the less likely the persons resulting preferences are autonomous, even though they 
have not resisted the acceptance of these preferences. An example from Locke 
demonstrates someone can be free, but not autonomous as well as showing how lack of 
information affects peoples' preferences preventing them from attaining genuine control 
over their life: A prisoner is locked in a cell, but the gaoler has accidentally forgotten to 
lock one of the doors, meaning the prisoner could walk through the door, but he does 
not know the door is not locked. Consequently, his liberty has not been interfered with, 
but his autonomy has been since, he has been manipulated into thinking all the doors are 
locked, so will not try to leave (Dworkin, 1988, p. 105). In terms of manipulation's 
being ethically acceptable, Elster in `Ulysses and the Sirens' (1976), believes that if a 
change in preferences is to be autonomous it must be the case `that the individual - if 
rational - would have done the same himself given the same knowledge about the causal 
process underlying the preference change' (Elster, 1976, p. 500). The key point here is 
with the same knowledge, so surely external rational requirements are essential to 
autonomy, because we can rarely know what another person would decide given the 
same information, prior to the fact. 
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External requirements of rationality are vital to autonomy. These requirements art;: 
1) Conditions to develop the necessary cognitive capacities for rationality in 
humans e. g. judgement. 
2) Absence of manipulation in the process of rationalisation. 
3) Availability of relevant information. It is then the process that is key, and the 
process of preference formation must meet Christman's three requirements to be 
autonomous. However the acceptance of these factors means we must address 
to what extent they need to be present to achieve autonomy. 
1.4.2.4 To what Extent should People be rational to be Autonomous? 
Autonomy as we have defined it is in danger of being indeterminate as it becomes 
unclear what minimal standards of rationality an individual would have to display in 
order to be judged minimally autonomous. The first variable is how many of a person's 
preferences need to be rationally formed for that person to be considered autonomous. 
Lawrence Haworth in An Essay in Philosophical Psychology and Ethics (1986), argues 
that when forming preferences `critical competence' is essential and should be used to 
find reasons which form these preferences. According to Haworth this process will lead 
one to achieve `normal autonomy. ' To achieve `full rationality', one must expose all 
one's preferences, beliefs, goals and values to this critical appraisal (Haworth, 1986, p. 
115). 
The second variable is how much rationality must be invoked when testing a particular 
preference. Not all people will consider the options, arguments and information to equal 
degree. There will be the extremes, those who consider and deliberate carefully over 
everything, and those who act merely on impulse and do not take any time to consider 
reasons for actions other than what they feel like doing at that moment. However, as 
Sccocia informs us most of us fall between these extremes and will take time to 
deliberate on decisions such as buying a house or selecting a career, but take little 
consideration when choosing a flavour of ice-cream (Scoccia, 1990, p. 321). Benn 
correctly recognises that this is not necessary as, `most of the autonomous man's actions 
would be appropriate but non- deliberate responses to situations falling into fairly 
standard, readily recognisable categories. Living according to principle does not 
demand continuous ratiocination' (Benn, 1976, p. 127). This is in accordance with how 
Wall distinguishes between two types of choices: Comprehensive options which are 
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fundamental to the formation of an agent's identity and peripheral options which are 
dictated by comprehensive options or are not related to comprehensive options (Wall, 
1998, p. 140). 
Scoccia also believes that it is possible for some people to be bad at deliberating and 
consequently to make more autonomous choices by acting on impulse as by doing so 
reflects their `true self' nd will more accurately. For example when choosing a car `X' 
they may make a more autonomous choice if she impulsively buys a car because it is 
red and she likes the colour red rather than finding out about its mileage, fuel economy, 
safety credentials and deliberating over these factors. This may be true although I am 
not entirely convinced. Benn accepts that someone could act autonomously on impulse 
if they were compelled to for the type of reason Scoccia outlines, but not because, `he 
acknowledges nothing as a reason for doing otherwise. Caring about nothing... ' as this 
will mean `he sees no point controlling the inclination of the moment' (Benn, 1976, p. 
124). In this instance the person is not self-determining and therefore not autonomous. 
For some people variety and spontaneity is the life that best suits them, but this does not 
mean that they have not decided this rationally. However, most people's lives do 
involve long-term commitments and aims and spontaneity could be a barrier to 
achieving these (Wall, 1998, p. 133). 
The third variable derives from an acceptance that an agent's desires are themselves 
important reasons for action (Sher, 1997, p. 52). If this is the case then there are many 
different reasons for action, but which reasons are the important reasons for acting in 
order to ensure autonomy. The first requirement is that these reasons must be 
relativised and contextualised so that it is reasons of which an agent is aware of in a 
given situation (Sher, 1997, p. 53). However, there are limits to the extent autonomy 
can be relativised in this manner. We cannot for instance say an agent acts 
autonomously if and only if they act on what they consider to be the strongest reasons 
for action at a specific time, as this would result in autonomy having no content at all, as 
any actions or reasons for action would appear autonomous even the insane. Moreover, 
the connection between acting autonomously and finding one's actual reasons for action 
would be lost (Sher, 1997, p. 54). In this sense an agent may not need to follow their 
`strongest reasons' to be autonomous, but instead their actual reasons. For example our 
group may have met in the centre of town and all reached a consensus that they were 
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going to gout to eat at an Italian Restaurant for their evening out. Supposing there are 
two Italian restaurants in town, both exactly the same distance away and as easy to get 
to as each other. The entire group may opt for `Lasagne Shed' because they love the 
lasagne they serve, it is inexpensive and the service is good. They may still think that 
the other restaurant also meets all these criteria, but these are still their actual reasons 
for opting for the restaurant they do. The point is that just because neither option has 
stronger reasons to be chosen does not mean a decision is not required. If this is 
accepted, Sher progresses from this to argue that a choice or action can be reason based 
even if there are stronger reasons to select an alternative option, and therefore still be 
autonomous. The basis of this argument is a distinction between rationality and full 
rationality. The conclusion is that `an agent may qualify as autonomous whenever he 
acts in response to reasons provided by what he knows about his situation that are at 
least strong enough' (Sher, 1997, p. 55). `Subjecting one's ends to scrutiny involves 
considering the reasons for and against doing what one prefers, and acting only on the 
preferences that survive. It also involves trying to modify any preferences that one 
finds good reason to abandon' (Sher, 1997, p. 47). 
I think it is the case that all have the potential to be rational and reflect on information 
and factors and make choices and decisions based on this reflection, which will shape 
their life. In fact it is the capacity, which is distinct to humans and is part of their very 
essence. It is undeniable that some have a greater ability for this type of rationality than 
others and this could well mean that they will be more autonomous. However, it does 
not imply that when making collective decisions the autonomy of the more rational 
should be valued above the autonomy of the less rational. In Considerations On 
Representative Government (1993, first published 1861), Mill advocates a plural 
conception of voting, where citizens that are more rational and more autonomous should 
have more votes. This is necessary to ensure that the masses would not subject the entire 
political order to `ignorance'. I would strongly oppose any suggestion that such an elitist 
conclusion should be drawn from the justification of democracy on autonomy, as 
outlined in this chapter. Firstly, I am very sceptical that a mechanism to accurately and 
fairly judge who the most autonomous citizens are, could be devised and implemented. 
I certainly would not agree with Mill that occupational status could be the guide to the 
allocation of votes. In the form autonomy is outlined here, a dustman could be more 
autonomous than a bank manager. Secondly, I would agree with Dworkin that what 
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matters is that all citizens have the capacity to be autonomous to a certain level, even 
though some will have the capacity well above this level, it does not justify a hierarchy. 
The fact that all are capable of this rational choice means all should have their chosen 
ends respected equally. Just because you are not as autonomous as some other citizens 
does not justify the abandonment of your autonomy altogether (Dworkin, 1988, pp. 31- 
32). What that certain level is, is very difficult to say and is essentially an empirical 
question which cannot be addressed here, despite the fact that it is of central importance. 
To summarise, the conditions to be autonomous are free choice and rationality. A 
choice is free if there is an acceptable range of options, there is knowledge of these 
options, the choice is not coerced and the preferences this choice is based upon are not 
the result of manipulation and seduction. A free choice must be free in the negative and 
in the positive sense to be autonomous. The preferences upon which these choices are 
made must be rationally formed, but it is the acceptance of the process and not the 
content of the preference itself, which is key. Internalist rationality must be invoked to 
ensure that these preferences are consistent and externalist rationality is also necessary, 
this involves the consideration of information and reasons for and against the 
preference. Finally there are different extents of these variables; people can rationally 
form more or less of their preferences, use more or less rational consideration when 
forming a particular preference, and use good or the strongest reasons. However, 
despite the fact that some people may make more rational choices than another, it does 
not justify inequality providing all are capable of rational choices to a certain degree. 
Held's definition of autonomy incorporates all these aspects: `Autonomy connotes the 
capacity of human beings to reason self-consciously, to be self-reflective and to be self 
determining. It involves the ability to deliberate, judge, choose and act upon different 
possible courses of action in private as well as public life' (Held, 1996, p. 300). 
However, communitarians claim that it is impossible for anyone to make a free and 
rational choice because we are all embedded and not atomistic. 
1.4.3 Autonomy Versus Embeddedness 
One of the main accusations against autonomy is that it is not possible, because 
autonomy requires us to be self-determining and make choices, but communitarians 
argue this is not possible, as we are completely socially determined, and therefore 
unable to make these choices. Because all people are the product of their society, they 
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cannot make choices as choices are based upon values, and desires, but these have been 
constituted in the person by the society itself. In short, they are saying choices do not 
come from the agent, but are imposed upon the agent, so the agent cannot be 
autonomous. The claim is that claims to autonomy require the rejection of this 
embeddedness theory. This section will consider the communitarian critique of 
autonomy and existentialism, but will ultimately defend the conception of autonomy 
agreeing with Simon Caney's view, expressed in `Liberalism and Communitarianism: a 
Misconceived Debate' (1992), that, `this argument fails because it foists upon liberals 
an implausible conception of autonomy' (Caney, 1992, p. 277). The criticism also 
makes an assumption that liberal theory's conception of autonomy is necessarily 
atomistic (Levine, 1993, p. 160). However as Raz argues: `The completely autonomous 
person is an impossibility. The ideal of the perfect existentialist with no fixed 
biological and social nature who creates himself as he goes along is an incoherent 
dream' (Raz, 1987, p. 155). The following discussion will hopefully lend support to 
Raz's argument, and show that the acceptance of the embedded individual does not 
mean a rejection of the liberal theory of autonomy if properly conceived. 
Michael Sandel's. arguments in `Morality and the Liberal Ideal' (1984) and in 
Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982) are considered classic statements of this 
view. For Sandel, `the notion of a subject prior to and independent of experience' is a 
`... a necessary presupposition of the possibility of freedom' (Sandet, 1984, p. 85). It is 
safe to assume, I think, that Sandei would feel it is equally necessary to have an 
`unencumbered self prior and separate from our goals and ends, to be autonomous. 
Consequently autonomy is impossible to achieve. Clarke succinctly sets out the core to 
the communitarian argument: `The autonomous self, it is often argued, does not exist 
and if the self did exist it would, in any case, not be autonomous' (Clarke, 1999, p. 1). 
Communitarians claim that people are not self-determining, but socially constructed 
and, the idea and value of autonomy is a creation of Western society itself. Clarke 
understands that to be autonomous, `includes both inner and outer components, a self of 
a certain kind and a world of a certain kind. The self must be capable of initiating 
action and the world must be capable of yielding to certain sorts of action' (Clarke, 
1999, p. 3). 
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Sandel is sceptical of the existence of a `freely choosing individual' because, 
individuals cannot conceive of themselves separately without consideration to their role 
and position within the community. This means one's ends or goals never define one's 
identity, but that each individual can assess these attachments as if they were separate to 
her (Sandel, 1984, p. 167). For Sandel such a conception is impossible, because people 
are constituted by and formed by the communities and environment that they grow up in 
and live in, hence we can never be separate from our ends. From this premise Sandel 
argues that, `if we are partly defined by the communities we inhabit, then we must also 
be implicated in the purpose and ends characteristic of those communities' (Sandel, 
1984, p. 167) Therefore the conclusion of the argument would be that we need to 
discover and live by these shared constitutive ends of our community, and not be given 
opportunities to choose new ends, because the individual does not choose ends. If we 
accept this argument there can be no such thing as an autonomous individual, selecting 
their goals and ends. Daniel Bell agrees, arguing: `I don't choose to love my mother 
and father, to care about the neighbourhood in which I grew up, to have special feelings 
for the people of my country, and it is difficult to understand why anyone would think 
that I have chosen those attachments or that I ought to have done so' (Bell in Barry, 
2001, p. 149). 
To be an `unencumbered self' s to be independent of one's own values, for them to be 
separate to the self in some important way is to suggest that there is `some subject "me" 
standing behind them' (Sandel, 1984, p. 86). It is therefore not the ends and desires I 
have that constitute my identity, that define, but something else that is more important 
than any of these. It is this very idea that Sandel and other communitarians criticise; for 
them it is not possible to separate, from one's desires and goals, because these define 
the person, and without which it is impossible to critically evaluate anything, because 
what would motivate that evaluation? What would it be based on? `To imagine a 
person incapable of constitutive attachments such as these (history, citizenship, family, 
community, nation) is not to conceive an ideally free and rational agent, but to imagine 
a person wholly without character, without moral depth' (Sandet, 1984, p. 86). To 
defend the idea of the self, Sandei requires two arguments. We must say how the self is 
separate from its ends and how the self is connected to its ends (Sandet, 1982, p. 54). If 
there is no such thing as the self, if people are entirely determined by society and its 
myriad of contingent factors, then there is no chooser making decisions forming desires 
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and goals in accordance with the sort of person they want to be. They are who they are 
and it is out of their control. Consequently autonomy is a myth. Clarke attempts to 
defend the idea of autonomy by arguing that just because something rises in 
`contingently precise circumstances' does not mean it does not exist. Everything exists 
in `contingently precise circumstances' including autonomous choices. Just because 
autonomy is exercised in such circumstances does not mean it is a pretence (Clarke, 
1999, p. 136). 
However, it does seem the case that if one's identity is predetermined by the social 
context then this devalues autonomy somewhat as part of the concept involves the agent 
forming and choosing their own identity: 
`If the notion of self-determination is given a very strong, definition- the unchosen chooser, the 
uninfluenced influencer- then it seems as if autonomy is impossible. We know that all 
individuals have a history. They develop socially and psychologically in a given environment by 
parents, peers and culture' (Dworkin, 1988, p. 12). 
his Marion Young highlights the critique that has emanated from feminist theory, that 
requires people to be independent to be autonomous: `Feminists (Gilligan and 
Friedman) have exposed this assumption as inappropriately individualistic and derived 
from a specifically male experience of social relations, which values competition and 
solitary achievement' (Young, 1990, p. 55). 27 
Gutmann realises that the way the conflict between the atomistic and situated self has 
traditionally been conceived, invites us to see the moral universe in dualistic terms: 
`either our identities are independent of our ends, leaving us totally free to choose our 
life plans, or they are constituted by community, leaving us totally encumbered by 
socially given ends' (Gutmann, 1985, pp. 316-317). This is a false dualism, because 
liberals need not and do not deny that people are socially constituted, and accept that 
there is no pre-social self. However, they need only to and do claim that there exists a 
self that can critically analyse the values and processes in society that has socialised the 
self. Nevertheless, Sandel maintains that this critical reflection, because it inevitably 
involves distancing oneself from what one is analysing, is always `precarious' and 
`provisional' because the 'point of reflection is never finally secured outside the history 
itself' Sandel, 1984, p. 91, my emphasis). Taylor sums up the argument thus: `The 
self which has 
. 
arrived at freedom by setting aside all external obstacles and 
27 For more detail on this argument see Gilligan (1982) and Friedman (1985). 
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impingements is characterless, and hence without defined purpose, however much this 
is hidden by such seemingly positive terms as "rationality" or "creativity"' (Taylor in 
Kymlicka, 1988, p. 186). Therefore a situationless person is incapable of autonomy. A 
person without any history, without any attachments, without any goals, desires and 
beliefs is difficult to imagine, and certainly such a person could never be autonomous. 
How could they ever make autonomous choices, when there is nothing to base the 
choice on? `The agent cannot choose, for there is nothing about her that would incline 
her to one option rather than another' (Lipson, 1995, p. 2264). 
Fortunately, there are several faults, which undermine Sandel's argument. Firstly, as 
Will Kymlicl a in `Liberalism and Communitarianism' (1988) has realised, Sandet has 
misrepresented the liberal argument, and its idea of perception of the self `What is 
central to the liberal view' asserts Kymlicka, `is not that we can perceive a self prior to 
its ends, but that we understand ourselves to be prior to our ends, in the sense that no 
end or goal is exempt from re-examination' (Kymlicka, 1988, p. 190). By this 
Kymlicka means the individual is capable of reviewing and revising their ends through 
rational thought and is able to change their mind and revise their goals in light of new 
information and different considerations. If this is the case then, `Our self is, in this 
sense, perceived prior to its ends, i. e. we can always envisage our self without its 
present ends' (Kymlicka, 1988, p. 190). This does not mean is that the self can be 
envisaged without any ends at all, but is just a matter of changing ends, for without ends 
one could not even engage in rational analysis of various ends. 
However, this does still not counter the communitarian argument that ends are not 
chosen, but discovered, as `constituents of our identity. ' Yet this claim seems to flout 
our natural instincts and understandings of ourselves. We do not sec ourselves as bound 
for life to certain ends and commitments, but believe we can (and do) make choices in 
life that change its direction and make new commitments, which alter our identity. It is 
certainly not the case that all people do make such choices. Some people seem so 
embedded in a particular social practice, that they become blinkered, unable to review 
that practice in any meaningful sense. Nevertheless to deny that no-one or even most of 
us are not capable of reviewing at least some of our attachments go against both 
instinctive and empirical evidence. 
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Mark Warren, in his very impressive study of Democracy and Association (2001), 
provides two reasons to prove how it is possible for someone to gain the necessary 
`critical distance' to `subject some elements of one's social context to criticism'. The 
first is `imagination'; people are able to think of and consider other alternatives and 
secondly they can furthermore, consider and express reasons for and against both these 
other alternatives and the present situation (Warren, 2001, p. 64). 
Sandel himself appears to admit that identity is not just a question of `discovery', but 
includes participation from the agent in forming that identity and the ends that 
`impinge' upon it, in this sense, `the bounds of the self (are) open and the identity of the 
subject (is) the product rather than the premise of its agency' (Sandei, 1982, p. 58). But 
if Sandel does accept this then surely he is accepting that people can reconstitute their 
identity and select new goals and ends at least in some form, in which case surely 
Kymlicka is correct to claim that, `at this point it's not clear whether the whole 
distinction between the two views doesn't collapse entirely' (Kymlicka, 1988, p. 192; 
See also Walzer, 1989, p. 21; Caney, 1992). Communitarians assert that the distinction 
is that we can interpret the social relations that we find ourselves in, in different ways, 
but we cannot reject these relationships, because we are `embedded' in them. Does this 
mean that someone who has been brought up as a Catholic can grow up and reject 
Catholicism in later life? Surely they can and have. Surely some people, brought up as 
atheists, re-evaluate their convictions to commit themselves to a religion? It does seem 
that people do critically evaluate goals and aims they `discover', and in light of new 
information, perspectives and experiences reject or alter these goals, establishing new 
ones. In this sense the individual is prior to any particular aims, but not prior to aims in 
generaL However, for our purposes it demonstrates that individuals can be a `chooser', 
and can be autonomous. Yet this is not to say that they will be unless the conditions 
necessary for autonomous choice are present (Raz, 1986, p. 312). 
People do change their minds; reflect upon their desires and alter them, make significant 
life style changes. In these cases it does appear that the self is able to reflect and review 
critically their desires, goals and even aspects of their personality and make significant 
changes. Such evidence does indicate that autonomy is possible. Clarke argues that 
what such critical reflection requires is for the "`I" to be sufficiently localised within the 
self that it can be distinguished and identified as a component within the larger self' 
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(Clarke, 1999, p. 105, my emphasis). Clarke eloquently argues that even if an 
individual's life is not metaphysically free/ autonomous in the sense that every aspect of 
it has been established and chosen by the agent, it does not rule out autonomy. This is 
because he can still 
`interpret it, if not in just any way I please, at least in a variety of possible ways that are uniquely 
my way of interpreting me. And this no one else is entitled to, or without force and/ or the 
distortion of me, able to do. Of course I might in making my self - assessment and my 
interpretation deceive myself about aspects of myself and my motives for acting and later I might 
change my mind or someone might do or say something to lead me to change my mind. But 
none of this matters to the centrality of the interpretations, for they are still mine' (Clarke, I999, 
p. 111). 28 
All Sandel has proven then, is Thomas Nagel's criticism that Rawls is wrong to talk of a 
`view from nowhere', as an unencumbered self does not exist. There is no original 
position, there are no people not formed and framed by their environment. This does 
not mean that within this framework choice becomes impossible, or that they are 
completely passive. It does not mean that people cannot critically review their 
attachments, reflect upon their desires and then make active choices and decisions about 
them. Clarke distinguishes between `the social and contingent self', which is 
determined by environment, and the `conditions of selfhood', which is not: 
`The former provides the content of identity, the latter provides the sense that the identity is 
mine. The former provides the sense of the social `me', the latter provides the sense of the 
slightly less social `I' that lies within the `me'. The former, therefore, appears more the product 
of happenstance while the latter provides the sense that happenstance, or not, it is still `1' that is 
subject to the happenstance. The former appears passive while the latter appears to be able to 
make some admittedly limited choices within the passive presentations of experience' (Clarke, 
1999, p. 151). 
Just because choice is limited, does not mean the choice is determined, or that the will 
is not free when making those decisions, which would indicate that autonomy, although 
restricted is possible, and provides important meaning to that life. If we do not accept 
this counter to Sandel's case then we must be led to conclude that only God could be 
autonomous, as only a God can be truly self-governing and self-determining in the 
sense that it forms its own nature, conditions and principles upon which to act, But this 
is a very strong requirement to be autonomous, as it essentially means equating 
autonomy with omnipotence (Clarke, 1999, p. 42). 
28 This is of course unless 'the someone' causes him to change his mind through coercion, seduction or 
manipulation, as discussed earlier. 
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The notion that individuals are embedded should not just be acknowledged in the sense 
that individuals are embedded in communities with other individuals, but also the 
broader ecological environment. As Eckersley argues the acceptance of the embedded 
individual acknowledges `that the well being of individuals is indissolubly linked with 
the well being of the broader social and/or ecological communities of which they are 
part' (Eckersley, 1996, p. 226). Unfortunately Eckersley takes a problematic ecocentric 
stance and attributes the possibility of autonomy to non-humans and ecosystems. As 
should be clear the way that autonomy has been presented here would eliminate non- 
humans and ecosystems from being autonomous, as they do not have the cognitive 
capacities for choice and rationality. However, as Ian Atkinson has realised in his 
discussion of autonomy and sustainability, in accepting that individuals are socially and 
ecologically embedded and acknowledging the effects this will have on autonomy does 
not mean we have to accept Eckersley's ecocentric stance (Atkinson, 2002, p. 87). 
Swindler sees the values and ideas that are induced in people through socialisation and 
culture not as a straightjacket, but as a resource of `symbols, stories, rituals and world- 
views, which people can draw upon to solve various problems' (Swindler in Santoro, 
1993, p. 137). Taylor concurs; because there is no objective content to being 
autonomous, it `cannot specify any content to our action outside of a situation which 
sets goals for us, which thus imparts a shape to rationality and provides an inspiration 
for creativity' (Taylor in Kymlicka, 1988, p. 186; See also Taylor, 1985, pp. 190-191). 
What these ideas of social embeddedness show us is not that autonomy is impossible, 
but rather that any theory of autonomy must meet Dworkin's standard of empirical 
possibility, which demands that: 
`There should be no empirically grounded or theoretically derived knowledge which makes it impossible or extremely unlikely that anybody ever has been, or could be, autonomous. Thus a 
theory which required as a condition of autonomy that an individual's values not be influenced 
by his parents, peers, or culture would violate this condition' (Dworkin, 1988, p. 6). 
Choices are always contextual (as is reason): `Autonomy is always bound, it is the 
binding that makes autonomy possible. Consequently some conditions, some prior 
aspects and features are required for its manifestation. Complete freedom in an 
otherwise empty universe is not autonomy: it is nothing' (Clarke, 1999, p. 174). 
58 
There are then cultural preconditions necessary for autonomous choice. Firstly to 
provide us with the rational capacities and secondly to ensure there is a plurality of 
choice (Caney, 1992, pp. 279-282; Wall, 1998, p. 140). The connection between 
pluralism and autonomy works in both directions as Wall has appreciated. Autonomy 
requires pluralism to ensure a varied choice of options and identities. However, 
pluralism also encourages people to be autonomous as the presence of a variety of 
differing lifestyles means people need to define themselves and be self-determining 
(Wall, 1998, p. 169). Walzer and Warren both argue that this plurality of choice is best 
provided by a diverse associational ecology (Warren, 2001; Walzer, 1989). However, 
this point does not alter our position as we have already accepted that autonomy 
requires the conditions of both negative and positive freedom. As Gould realises this 
means that we cannot control the choice of another agent, but can control the conditions 
that make this choice possible (Gould, 1988, p. 109-110). 
S. I. Benn's argument in `Freedom, Autonomy and the Concept of a Person' (1976), also 
concurs with this view because without cultural resources there would be no criteria and 
no `conceptual scheme' to base a choice upon. To be autonomous is, `not to have a 
capacity for conjuring criteria out of nowhere' (Benn, 1976, p. 126). The fact that 
culture and community provide resources to make autonomous choice does not rule out 
the possibility of being autonomous providing these resources are critically evaluated 
themselves. Benn continues: 
`Within this conception of a socialised individual, there is room to distinguish one who simply 
accepts the roles society thrusts on him, uncritically internalising the received mores, from 
someone committed to a critical and creative conscious search for coherence. The autonomous 
man does not rest on the unexamined if fashionable conventions of his subculture when they 
lead to palpable inconsistencies. He will ap$raise one aspect of his tradition by critical canons 
derived from another' (Benn, 1976, p. 126). 
Habennas accepts that people are not able to `choose' everything about their life due to 
the processes of cultural tradition, social integrating and socialisation. However, for 
him, the individual still has the ability to make autonomous decisions and form 
autonomous preferences, `by appropriating traditions, belonging to social groups, and 
taking part in socialising interactions' (Habermas, 1990, p. 102). In one sense then the 
" It is important to note the danger of circularity in this argument. We need some more criteria about 
how to distinguish between those who `uncritically internalise the received mores' and the autonomous 
person in order to break this circle. Otherwise the autonomous man may not be autonomous at all as `the 
critical canons derived from another tradition' may have been uncritically internalised. This problem is 
avoided providing the process of preference formation is accepted. 
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agent is a `product' of the traditions of her community, but also an `initiator' who 
controls situations through her own actions for which she then must be responsible. 
Habermas sees the lifeworld that provides the background to each individual, as a pool 
of resources that can be drawn upon when making interpretations of actions and 
forming beliefs and goals. Benjamin Barber, in Strong Democracy (1984) quotes Berger 
and Luckmann to explain simply and clearly how man inevitably and necessarily is a 
social creature, but can still be autonomous within that framework: `Man is biologically 
predestined to construct and inhabit a world with others. This world becomes for him 
the dominant and definitive reality. Its limits are set by nature, but once constructed, this 
world acts back upon nature. In the dialectic between nature and the socially constructed 
world the human organism itself is transformed. In this same dialectic, man produces 
reality and thereby produces himself' Berger and Luckmann in Barber, 1984, p. 215; 
See also Gould, 1988, p. 107). This agency of individuals is often collective, with 
individuals acting together to achieve common aims. Gould suggests that common 
activity is ontologically distinct to individual action, as it cannot be explained by 
reference to individual action by itself. She further warns that this activity may not be 
`common' at all, but simply appear so due to subordination. Nevertheless, the 
important point remains that the collective can be a constituted entity providing the 
subordination does not eliminate the capacity to change these relations through choice 
and action (Gould, 1988, p. 108). 
This idea of socially constructed people is taken too far by the communitarians and 
republicans and not taken seriously enough by the liberals. In this sense autonomy is 
contextual and dependent upon the prevailing social forms of society as Raz correctly 
conceived it as individuals are not entirely atomistic and cannot ever be separated from 
social norms, so there are only certain goals that can be valuable for a person within a 
given context: `They can be valuable only if they can be his goals and they can be his 
goals only if they are founded in social forms' (Raz, 1986, p. 310). Without certain 
social practices an individual cannot pursue certain goals e. g. Without the social 
recognition of `bird watching' one cannot be a `bird watcher' because otherwise this 
would apply to anyone who sees birds. 30 Custom and tradition are then not 
30 Gould (1988, pp. 105-106) makes a similar point about the need for social relations to be recogniscd in 
order to exist, but also notes that individuals must exist and also want to pursue them or else they only 
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incompatible with autonomy as an agent can rationally revue these connections and 
accept them. It is also unsurprising if they do as customs and traditions play a 
significant part in forming people' nature and rationality (Wall, 1998, p. 138). 
If societies are formed and changed through the actions of individuals and collectives 
then providing some of these actions and causes are intentional then it is possible for 
autonomous action to take place. In which case the task is to organise society to allow 
for all to have an equal role in making these collective decisions, which determine 
collective action, so that autonomy for all is equally cultivated. Such a situation is 
democracy. Surely then the idea that people are socially determined makes the idea of 
democracy even more essential as Robert Post in `Managing Deliberation' (1993), 
explains: `Through sophisticated forms of social engineering we manipulate the 
conditions of our environment, including the persons who inhabit it. We do not regard 
these government controls as fundamentally incompatible with the premises of 
democratic freedom because we conceive them to have been freely adopted by the 
citizens of a democratic state' (Post, 1993, p. 673). 
This discussion of communitarianism should therefore show that we should not consider 
individuals as entirely atomistic and neither does the concept of autonomy properly 
conceived require us to do so. We can still therefore provide `a coherent ontology in 
which individuality is given its full due but not at the cost of regarding individuals as 
isolated and abstract egos, standing in only external relations to each other' (Gould, 
1988, p. 105). In this sense the autonomous free and rational chooser is possible 
providing the individual is not seen as a complete isolated being and that it is accepted 
that society and environment will form this individual, but the right environment will 
actually make the critical reflection and choice among ends possible and not impossible. 
1.5. The Conflict Between Autonomy and Authority 
It has already been alluded to that there is a conflict between `being autonomous' and 
therefore self-determining and `authority', being compelled to act or not act in certain 
ways. However democracy necessarily entails authority. Consequently I will explore 
exist as an `object of thought'. This means neither individuals nor social relations can exist independently 
of each other. 
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three tensions that can manifest themselves between authority and autonomy. There are 
perfectionism, paternalism and majority rule, and each will be considered in turn. 
1.5.1 Perfectionism 
Autonomy is a value, and if we argue (as I do) that rights are necessary to ensure 
autonomy, we cannot claim, as some Kantians do, neutrality towards values. Not all 
people would accept the value of autonomy, for example those guided by self-sacrifice 
or self-abnegation, or religious fundamentalists. Many others may not rank autonomy 
as such an important value. To devise a system that guarantees the autonomy of all, 
could therefore involve paternalistic interference towards these people, but would it be 
justified? Benn suggests that, `someone who cared nothing for his ontological status as 
a natural person... need have no particular concern for autonomy', but what does this 
mean for autonomy as grounding for democracy, given democracies commitment to 
equality? John Gray argues that grounding liberal democracy on autonomy goes against 
pluralism as he suggests there are many good lives that are not autonomous, but should 
still be protected by liberal democracies (Gray in Wall, 1998, p. 163). Barry further 
argues that liberalism can provide the institutions to make autonomy possible, but 
cannot force people to do so, and those who do not wish to be autonomous should be 
free to be so (Barry, 2001, p. 121). `The ideal of autonomy... ' is for Barry `a 
conception of the good life like any other' and if the state pursued it, it would be as 
guilty of perfectionism as if it pursued and promoted a specific religion (Barry, 2001, p. 
123). The pluralist argument must accept that `the realisation of autonomy is not a 
necessary component of a fully good life for people who live in modern Western 
societies' (Wall, 1998, p. 164). 
Hopefully I have already established that there is and has been a connection between 
autonomy and justifications of liberal democracy. However, Gray's argument 
demonstrates that the view that the state should be neutral towards conceptions of the 
good life is also central to liberalism (Rawls, 1993; Nozick, 1974; Dworkin, 1985; 
Larmore, 1987; Nagel, 1991). `Political decisions must be, so far as is possible, 
independent of any particular conception of the good life, or of what gives value to life' 
(Dworkin in Sher, 1997, p. 20). 
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In Culture and Equality (2001) Brian Barry argues that liberalism 
is not and never 
should have been considered a justification of neutralism: `It would seem that 
for 
liberalism - or any other doctrine for that matter to 
be culturally neutral, there would 
have to be no existing (or possible? ) world-view with which it conflicts. 
Since this is 
manifestly absurd, the assertion that liberalism is not culturally neutral asserts 
something that could not conceivably be denied' (Barry, 2001, p. 27). 
Consequently, 
for him liberalism is neutral to the extent that it is fair, with fairness conceived as `equal 
treatment' (Barry, 2001, p. 28). Neutralists defend themselves by distinguishing 
between strong and weak neutrality. The strong version is consequentionalist, and 
suggests that the state must not pass laws or policies which `have the effect' of 
favouring any particular conception of the good life. The weaker conception of 
neutrality is deontological and means the state can be neutral providing it does not pass 
laws or policies `in order' to favour a conception of the good life. Now Barry is right 
that the stronger version of neutrality is impossible, but his arguments do not rule out 
the weaker version (Sher, 1997, p. 4). Now if the only conceivable conception of 
neutrality is that the reason why a government may act should be neutral, therefore 
reasons that are non-neutral must be ruled out of democratic debate (Larmore, 1987, p. 
44). Following this argument Sher provides a definition of the requirement of 
neutrality: `A law, institution, or other political arrangement is neutrally justifiable if 
and only if at least one possible argument for it (1) has neutral normative premises, and 
(2) contains no implausible premises or obvious fallacies, and (3) provides justification 
of reasonable strength' (Sher, 1997, p. 26). However as both D'Entreves and Sher 
realise what is reasonable, plausible and obvious are contentious issues themselves 
(D'Entrdves, 2002, p. 40; Sher, 1997, p. 26). Such a conception of neutrality will be 
unlikely to be achieved, as agreement on these factors is unlikely to be forthcoming. 
As Sher argues, one of the most important justifications for the neutral state is that non- 
neutral laws and policies restrict autonomy, and many liberals including Mill, Kant, 
Rawls, Ackerman, Waldron and Dworkin have made such claims. The essential 
premise of these theories is that to be autonomous one needs to be sclf determining, and 
so the individual agent must make their own decisions, but if the state promotes a 
conception of the good it, compels individuals to act in ways that they have not chosen. 
In this sense neutralism is justified on a particular conception of the good. Although 
this position appears inconsistent, it can be argued that the state must be neutral towards 
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the different beliefs, values and identities people can choose, but not just to autonomous 
choice itself. Now to hold this argument it is obviously essential to suggest why 
autonomy deserves this special treatment, but I have hopefully suggested why this is the 
case, at least in Western liberal democracies (Slier, 1997, pp. 14-15). However, this 
position only seems to acknowledge coercion as a method of government influence over 
choices and is therefore ignorant of the fact that government can influence the options 
that someone would want to select and pursue through manipulation and seduction of 
preferences and through what options for choice are made available (Sher, 1997, p. 36- 
37). This approach is often seen as perfectionist rather than neutral. 
Maurizio Passerin D'Entreves, in `Political Legitimacy and Democratic Deliberation' 
(2002), comes from a Habermasian tradition to argue that justifications of democracy 
based upon autonomy e. g. Raz and Kymlicka, are guilty of perfectionism (D'Entreves, 
2002, pp. 41-3). The central criticism of perfectionism is that `it will ultimately favour 
those individuals and groups whose conceptions of the good or well-being are 
predisposed to the value of autonomy' (D'Entreves, 2002, p. 42). Therefore any 
perfectionist justification of democracy fails to be truly inclusive. However, D'Entreves 
does accept that no model of democracy can be completely inclusive. Charles Taylor 
defends autonomy from such criticism by arguing that certain exclusions are inevitable, 
claiming that `liberalism can't and shouldn't claim complete cultural neutrality. 
Liberalism is also a fighting creed' (Taylor in Cooke, 1997, p. 280). All political 
theories have certain doctrines that lie at its heart and cannot be transgressed. Therefore 
the best defence of rights is not to claim them as neutral, but to say that a framework of 
rights enhances a conception of the good, that people should be autonomous in selecting 
their own aims and goals. Amy Guttman in `Communitarian Critics of Liberalism' 
(1985), makes a similar point, arguing that `we may accept the politics of rights not 
because justice is prior to the good, but because our search for the good requires society 
to protect our right to certain basic freedoms and welfare goods' (Guttman, 1985, p. 
311). D'Entreves also claims that this fact should not stop us seeking the most inclusive 
model of democracy possible (D'Entreves, 2002, p. 43). This model is claimed to be 
the deliberative model of democracy, a point with which I am in complete agreement 
and this thesis is centred around, this model of democracy. However, D'Entreves 
claims this is not a perfectionist model of democracy, as it contains no view of the 
`good life' (D'Entreves, 2002, p. 46). It does though seem to suggest certain aspects of 
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the good life e. g. political participation and rationality, which are surely not compatible 
with all conceptions of the good life. They are also key aspects of what it is to be 
autonomous, and in the following chapter I will argue that deliberative democracy is the 
model of democracy most likely to equally cultivate the autonomy of its citizens. In 
this sense even if deliberative democracy is not justified upon the value of autonomy it 
still seems to suffer from at least a mild perfectionism as D'Entreves has conceived it. 
However, I accept D'Entreves' point that justifying democracy on autonomy is 
perfectionist, all be it a mild, liberal perfectionism. 
Wall defines liberal perfectionism as `a perfectionist theory that holds personal 
autonomy as a central component of human flourishing' (Wall, 1998, p. 127). Hurka 
argues that by seeing autonomy as an intrinsic good, we `embrace a mild perfectionism' 
(Hurka, 1987, p. 361). Wall outlines two types of perfectionism: In type (1) 
perfectionism governments can intentionally and actively promote the autonomy of its 
citizens. In type (2) perfectionism the government can actively and intentionally 
promote certain pursuits over others (Wall, 1998, p. 197). 31 Wall's argument that type 
(2) perfectionism does not infringe upon autonomy, is based upon the argument, already 
accepted, that although autonomy is an intrinsic good it is not the only good. 
As Wall notes, Kymlicka and Waldron accept type (1) perfectionism, but rejects type 
(2) perfectionism, as it can involve coercion and manipulation, which as already 
discussed, goes against proper respect for autonomy, because it promotes certain values 
above others, without the agent accepting these values. Wall terms this the `non- 
discrimination argument' (Wall, 1998, p. 198). Essentially the main argument this non- 
discrimination argument is that it is impossible for the state to be neutral in respect of 
individual's autonomy. The state will always, it seems, coerce, manipulate and seduce, 
even if it tries not to, as these phenomena can manifest themselves as unintended 
consequences (Sher, 1997, p. 66). However, this seems legitimate if the justification 
and intention of the policies and laws is not to coerce, seduce and manipulate and 
restrict citizen's autonomy, unless it is an example of collective restriction, which I 
31 Here we see a further weakness in D'Entreves' argument, as he lumps both Kymlicka and Raz under 
the same perfection label. Although they are both perfectionists, D'Entreves fails to distinguish between 
these two types of perfectionism. Kymlicka rejects type (2) perfectionism, so is only a type (1) 
perfectionist. In contrast Raz accepts both types. 
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suggested was consistent with autonomy. The best hope is that decisions arc made 
democratically. 
This leads to the pragmatic argument, accepted by Kymlicka, in Contemporary Political 
Philosophy (1990), that type (2) perfectionism should be allowed, but that it is not the 
role of the government to pursue it, but rather through the democratic participation of 
citizens in civil society (Kymlicka, 1990, p. 219). The argument is based on a 
presumption, which will be pursued in more detail in chapter three, that government 
officials are too distant from citizens to be able to democratically decide what is of 
value and what should be promoted. If the government does impose its perception of 
what is valuable then this will infringe on the autonomy of the citizens' as they will not 
be self-determining. In contrast voluntary associations in civil society are much closer 
to citizens and could therefore provide are more suitable location for governance. 
Chapter Three then proposes an associational democracy, grounded upon perfectionism, 
as collective self-compulsion is legitimate providing this compulsion is democratic. 
Sher, who admits his book is not about political authority, does not address the 
decision-making mechanisms to ensure that collective compulsion is democratic. lie 
therefore assumes the current institutions and models of decision-making, present in 
liberal democracies, are compatible with democratic collective compulsion (Sher, 1997, 
p. 6). However, this assumption will be disputed in this thesis. 
We do not have to accept Bruce Ackerman's claim that autonomy is the ultimate good 
in order to maintain that autonomy is the normative core of democracy (Ackerman in 
Sher, 1997). Instead we can take Warren's claim that autonomy `is a fundamental 
political good. ' In defending this claim Warren distinguishes between the demands of 
political and social relationships, with the latter being less conflictual (Warren, 2001, 
pp. 62-63). Or at the very least we can claim that if autonomy does have an intrinsic 
good, some autonomous decisions are more important than others as Hurka explains: 
`It is more valuable to choose goals which organise and encompass many others 
subordinate to them in a means-end hierarchy' (Burka, 1987, p. 373). In this sense 
autonomy in forming central goals to our life is more important than the achievement of 
a specific goal like eating a plate of spaghetti without making a mess. The former 
dictates what other specific goals we will adopt (Burka, 1987, pp. 373-376). Political 
relations, being by their nature conflictual involves collective action and decisions to be 
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made which means that we must, `place a premium on clarifying interests and seeking 
influence through argument, thus making the concept of autonomy essential to that of 
political self-rule' (Warren, 2001, p. 62). 
In his social contract Rawls's citizens do not have private autonomy, but only political 
autonomy because he argues that citizens with religious faith would not accept private 
autonomy as part of political justice. However, as Maeve Cooke perceptively realises in 
`Five Arguments For Deliberative Democracy' (2000), `it is hard to see how citizens 
who did not affirm a conception of personal autonomy as self-authorship could be 
motivated to affirm the ideal of political autonomy presented by Rawls, or could 
coherently do so' (Cooke, 2000, p. 963). Neither is it clear why citizens would accept 
the importance and value of autonomy in public affairs, but reject it in private affairs 
despite religious beliefs. Surely though, if we do have a commitment to autonomy for 
all, we have a responsibility of recognising and incorporating into the decision-making 
process those who do not see autonomy as important. Cooke invokes such an argument 
against neutralism: `The denial of equal political recognition to such groups poses a 
moral problem precisely because we hold such an ideal' (Cooke, 1997. p. 281). If we 
consult the hypothetical example of collective decision-making outlined earlier and 
suppose that Chris had no interest in the value of autonomy and for this reason did not 
want to participate or have the opportunity to participate in the decisions about going 
out. If the others were committed to autonomy and believed everyone's autonomy 
should be respected equally, then they should still consult Chris about the decision and 
ask for his opinion, therefore providing him with the opportunity to have equal control 
and autonomy. However, they cannot force him to participate, and the same applies to 
society. It seems neutrality is very hard if not impossible to achieve, therefore some 
level of perfectionism is then necessary. I have suggested that this is best achieved 
through democracy, where all have an opportunity to participate in deciding what 
decisions will be made. This should be based upon the intrinsic good of autonomy as 
potential of other goods will only be realised if autonomously chosen. However, not all 
citizens will be interested in autonomy, so it should only be collectively sought in the 
political sphere. This though will inevitably involve paternalism even though citizens 
can decide not to participate. However, is this paternalism consistent with the 
cultivation of equal autonomy of all? 
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1.5.2 Paternalism 
Lindley rightly distinguishes between strong and weak paternalism. Strong paternalism 
is defined as `intervention to protect or benefit a person, despite that person's informed 
and voluntary denial of consent to the paternalistic measures proposed. ' Weak 
paternalism, `involves interference where there is (or believed to be) a defect in the 
decision-making capacities of the person interfered with, or where it is necessary to 
ascertain whether the person's behaviour is fully reflective' (Lindley, 1986, p. 64). We 
must consider both types of paternalism to see if they are consistent with autonomy. 
1.5.2.1 Weak Paternalism 
Equality seems to be central to this question. It seems apparent that if autonomy 
requires rationality then the more rational a person is the more autonomous a person 
will be. Therefore, not all people can be autonomous as each other if capacities for 
rationality are not evenly distributed. If people are not equally autonomous then does 
this mean that people's right to self determination (which 1 have been arguing derives 
from autonomy) is not equal either? In Christman's words, `if respect for autonomy is 
the basis of a general anti-paternalism, then the "sliding scale" conception of autonomy 
would, strictly speaking, allow differing degrees of paternalistic intervention according 
to the level of competence a person displays in decision-making' (Christman, 1988, p. 
116). If this were the case then autonomy would be a poor basis on which to justify 
democracy, as equal power and rights are integral to the idea of democracy. Dworkin 
defines paternalism as, `interference with a person's liberty of action justified by 
reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests, or values 
of the person being coerced' (Dworkin, 1988, p. 121). There arc two main views to 
this problem. The first is autonomy should always be respected and therefore that any 
voluntary decision cannot be interfered with. 32 The unifying theme behind the 
supporters of this view is that a decision can be voluntary and autonomous without 
being rational, and consequently that it is a violation of autonomy to interfere with such 
choices. I do not take this position, and have argued that rationality is a requirement of 
autonomy. Therefore, it is the second view that I will evaluate here. On this view 
autonomy is still a constraint, but if decisions made are irrational and therefore not 
autonomous is interference justifiable? The essential point is that an irrational decision 
32 Scoccia (1990) informs us of those who hold this view. They include: Feinberg, (1971), Arneson (1980) and Van De Veer, Donald (1986). 
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is not an autonomous one, and therefore interfering with it is not a violation of 
autonomy. 
Dworkin expresses this view when he provides the example of forcing people to wear 
crash helmets on motorbikes or seatbelts in cars. He believes such paternalistic 
intervention is justified because those who do not wear seatbelts or crash helmets arc 
acting irrationally. As he describes it they either weight the inconvenience too 
negatively or underestimate the probability of needing them or the possible extent of 
injuries (Dworkin, 1988, p. 125). The argument goes that if all agents were rational 
then all would wear seat belts and crash helmets; those who do not, are acting 
irrationally and not autonomously, and can thus be made to do so for their own 
benefit. 33 
Scoccia argues that there are three circumstances when paternalistic interference does 
not violate autonomy: 
1. Failure in economic rationality- The person has autonomous goals, but chooses poor 
means to achieve these goals, and the person would agree to the interference if she 
were fully rational. 
2. The individual has `low autonomy desires' and lacks the capacity to form `high 
autonomous desires' and the interference will maintain the individual's potential to 
form `high autonomous desires' in the future. 
3. Again the individual has low autonomous desires and the interference would 
increase the autonomy of their desires, and the person would not object to this 
interference if they were fully rational (Scoccia, 1990, pp. 330-331). 
By Scoccia's analysis the government is justified in forcing people to wear crash 
helmets and seat belts for their own good. Howvcver, such paternalistic actions still ;d 
impose values on the person that they have not chosen, and may not reflect their true 
33 Dworkin does not mention whether Sikhs could autonomously decide not to wear crash helmets. It 
seems apparent that it is autonomous, as they could not wear a helmet and a turban, which is an important 
part of their religious beliefs. However, Dworkin does suggest that Jehovah's Witnesses should not be 
made to have a blood transfusion because this is based on evaluative differences, so Dworkin might well 
extend this view to Sikhs. 
14 Crash helmets for motorbike riders is a better example as it has been proven that by not wearing a seat 
belt one is more likely to hurt others involved in an accident especially fellow passengers. Therefore the 
government would be justified in forcing people to wear seat belts to ensure the safety of others and 
protect their freedom, and so it is not necessarily an example of paternalism. 
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will and therefore deny them the opportunity of being fully self-determinate. How do 
we know what interference they would consent to if `they were fully rational'? It is an 
empirical impossibility. We only know what information and arguments will influence 
people and how it will influence them when it happens, we cannot presume such things. 
Such interference inevitably involves enforcing the values of one on to another, and 
therefore violating autonomy as the agent in question has not accepted the value or its 
process. What we must do is provide the circumstances to aid people to make rational 
decisions and make rational choices by providing them with the relevant information on 
such issues and giving them `training' to develop their rational capacities. (In modern 
societies we do this through education when people are children and thought of as not 
being competent to make autonomous decisions. Voluntary education can then follow 
when people are adults). 
The question is then, whether it is possible to anticipate consent. As has already been 
suggested people can be manipulated to consent to the manipulation and this could be 
the case with weak paternalism (Lindley, 1986, p. 67). Lindley further suggests that we 
can imagine an individual would not subsequently agree that the interference was 
justified. Dworkin's justification of paternalism is based upon the assumption that those 
who do not want to wear seatbelts and crash helmets would change their mind when 
presented with the facts of the risks they undertake, but what of people who are fully 
aware of the risks and still choose not to wear the seatbelt and crash helmet? In this 
sense Dworkin has to resort to saying the person is objectively wrong which is a case of 
strong and not weak paternalism (Lindley, 1986, pp. 68-70). 
J. S. Mill raised a more complex question for the legitimacy of paternalism. Should we 
allow people to commit themselves to slavery? His answer was no as, `by selling 
himself for a slave, he abdicates his liberty; he forgoes any future use of it beyond that 
single act.... ' I would agree with Mill, which does then open a window for paternalism 
providing it is motivated to ensure that autonomy is still preserved. It is legitimate to 
restrict autonomy at time a specific time to ensure the possibility of autonomy in the 
future. This is because the aim of autonomy is to be self-determining throughout ones 
life not just at any single moment (Lindley, 1986, pp. 72-73). 35 1 would also argue that 
's Whether this is as an example of weak or strong paternalism I am not sure as it is unclear whether the 
agent an autonomously wish to be a slave. Lindley discusses this issue (Lindley, 1986, p. 73-74). 
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this applies to individuals and collectives, so just as it is legitimate to paternalistically 
restrict an individual from committing herself to slavery, so it is also legitimate to 
prevent a collective committing themselves to an authoritarian government. Basing 
democracy upon autonomy is therefore justifiable paternalism for citizens who have no 
interest in being autonomous because it ensures that they will have the opportunity in 
the future. 
Elster quite rightly points out that many things that are mistaken for paternalism, are 
not, but just examples of the people (acting as a collective through democratic 
decisions) binding themselves, to avoid certain results occurring in the future. He gives 
the example of the ban on cigarette advertising, which marks an example of people 
ensuring they will not hear the voices of the Sirens and be compelled into taking an 
action they do not want (Elster, 1976, pp. 469-470). Such an example is an autonomous 
decision, and therefore not paternalistic. People can bind themselves autonomously, as 
this may well be done with the intention of bringing about the satisfaction of a different 
end. As Elster defines this: `To bind oneself is to carry out a certain decision at time tl, 
in order to increase the probability of another decision being carried out at time t2' 
(Elster, 1976, p. 470). However, it is only binding oneself if the decision at t1 reduces 
the feasible set of options at t2, otherwise at t2 the person is not actually bound by the tl 
decision. People can autonomously bind themselves, this works for both individuals 
and collectives, what is important is that the binding laws are democratic so people are 
actually binding themselves and not being bound by others for their own good. The 
former being compatible with autonomy, the latter being paternalism. Consequently, 
citizens can make a collective decision to bind themselves to wear seat belts and crash 
helmets, foreseeing that it will prevent them from not wearing them when in a rush or 
feeling temporarily rash etc and hence achieving what they see to be a rational aim. 36 
There is still the problem as to whether such legislation is `self binding or not if the 
agent has not consented to it, and this will be discussed in section 1.5.3. 
1.5.2.2 Strong Paternalism 
If it is the case that to be autonomous I would have to act rationally then is it 
permissible to force people to obey what I see to be the laws and outcomes of 
36 This is not to say that the present laws insisting on seat belts and crash helmets have been made in this way and were not motivated by paternalism. 
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rationality? By doing this one is actually helping these people to be more autonomous. 
In short autonomy combined with rationality could actually be used to justify 
totalitarianism and authoritarianism, and as previously suggested such forms of political 
organisation go completely against the idea of self-government, which is the essence of 
autonomy. 
Berlin, with his conception of positive liberty as being led by a rational conception of 
one's `real' interests, or one's `higher nature', demonstrates how positive liberty or 
autonomy as defined by rationality can justify coercive practices which arc the 
antithesis to negative liberty. If rational desires designate our `higher selves' then 
irrational impulses are our `lower nature'. Rawls seems to hold such a view. According 
to Rawls, to be autonomous requires one to be motivated by `higher interests' such as 
`justice' and `rightness' and not by `selfish interests' and desires for money, wealth, 
power, food and drink; being motivated by such interests one would be heteronomous 
(Rawls, 1993, p. 76). 37 As each individual is part of a social whole then one's `real' 
self is exemplified by the higher interests of all, which form an organic whole. 
However, as not all humans are equally rational (although it may be supposed that all 
have the potential to be rational) it is left to those who are the most rational, and who 
are aware of the `real' interests of society, to `force the others to be free' by conforming 
to laws set by the rational elite (which all would accept if they were fully rational) (At 
least this is what Berlin envisages as possible following the distinction of interests). 
Such a 
. 
situation would elevate society to a higher freedom. The obvious examples of 
proponents of this view are idealists from a republican background for example 
Rousseau who believed conformity to a `general will' was freedom and those who did 
not agree were simply mistaken as to what the general will was. This is obviously a very 
dangerous conception and can be used to justify forcing people to do or conform to an 
argument that they are against. In practice we have seen such a conception of freedom 
adhered to in the Soviet Union where the vanguard (supposedly rational and aware of 
the collective's `real' interests) led the masses (irrational and unaware of their situation 
as an oppressed class) to revolution and supposed higher freedom. What followed was 
31 This point is undermined by Rawls's inclusion of food and drink as selfish interests. We can only 
presume he meant consumption of these in the excess. Nevertheless it is the credibility of the idea of `higher' and `selfish' interests that we consider here, not what higher or lower interests include. 
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coercion of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat by the `vanguard'. 
311 It is a clear example 
of `the perils of using organic metaphors to justify the coercion of some men by others 
in order to raise them to a higher level of freedom' (Berlin, 1984, p. 24). 
Can the concept of autonomy avoid such coercion if it requires a rational conception of 
interests? Such an idea is totally at odds with the essence of what we want to obtain 
through the concept of autonomy, which is the sense of people being the author of their 
own lives. So are we doomed to `rational authoritarianism' if we consider autonomy or 
positive liberty as obedience to one's rational will? Connolly tries to defend positive 
liberty against Berlin's criticism by arguing, `it is never in itself a sufficient argument 
against an idea to say that it can be misused. That is true of all ideas. The appropriate 
questions to pose are, how clear and important is the idea when it is properly used? ' 
(Connolly, 1993, p. 144; See also Lukes, 1973, p. 56). This is not a sufficient defence 
though, as this conception of peoples' `real' interests or of people having `false 
consciousness' has been the source of justification for many undemocratic processes 
including limitation of suffrage and totalitarianism. It maybe not be because the idea 
has been misused, but due to faults embedded in the idea itself, so a more substantive 
defence is clearly needed. Such a defence comes from C. B. Macpherson who, in his 
excellent discussion of Berlin's essay in Democratic Theory (1973), realised that the 
outline of positive liberty presented by Berlin contains three different points 
(Macpherson, 1973, p. 108): A) The first is `the desire... to participate in the process by 
which my life is to be controlled... ' (Berlin, 1984, p. 22) B) In a fuller discussion of 
positive liberty, Berlin introduces the second point as the ability to be self-directing, to 
act and decide for oneself on conscious purposes and goals (Berlin, 1984, pp. 22-23) C) 
This second point leads to the third point that these goals should be rational and higher 
interests, which follows to positive liberty being conformity with the rational desires of 
all society. 
Now Macpherson argues, correctly I feel, that `B' (being self directed) is dependent on 
`A' (having a share of sovereignty and participating in decisions): `Without `A' the 
man who cannot participate in the making of political decisions is governed by rules 
made entirely by others i. e. is directed entirely from outside himself, which is 
38 As Levine (1993, p. 161) notes, Berlin does not advance this view, but comes `perilously close'. 
However, this view can be found in Talmon, (1952) and Popper, (1962). 
73 
inconsistent with `B" (Macpherson, 1973, p. 109, my emphasis). As such, the first two 
parts of Berlin's concept of positive liberty are mutually supporting and therefore make 
sense to come as a package. In contrast `C' (conformity to objective rational standards) 
is at odds with negative liberty (as it allows for coercion); with `A' as it allows elitist 
rule; and B' as it allows for some to decide for others (Macpherson, 1973, p. 110). In 
which case `C' does not follow logically from `B' as many have maintained and is 
therefore not a necessary nor a desirable part of the conception of positive liberty/ 
autonomy. 39 Thus Dworkin defines the core notion of autonomy as, `the ability of a 
person to effectuate his decisions in action' (Dworkin, 1988, p. 105). However, the 
process by which these decisions are formed must be conscious and rational. 
The key aspect of the connection between rationality and autonomy is that the reasons 
supplied for motivation and justification are one's own and have been accepted and not 
resisted by one-self, that this lack of resistance was based upon self reflection that was 
rationally motivated and not due to self-deception. It is still possible that on further 
reflection later, these values and decisions will be rejected, but this is why values, 
beliefs and principles are the persons as Benn explains: `They are his, because the 
outcome of a still-continuing process of criticism and re-evaluation' (Benn, 1976, p. 
124). Cooke agrees arguing: 
`The reason why the exercise of rational accountability promotes the specific identity of the 
individual is that the reasons she provides in defending her position, or in challenging that of 
others, must always be her reasons, in the sense that she must work them out for herself and no 
one may (without her consent) speak on her behalf (Cooke, 1997, p. 274). 
This means the claims are self-determined and represent her will, as the agent herself 
has formed her preferences (Kant, 1964, p. 116). 
The rationality required for autonomy that was spoken of above is not some form of 
objective rationality, that can be decided by others for the person, but is the formation of 
goals for self-direction, that are consciously and rationally formed in light of available 
information. For aims, goals, preferences, values and desires to be autonomous the 
content is largely irrelevant, it is their process of formation which makes them 
autonomous if the motivation for the desire has come from the person and the options 
39 Macpherson (1973, p. 113) suggests that the idea of C, has arisen from both theoretical and practical 
solutions to the problem of impediments to maximisation of'B' s' developmental power. 'Among those 
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and their implications have been critically scrutinised then they will 
be autonomous. 
There is no objective content to autonomous preferences, because, 'we can 
imagine 
cases where an agent would have good reason to have such a desire. 
Hence, we can 
also imagine that the person is autonomously guided by those good reasons 
in 
formulating that desire, and so by token we can imagine it as autonomously formed' 
(Christman, 1991, p. 23). It is then the process by which people form beliefs and make 
decisions, which depicts whether or not they are autonomous and not the content There 
are no `higher' or `lower' interests as Rawls indicates, only more or less rationally 
formed goals dependent on the level of consideration and amount of relevant 
information available. 
Strong paternalism is not then consistent with autonomy, but neither does the concept of 
rational autonomy suggest that it is and we would only be guilty of strong paternalism if 
we forced citizens to participate when they didn't want to. I now want to turn my 
attention to whether the autonomy of all can be preserved in collective decision-making. 
1.5.3. Minorities in Collective Decisions 
We have described how those in the majority are self-determining and therefore 
autonomous in democratic decision-making, and why those who are not interested in 
preserving their autonomy should still be ensured the opportunity to be autonomous in 
the future, however, what of those people who are involved in democratic collective 
decisions and want to preserve their autonomy, but are in the minority on these 
decisions. In what sense can they be autonomous if the majority, with whom they 
disagree, compels them? There have been many notable attempts to resolve this 
tension, three of which will be considered here. Firstly, Rousseau's general will, 
secondly Wolffs unanimous agreement both of which will be dismissed as will 
Graham's revision of Wolff (Graham, 1982). Finally, I shall argue that a normative 
conception of authority combined with a distinction between individual and collective 
autonomy provides the most promising route to a resolution between these concepts. 
impediments are some men's lack of access to the means of life and labour. Failure to see this and to follow it up appears to be the cause, directly or indirectly, of the emergence of `C" (My emphasis). 
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1.5.3.1. Rousseau and The General Will 
Rousseau sums up the tension between autonomy and authority: `The fundamental 
problem' to solve is to `find a form of association that defends and protects the person 
and goods of each associate with all the common force, and by means of which each 
one, uniting with all, nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as bef'ore' 
(Rousseau, 1968, p. 60). How can people gain the advantages of being in a collective 
and yet still maintain the autonomy one requires as an individual? For Rousseau the 
solution is for all to, `put his person and all his power in common under the supreme 
direction of the general will' (Rousseau, 1968, pp. 60-61) 4° In this conception, 
autonomy is only ensured when all citizens will the same thing, which is the general 
interest. It is then impossible for autonomous citizens to be in conflict. This is not to 
say that there will be complete agreement as to what the general interest is, but 
Rousseau presumed that the majority would be correct on this manner. Therefore the 
minority can be forced to comply with this general will and still be autonomous as they 
are being ruled by laws to which they would have agreed if they had interpreted the 
general interest correctly. Manin criticises the republican view of Rousseau for its lack 
of recognition of minority opinions because majority opinion is interpreted as the 
general will, because despite Rousseau's suggestion that majority opinion represents the 
interests of all, Manin argues minority opinion is in no way incorporated into the will of 
the majority and so institutional design must ensure minorities can still register their 
opinions and arguments even if they are not accepted by the majority if autonomy is to 
be maintained (Manin, 1987, p. 360). Their participation in the decision- making 
process would be meaningless and no part of their lives would be protected from the 
majority will. As a result I have to agree with Michael Lessnoff, in `Social Contract' 
(1986), that Rousseau's general will, ` does not adequately cope with the possibility that 
the individual may still be oppressed by the sovereign body operating by majority vote' 
(Lessnoff, 1986, p. 82). 
1.5.3.2. Wolff and Unanimous Agreement 
Wolff describes the tension between autonomy and authority pertinently: `The defining 
mark of the state is authority, the right to rule. The primary obligation of man is 
40 It is essential to appreciate the difference between the `general will' and the `will of all. ' The general 
will is a judgement upon the common good, while the will of all is the aggregation of private interests 
(Rousseau, 1968, pp. 72-75). 
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autonomy of the individual and the private authority of the state. Insofar as a man 
fulfils his obligation to make himself the author of his decisions, he will resist the 
state's claim to have authority over him' (Wolff, 1976, p. 18). It is undeniable that there 
is a conflict between autonomy and authority, but it is only because Wolff has such a 
strong conception of autonomy that he sees it as inconsistent with any type of authority, 
other than the utopia of unanimous direct democracy. Wolff following Kant believes 
autonomy is the `primary obligation of man. ' Dworkin criticises this, pointing out that 
such a strong conception of autonomy is also incompatible with promising and 
commitment and therefore, `has no claim to be the supreme value' (Dworkin, 1988, p. 
26). Consequently Dworkin claims that authority can be consistent with autonomy if 
we reject substantive independence and providing consent to the authority comes from 
the agent. For example, Wolff would consider an agent who decides to do whatever his 
mother tells him to do, heteronomous. In Contrast Dworkin argues just because we 
know what an agent's mother wants does not mean we can tell what he will do. We 
must appreciate that his conviction is to do what his mother wants first, and there is 
nothing to stop him changing this conviction. Also the decision to obey his mother 
could be a perfectly rational and autonomous decision. His main aim maybe to please 
his mother, or through his experience he may know that his mother's advice is very 
good. Either way he has chosen his own ends and is pursuing them, so how could such 
a decision not be autonomous? In the same manner a decision to join the army, or a 
monastery can be an autonomous decision if made freely and rationally. Likewise when 
we make a promise, have children, get married we limit our substantive independence, 
but these are still constraints that we can choose autonomously (Dworkin, 1988, pp. 21- 
23; see also Wall, 1998, p. 170). 41 In light of this it seems that constraints are 
compatible with autonomy if the are constraints that are chosen, or consented to by the 
actor(s) in question after rational scrutiny of the available options 42 43 
41 It is important to note that it is not the case that all people who have got marred, joined the army etc 
have chosen to do autonomously. It just means that it can be an autonomous choice. 42 Promising and other types of pre-commitment can therefore be perfectly compatible with self 
government providing these commitments are autonomously made in the first instance. 3 The famous example of Odysseus and the Sirens was considered earlier and showed how constraints 
can be autonomous. Knowing the dangers of the Sirens and not wanting to be lured by them to cash on 
to the rocks, Odysseus orders his men to tie him to the mast and ignore all subsequent orders to untie him- 
He is making a conscious and rational decision to limit his liberty in order to save himself and his men. 
When he hears the Sirens he desperately desires to go towards them and is not free to do so, but prior to 
this he was aware that this desire would not be a rationally formed one and did not represent his true will. 
He constrained himself to advance his autonomy. Likewise a collective can make a democratic decision 
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The only form of government that Wolff sees as being legitimate and preserving the 
autonomy of all is unanimous direct democracy, because only through such a system 
does, `every member will freely every law which is actually passed' (Wolff', 1976, p. 
23). As people who are ruled by laws they themselves have willed and consented to are 
autonomous, autonomy is reconciled with authority. 44 Wolff is therefore against 
majority rule because although the autonomy of the majority is maintained as they have 
willed and consented to the laws that have been passed, the of the autonomy of the 
minority is abandoned because they have not willed or consented to the law, but are still 
coerced to obey it. Wolff concludes that unanimous direct democracy is the only way to 
preserve autonomy. However, in modem plural societies reaching unanimous 
agreement seems too high a demand for authority to be legitimate as it is unlikely to 
ever happen (Waldron, 1993, p. 406). Moreover it will lead to the preservation of the 
status quo and will therefore tend to benefit established interests and dominant social 
groups (Mansbridge, 1996, p. 48). 
As well as the practical problems of requiring unanimous agreement for collective 
decisions to be legitimate a commitment to the idea that a decision made must have 
unanimous support from the collective gives some members of the group more 
influence than others because the single dissenting voter can effectively veto the 
decision, they have equal weight to all the rest of the members put together. Emily has 
equal control to the other four combined. Ironically then Wolffs attempt to ensure that 
the autonomy of all citizens is equally cultivated by demanding unanimity, actually 
leads to the unequal cultivation of autonomy. Simmel argues that the majority rule 
shows a commitment to unity, and that demands for unanimity are based on possessive 
individualism as no decision can be made without the consent of all, while majority rule 
is a commitment to, `the ideal that the unity of the whole must, under all circumstances 
remain master over the antagonism of convictions and interests' (Simmel in 
Mansbridge, 1980, p. 260; See also Gould, 1988, pp. 236-237). Barry is also in favour 
of what he terms `the majority principle', because if unanimity impossible, it is hard to 
see why the decision should go in favour of the minority (Barry, 1991, p. 27). 
to constrain themselves and enhance autonomy in the process e. g. The wearing of crash helmets or the 
banning of cigarette advertising (Dworkin, 1988, p. 106). 
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To have a realistic conception of legitimate authority we must abandon Wolff's idea of 
unanimous agreement, and form a conception that allows collective decisions to be 
made when not all have agreed. Without this requirement democracy could never be 
legitimate4S because it seems there will always be minorities in decisions. How then 
can collective decisions be made and the autonomy of minorities be preserved? 
In analysing Wolff's argument in `Democracy and the Autonomous Moral Agent', 
Keith Graham (1982) argues that we must aim to maximise autonomy and that majority 
rule is the best way to achieve this, as we must treat all citizen's autonomy equally. This 
commitment to maximising autonomy is based upon Wolf''s own claim that autonomy 
should be relinquished as little as possible, but that sometimes it is rational to relinquish 
it to some degree. If this is the case then Wolff, following in the Kantian tradition, must 
want to universalise the maximization of autonomy, and majority rule achieves this: `If 
most decisions favour a certain state of affairs, less damage will be caused to the 
maximization of autonomy if that state of affairs is brought about rather than not. Or, to 
put it more simply, if you want to maximize autonomy where people disagree, accept 
majority votes' (Graham, 1982, p. 133). 46 I think Graham's argument for majority rule 
as the decision-making framework most compatible with the preservation of autonomy 
for all, is right, but there is still a key problem; in what sense is the autonomy of those in 
the minority preserved? 
A necessary element to achieve this comes from Ross Harrison in his analysis of 
Democracy (1993). He suggests that it is important `that any particular individual is as 
likely to be in the majority as any other, then through time this system will allow any 
individual to increase their choice or control' and consequently increase their autonomy 
(Harrison, 1993, p. 173). So the others are justified in making Emily go to the Italian 
restaurant because her autonomy should be treated equally to the others. Emily still has 
an opportunity of being in the majority on other decisions. For example what time to 
book the table, and may have been in the majority on the decision to go out on Tuesday. 
Such an idea is imbedded in the Roman maxim `Quod omnes tangit ab omnibus tractari et approbari 
debet' (what touches all must be approved by all). as At least in societies that strive to enhance the autonomy of all equally or in very homogenous societies. 461t is important to note that this principle of the maximisation of autonomy is based upon maximising 
the number of autonomous people rather than to maximise the autonomy of each and every member. 
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The claim here is that in a specific situation a minorities' autonomy is not cultivated, 
but his does not matter providing those who are in the minority on this decision are in 
the majority on others. A democracy cannot therefore operate with permanent 
minorities, because they would never be in the majority and so there autonomy would 
not be cultivated through any decision. For example, if a majority of people decided that 
all who drive motor bikes should wear helmets, they could force the minority, who were 
against this idea, to do so legitimately as those who do not want to where a helmet will 
be as likely to be in the majority on other issues. 47 48 
This argument is dependent upon autonomy not being an absolute: 
`The block which autonomy seemed to provide to every sort of government, including 
democracy (except unanimous democracy), depended upon treating it as an absolute. Nothing at 
all was to be allowed that interfered in any way with this autonomy. So if anything was 
considered which would depend on no other will than the will of the individual in question, it 
was forbidden with their autonomy. Autonomy could not be compromised and any decisions 
affecting an individual had to flow only from the will of that individual and no-one else' 
(Harrison, 1993, p. 171). 
is autonomy `an all or nothing affair? ' Meaning that you are either autonomous or you 
are not, or does it make sense to talk of autonomy in degrees in the sense that you can 
be more or less autonomous? I think it is the latter. As Van Hees realises in `Acting 
Autonomously Versus Acting Heteronomously' (2001), a person can therefore be more 
or less autonomous than another in two senses. Firstly, a person can make autonomous 
decisions and choices more often than another. Secondly, a person can, `express more 
autonomy in her actions' (Van Hees, 2001, p. 3; See also Young, 1986, p. 51; Levine, 
1993, p. 160). Morris Lipson disagrees and in `Autonomy and Democracy' (1995) he 
suggests that, `an agent who is under the influence of a demagogue... might not be 
autonomous if she is unable to make choices except insofar as the demagogue tells her 
what to "choose", because she is unable to base her choices on her own deliberations. 
47 To return to an earlier discussion, this would not necessarily be an act of paternalism because the 
majority maybe convinced by the consideration that it should be compulsory to ensure that if they ever 
did use a motorbike they would not be tempted not to wear a helmet. It is likely that different people in 
the majority would be in favour of compulsory helmet wearing while riding a bike for different reasons 
and some may be motivated by paternalism. °s This is not necessarily the case in terms of Sikhs as they cannot wear a turban and a crash helmet at the 
same time, and the wearing of a turban is vital to their religious beliefs. In most Western societies Sikhs 
are a minority, and although they may well be in the majority on other decisions, in terms of the issue of 
crash helmets and motorbikes if they are in the minority their autonomy is compromised because they 
must choose between their religious beliefs or their desire to ride a motorbike, both of which can easily be 
considered autonomous choices. In such cases different rights are required to protect the autonomy of 
such minority groups. For a discussion of this see Bhikhu. For an opposing view see Barry (2001). 
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Either an agent has that power or she doesn't; it doesn't make sense to say that she 
possesses it to some degree or other' (Lipson, 1995, p. 2273). lie tries to defend his 
position by distinguishing between personal autonomy and autonomous choice. 
According to this analysis, autonomous choice can come in degrees because it refers to 
the conditions that make it possible for choices to come from the agent. However, this 
does not mean that the agent makes all choices, or that the agent considers each choice 
to equal degree. Therefore, an agent's personal autonomy is irrelevant to the autonomy 
of their choices, which can come in degrees. This seems a peculiar position, as surely 
personal autonomy is dependent upon being able to make autonomous choices and 
decisions, and being able to determine the conditions under which one has to operate. 
Lipson is correct to claim choices can be more or less autonomous, and that this is 
determined by external and internal factors, but the extent to which someone makes 
autonomous choices is the extent to which they are autonomous. If they are not one and 
the same thing, they are certainly linear values. Furthermore, we have seen that people 
can be more or less rational and have more or less opportunities and options for choice, 
both of which are central to autonomy. Young compares this autonomy with the word 
`bald', to be completely `bald' would mean someone has no hair at all, but we still use 
the term to describe people who have lost a significant amount of hair. It is then a term 
of degree, like autonomy. To classify exactly how many or percentage of hairs a person 
needs to have lost to be classified `bald' is both idle and impossible and the same is true 
for autonomy (Young, 1986, p. 70). What it is necessary to suggest is that autonomy is 
an essential value of democracy and that democratic arrangements and institutions 
should be judged to the extent that they cultivate the autonomy of all equally. The 
arrangement that best achieves this is the one that should be implemented. 
Therefore it seems autonomy does come in degrees in a similar way that democracy 
does. It makes sense to say when comparing political arrangements, that one is more 
democratic than the other. The extent to which an arrangement is democratic depends 
on how great an opportunity there is for all citizens to participate and exercise popular 
sovereignty in collective decisions, and to the extent that citizens' rights of personal 
freedom are protected in line with Beetham's definition of democracy. For example, I 
think it is fair to say that most people would agree that Chile is less democratic than 
Sweden, but again most people would want to say that Chile, with its elected 
representatives, is democratic to a certain extent. Likewise then autonomy is 
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maintained in certain degree, depending on the opportunities people have for self- 
determination, so that they are the authors of their own arrangements. The door to the 
compatibility between minorities and the cultivation of their autonomy may be opened 
if autonomy is interpreted as not being an absolute however, this suggestion still 
requires further development. 
1.5.3.3 A Normative Conception ofAuthority 
Gould provides a solution by accepting Graham's majority rule principle, but rejecting 
his justification for it. For her, it is not the maximisation of autonomy that justifies 
majority rule, but equal agency. This means that majority rule should be accepted 
providing that all have equal opportunity to participate in making these decisions 
(Gould, 1988, p. 233). Equal agency is preserved because, `no one has more right to 
effect his or her will in joint decision than has any other and that each one is bound to 
respect the equal dignity of each of the others' (Gould, 1988, p. 237). The decision does 
not then just originate from the majority, but the collective as a whole. 
Nevertheless, even in a democracy where all have a chance to participate in making 
these decisions there will be a conflict between the resulting authority from that 
decision and individual autonomy. Thomas Christiano sums up the incompatibility that 
inevitably arises between autonomy and authority when making collective decisions in a 
democracy in his article on `Freedom, Consensus, and Equality in Collective Decision- 
Making' (1990): `I cannot be free to determine the course of an activity I share in 
common with others in a democracy. For whatever I want done must require the assent 
of some proportion of the other participants' (Christiano, 1990, p. 158). Despite the 
fact that I can participate in the decision-making process I do not have complete 
autonomy to make the decision. Christiano concludes therefore that democracy and 
self-rule are incompatible. Although there is no necessary reason why autonomous 
action and choices, and a process of self realisation should be incompatible with 
community interests in many cases, however this will not be the case all or even most 
the time in reality, especially if we consider modern plural societies. Conflict between 
the individual and community demands seem inevitable, and those who form a minority 
in democratic decisions will therefore lose their autonomy. A return to our hypothetical 
example will demonstrate this. Let us presume that all our friends have now rationally 
formed their preferences based upon available information, and had acceptable choices 
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to choose from when doing so. Let us also imagine they have all agreed to go out on 
Tuesday. Now if Andrea, Bob, Diane and Chris all agree that they should go out for an 
Italian meal at `Lasagne Shed' but Emily wants to go to the pub quiz at the `White 
Swan', Emily is the minority and is not in control of her life so how is she sclf- 
governing? 
Consequently, Gould proposes a normative conception of authority, which is compatible 
with autonomy, and claims that democratic institutions should aim to approximate this 
normative conception. The basis for this normative view of authority is that it is 
compatible with equal agency of all citizens, and so authority should not be based upon 
hierarchical relations with some people imposing authority upon others. The normative 
view of authority that Gould outlines perceives, 'individuals as internally related in their 
pursuit of common aims as a condition for common action. Such a shared understanding 
implies an intentional relation both to the common purposes and to rules or procedures 
that are followed in their joint activity' (Gould, 1988, p. 222). In this sense the 
individuals act as a collective exercising authority over each other as a collective. 
Therefore, Gould distinguishes between individual autonomy and collective 
autonomy. 49 She claims that, `since the form of such common activity (making 
collective decisions) differs from individual activity, in which one makes decisions 
about one's own actions independently of others, the nature of decision-making in 
common activity must also differ' (Gould, 1988, p. 89). Collective autonomy is 
therefore different to individual autonomy. The latter is the formation and pursuit of a 
private goal, the former is a collection of individuals forming and pursuing shared goals. 
Now in collective action the autonomy of the individual can only be preserved through 
her free participation with the others in the determination of these collective goals and 
formation of means to achieve them. This can be construed as a sacrifice of autonomy 
only if autonomy is viewed in the narrow sense of having total sovereignty to pursue 
specifically personal goals. Arendt eloquently describes how this is not possible by 
comparing freedom with sovereignty, but the analysis works equally well if freedom 
49 Warren also distinguishes between the autonomy of the individual and the autonomy of the collective. 
Following Habermas (1996a), he terms collective autonomy `political autonomy. ' The same distinction is 
made by Doyle who classifies the difference as. individual and social autonomy or negative and positive 
autonomy (Doyle, 1990, p. 82). 
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were replaced with autonomy. She argues that it is a mistake to think that autonomy 
can be unlimited or complete control as this confuses the term with sovereignty: 
`If it were true that sovereignty and freedom are the same, then indeed no man could be free, 
because sovereignty, the ideal of uncompromising self-sufficiency and mastership, 
is 
contradictory to the very condition of plurality. No man can be sovereign because not one man, 
but men inhabit the earth' (Arendt, 1958, p. 234). 
Implicit in this statement is the idea that because people share the earth with others, they 
must share sovereignty as well. Due to this fact and the fact that individuals wills are 
not the same, absolute personal autonomy cannot be achieved, but the equal autonomy 
of all can still be maintained if all have the chance to participate equally in collectively 
determining the goals of society. 
The argument is that we should not conceive autonomy as an absolute. Autonomy in 
collective decisions differs from autonomy in individual decisions, as it aims to achieve 
we have an equal chance to determine these collective decisions to ensure that the 
intrinsic connection between agency and autonomy is preserved and each agents 
autonomy is respected equally. However, Warren has realised that it is not just equal 
participation that is necessary to achieve equal respect for autonomy, but the type of 
participation in collective decision-making also has an effect. 
The necessary connection between autonomy and rationality has hopefully already been 
established, however, now we can see that collective decisions are different from 
individual decisions because they are public and political. Earlier I argued that 
individual opinions would be more autonomous if more relevant information is made 
available and hence extemalist rationality was necessary. If opinion formation is 
undertaken publicly more information can be generated if citizens share information and 
provide justification for their opinions. If autonomy is to be preserved in collective 
decisions, it is necessary, but not sufficient for these individual opinions to be 
autonomous because collective decisions differ from individual ones as Warren 
explains: `It is a distinct ideal because it involves modes of validity (and hence 
influence) that are not, shall we say, `epistemological': the influence of political 
judgments does not derive from the relationship between mind and object (whether fact 
or norm), but rather from interactions among individuals who recognise the validity of a 
claim and thus its authority' (Warren, 2001, p. 65). This means if individual decisions 
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needed to be based on a critical reflection of the available information, collective 
decisions need this critical reflection to be public. Reasons for opinions must therefore 
be provided and justified, by each individual who participates in the collective decision, 
to all the other participants: `Unless the interests and commitments individuals express 
are their own, unless they can justify the positions they take with reasons and do so in 
situations free of coercion or economic dependency, unless they have access to adequate 
information, it is just as possible that their opinions arc the result of unreflective beliefs, 
propaganda or other unreflective modes of influence, coercion, or forced collusive 
interest' (Warren, 2001, p. 64). Jeremy Waldron, in Liberal Rights (1993), holds a 
similar view arguing that `respect is owed to minority opinions. They should be aired in 
debate, and be given an effective opportunity to win supporters' (Waldron, 1993, p. 
425). Individual autonomy can still be enhanced when political autonomy is enhanced, 
because both political and individual autonomy require every individual to be included 
in the decision-making process (Warren, 2001, p. 67). 
If democratic decision-making processes derive their legitimacy from maintaining 
autonomy of the citizens, it seems that a decision-making procedure increases 
autonomy, by allowing more participation from participants, and providing them with 
access to more relevant information and ensuring that the preferences which are 
incorporated into the decision-making processes are rationally formed and therefore 
allowing collective self-determination. Now because collective decision-making is 
different to individual decision-making, the process of rationally forming intentions and 
goals should be done collectively not privately. This means decision-making needs to 
involve collective process of rational preference formation. As with the individual, it is 
the process that is important for rational preference formation in the collective. 
Obviously each individual will still form their own preferences, but because of the 
differences between individual and collective autonomy, and correspondingly individual 
and collective decisions, this should not be done independently. Our five friends should 
make their decisions then as a collective, if collective autonomy is to be preserved, 
rather than already forming and making their decisions in private. 
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1.6. Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter has been to argue that autonomy is the normative core of 
democracy, because there is an intrinsic link between them, as they are both essentially 
based upon the idea of self-government. This is definitely the case in Western liberal 
democracies where both the theory and practice of liberal democracy has sought the 
cultivation of autonomy. Furthermore, I have suggested that autonomy is an intrinsic 
good for its own sake, at least in Western societies, as it is constitutive of agency. 
However, we cannot assume that citizens are autonomous, as we require the right 
conditions to cultivate it, including an appropriate decision-making process. 
In order for autonomy to be cultivated, there are two essential requirements. The first is 
free choice, with freedom being interpreted in both the positive and negative sense. 
There must also be an acceptable range of options and the agents in question must have 
knowledge of these options. Finally, this choice must not be coerced, manipulated or 
seduced. The second is rationality. For a decision to be autonomous it must be based 
upon rationally formed preferences, which means that the agent must consciously accept 
the process of preference change or formation. Now when making collective decisions 
we need to distinguish between individual and collective autonomy, and collective 
decisions should be based upon preferences that have also been collectively formed 
through the give and take of justifications and information sharing. John Dewey makes 
a similar point: 
`Majority rule is as foolish as its critics charge it with being. But it is never merely majority rule. 
The counting of heads compels prior recourse to methods of discussion, consultation and 
persuasion. The essential need in other words, is the improvement of the methods and conditions 
of debate, discussion and persuasion. This is the problem of the public' (Dewey, 1988; p. 144). 
Following this argument I shall now review two different democratic decision-making 
models, deliberative democracy and aggregation of preferences, reviewing them from 
the point of view of their potential to cultivate autonomy of all participants equally. 
86 
CHAPTER TWO: 1WLIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND AUTONOMOUS 
DECISION-MAKING 
2.0. Introduction 
Joshua Cohen in his seminal work on deliberative democracy, `Deliberation and 
Democratic Legitimacy' (1991), claims that `the ideal deliberative scheme... indicates 
the importance of autonomy in a deliberative democracy' (Cohen, 199 t, p. 25). Cohen 
accepts that to be autonomous preferences must be determined by the agent and that this 
is aided by `the deliberative formation of preferences' (Cohen, 1991, p. 25). The aim of 
this chapter is to expand this argument, and place equal enhancement of autonomy, as 
the central justification of the deliberative model of democracy. 
In the previous chapter, I presented the case that autonomy is the normative core of 
democracy, and provided an exposition of the conditions necessary to make 
autonomous decisions. For a decision to be autonomous, there must be awareness of an 
adequate range of options to choose from, and this choice must be based upon rationally 
formed preferences. Essentially this thesis is dealing with collective decision-making. 
and previously I argued collective autonomy was distinct from individual autonomy and 
requires that preference formation take place through the participation of all, to ensure 
that the agency of all is preserved It is my contention that the model of decision- 
making most likely to meet the conditions of collective decision-making, outlined in the 
previous chapter, is the model of deliberative democracy. This chapter will attempt to 
demonstrate how deliberative democracy will enhance the autonomy of the participants 
by comparing it to purely aggregative models of decision-making. 
The first stage in section 2.1 is to define deliberative democracy and its two strands, and 
to distinguish it from private and dyadic deliberation. The argument is dependent upon 
the argument of John Dryzek, in his comprehensive study Deliberative Democracy and 
Beyond (2000), who claims that for deliberation to have taken place, communication 
between participants must induce `reflection upon preferences in non-coercive fashion' 
(Dryzek, 2000, p. 2). This deliberation is democratic if these reflective preferences 
influence collective decisions (Dryzek, 2000, p. 2). In this sense we can already see 
deliberative democracies compatibility with Lindley's `active theoretical rationality', 
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which requires the agent deliberating over preferences, desires and beliefs to achieve 
autonomy (Lindley, t986, pp. 2t-70). 
In section 2.3, three reasons will be considered as to why deliberative democracy can 
cultivate autonomy. The first is that it encourages participants to make their reasoning 
public, which entails the consideration of the reasons and opinions of all which makes 
judgement public and prior to aggregation, and which also launders purely self 
interested preferences. The second and third arguments are based upon the claim that in 
a deliberative situation people communicate through language. This means that at any 
point there are speakers and listeners involved. I argue that deliberative democracy 
enhances hearer autonomy by increasing the availability of information, so the rational 
external requirements of autonomy are improved. Speaker autonomy is enhanced 
because the ideal of deliberative democracy ensures all opinions are included and heard 
by all. When aggregation does take place this also means that choices are determined 
by citizens themselves and furthermore, are based upon the reflective preferences or 
citizens. 
The argument here is in what Matthew Festenstein, in `Deliberation, Citizenship and 
Identity' (2002) terms the `prudential' tradition of deliberative democracy: `On the 
prudential interpretation, deliberation is especially fair by virtue of allowing each 
participant to gain an equally clear and reflective understanding of his ideas and 
interests 
... ', at least in comparison to purely aggregative models. Deliberative 
democracy therefore, helps overcome inequalities in information and rationality 
(Festenstein, 2002, p. 103). 1 
There are also three critiques that seriously challenge the connection made between 
deliberative democracy and autonomy, and must therefore be considered in section 2.4. 
The first of these is the social choice theory critique, which views preferences as 
endogenous and not exogenous. Furthermore, if deliberative democracy cannot lead to 
consensus then aggregation is still required. How then can it avoid the problems of 
cycling, ambiguity and strategic manipulation that undermine citizens' autonomy? The 
` Festenstein outlines two other dominant justifications of deliberative democracy; the cpistemic conception (Festenstein, 2002, pp. 99-102) and deliberative democracy as fair procedure (Festentern, 2002, pp. 102-104). There are significant crossovers betwren all the justifications, which will not be considered here. Instead an in-depth discussion of the prudential model is provided. 
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next challenge comes from 'difference democrats', who claim deliberative democracy 
will fail to enhance the autonomy of subordinate groups, as the norms of this model e. g. 
reason, debate, impartiality are not universalisable, but culturally specific and act 
in 
favour of dominant groups. The final challenge to be considered here is that 
deliberative democracy, and its autonomy enhancing processes, arg dependent on 
citizens abiding by 'democratic obligations', but that we cannot ensure this commitment 
without civic virtue. 
2.1. Defining Deliberative Democracy 
The term `deliberative democracy' was first used by Joseph Bessette in The Mild Voice 
of Reason (1980). From the literature on deliberative democracy, Jon Elster, in 
Deliberative Democracy (1998), has identified a broad consensus on the two strands of 
the ideal as a decision-making process, the democratic strand and the delibcrativc 
strand. The democratic part is collective decision-making through the participation of 
all relevant actors. The deliberative strand is the making of the decisions through the 
give and take of rational arguments (Elster, 1998, p. 8). In the previous chapter, I 
invoked Beetham's definition of democracy, and it can also be used here. In this 
definition a collective is more democratic the more it ensures that all citizens have 
effective equal rights to directly participate in making the collective decisions 
(Beetham, 1993, p. 40). The more a deliberative democracy can ensure all citizens 
participate in deliberation equally and directly; the more the democratic criteria will be 
fulfilled. 
James Bohman in Public Deliberation (1996) defines deliberation as; 'a dialogical 
process of exchanging reasons for the purpose of resolving problematic situations that 
cannot be settled without interpersonal co-ordination and co-operation' (Bohman, 1996, 
p. 27). It is apparent that discussion is the central tenet of democratic deliberation. 
Discussion and debate inevitably involves arguing, both formulating and putting across 
one's argument and listening to and evaluating others. Elster appreciates that 'arguing is 
intrinsically connected to reason, in the sense that anyone who engages in argument 
must appeal to impartial views' (Elster, 1998, p6). In his discussion of '= and 
Liberty' (1998), Joshua Cohen defines a reason as 'a consideration that counts in favour 
of something: in particular, a belief, or action' (Cohen, 1998, p. 194). It is then 
Habermas' famous 'unforced force of the better argument' that should be decisive, and 
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the better argument must be based upon reasons and not asymmetries of power 
(Habermas, 1996a; McCarthy, 1994, p. 45). In this sense collective deliberation helps 
promote rationality, a central requirement of autonomy. Even before voting has been 
decided upon as the best form of decision-making, the decision must be preceded by 
argument. Argument and therefore discussion is then `logically prior to all other modes 
of collective decision-making' (Elster, 1998, p. 10; Sec also Gambetta 1998; Fearon 
1998; Johnson 1998; Manin 1987; Cronin 1989 who all make this same point). 
Michael Saward, in `Less Than Meets the Eye' (2000), suggests that deliberative 
democrats, by distinguishing the deliberative model of democracy from an aggregative 
model, elevate deliberation above voting as a form of legitimate democratic 
participation, which leads him to question the validity of calling deliberative democracy 
a model of democracy, saying that such a view is `blinkered' and `artificially self- 
contained' (Saward, 2000, p. 67). As will be apparent below with the discussion of 
social choice theory and the scepticism that deliberative democracy can and should lead 
to consensus, I accept Saward's point that deliberation can only ever be a part of 
democracy because it is not a self-sufficient model due to the fact that voting is still 
required to make a decision, however, for Saward this means deliberative and 
aggregative models of democracy are not separate and distinct models of democracy 
(Saward, 2000, pp. 67-68; see also Squires, 2002, pp. 133-134). 
Whether this argument is accepted depends upon how one defines a `model of 
democracy. ' David Held in his far-reaching discussion of Models of Democracy (1996) 
and C. B. Macpherson in The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy (1977) both offer 
similar definitions of a model. C. B. Macpherson defines a model in a broad manner as 
`a theoretical construction intended to exhibit and explain the real relations, underlying 
the appearances, between or within the phenomena under study', in this case democracy 
and decision-making. He further suggests that a model should also have a normative 
element, which offers a `model of man' and an `ethically justificatory theory'- Held 
uses the term `model' to refer to `a theoretical construction designed to reveal and 
explain the chief elements of a democratic form and its underlying structure of 
relations' (Held, 1996, p. 7; Macpherson, 1977, pp. 2-6). In section 2.2,1 will Uy 10 
suggest that a purely aggregative model and a deliberative model would produce 
differing structural relations and rely upon differing forms of participation due to the 
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difference between public and private deliberation. For Held and Macpherson a model 
of democracy inevitably involves descriptive and normative statements. For an 
approach to democracy to be considered a model it must then be distinctive in relations 
to its explanatory or normative approach (Held, 1996, pp. 8-10; Macpherson, 1977, pp. 
2-6). Again, I think Held's and Macpherson's definition of a democratic model suggests 
that the deliberative and aggregative models are different. As will be discussed in more 
detail below a purely aggregative model views the source of legitimacy as citizens' 
predetermined preferences and a deliberative model sees the formation of these 
preferences as the source of legitimacy, which therefore leads to differing normative 
and empirical claims. Furthermore, deliberation and aggregation arc not elements in all 
conceptions of democracy; Habermas (1996b) has suggested in the past the collective 
discourse could lead to consensus and Riker (1982, p. 5) and Rousseau (1968) have 
perceived democratic arrangements without any collective deliberation and only voting. 
In this sense a purely aggregative model of democracy is not a mythical construct setup 
as a straw man by deliberative democrats. Now it is true that liberal democracies do not 
presently approximate the aggregative model of democracy as collective deliberation 
does occur in certain circumstances, but this does not mean the aggmegative model does 
not exist as a theoretical construct. Neither does it rule out the deliberative model being 
a model, because as Macpherson realised new models develop as a critique of previous 
models, and are suggested as a `corrective' or `replacement'. However, this critique 
only need to be upon part of the preceding model and can therefore embody `substantial 
elements of an earlier', model (Macpherson, 1977, p. 8). Therefore, I maintain that 
despite the existence of some form of deliberation and voting existing in many 
conceptions of democracy, it still can bea useful, meaningful and enlightening to 
highlight the empirical and normative differences between these models in relation to 
democratic forms and structural relations. 
Saward has further suggested that deliberative democrats have `overdrawn' the 
distinction between deliberative and aggregative models of democracy, bei citizens 
can deliberate in private prior to voting (Savard, 2000, p. 6ß). However, the 
deliberative strand of deliberative democracy is different from individual deliberation. 
Democratic deliberation is a joint, collective activity. Individual deliberation is 
structurally different as it contains no dialogue, no give and take of reasons, and no 
influence between actors. The aim of deliberative democracy is to provide solutions 
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collectively through the expression of a plurality of opinions and interests to achieve 
collective goals, resolving conflicts and solving collective problems (Bohman, 1996, p. 
55). In this sense the conception of deliberative democracy is in contrast to the claims of 
both Robert Goodin in `Democratic Deliberation Within' (2003) and Adolf Gunderscn's 
Socratic model in The Socratic Citizen (2000), who envisage democratic deliberation as 
being desirable and possible outside of collective debate. Goodin suggests deliberative 
democracy can be a solo affair, providing others are made `imaginatively present. ' He 
does accept that internal reflection could never replace externally induced reflection, but 
suggests it could supplement it (Goodin, 2003, p. 55). Goodin hopes that `through the 
exercise of a suitably informed imagination, each of us might be able to conduct a wide 
ranging debate within our heads among all the contending perspectives. ' Nevertheless, 
he accepts collective deliberation will still be necessary as we can never know the views 
of others; so some -svill be misportrayed, others completely ignored and few put as 
persuasively as they would be by the agent themselves (Goodin, 2003, pp. 63-64). 
Goodin then at least accepts that democratic deliberation at some point must be 
collective. In contrast Gundersen advocates `dyadic', as opposed to collective 
deliberation. Groups could still assemble to make collective decisions, but 
communication between them would always be dyadic with `serial one-to-one 
encounters' (Gundersen, 2000, p. 98). According to Gundersen, the first advantage of 
dyadic deliberation over collective deliberation is that it is easier to institutionalise 
(Gundersen, 2000, p. 98). This assertion is certainly a pertinent one and will be 
reviewed in the following chapter. The second advantage Gundersen claims dyadic 
deliberation brings over the collective alternative is that the relationship between 
participants is more interactive and therefore `allows each partner to more easily 
ascertain the other's knowledge and interests. ' He argues that if clarification of a point 
is needed it is much easier in dyadic, rather than group communication, because in a 
group it would mean the monopolisation of debate between two people. In this sense if 
group deliberation leads to the exchange of information and knowledge it is dyadic 
anyway (Gundersen, 2000, pp. 98-100). Gundersen seems to have completely missed 
the point here, because there may be more than one misunderstanding that shares 
similarities with others. A debate about clarification could therefore take place between 
more than two participants and aid the understanding of many participants. For 
example, many participants may think that they do understand a point that has been 
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made until it is questioned and then they realise that originally they did not. Hence, I do 
not accept that the dyadic model of deliberation leads to greater clarity. Thirdly, 
Gundersen suggests that dyadic communication will mean greater equality between 
participants than in collective deliberation because power in dyadic relationships is 
easier to challenge verbally and exit is also easier (Gundersen, 2000, p. 101). This 
claim may be true in some cases, but certainly not in all. There are certain dyadic 
relationships where it is harder to challenge power verbally and exit is even harder than 
in collective debate, it seems to depend upon context. For example a dyadic 
relationship may be dominated by one of the participants, if the other holds them in high 
esteem or with excessive respect, for whatever reason. This of course can occur in 
collective deliberation, but others would be present and would hopefully challenge the 
`esteemed figure' with reasons. Two people may find it very hard to respect 
deliberative procedures because of the disrespect they feel towards each other, but these 
feelings maybe calmed by the presence of other participants debating. I therefore reject 
Gundersen's suggestion that dyadic deliberation is superior to collective deliberation. 
However, my main argument against Gundersen is that dyadic deliberation cannot lead 
to the same level of autonomy supporting conditions that are outlined below. As will 
become apparent, these benefits are necessarily achieved in a collective setting. 
It is apparent that deliberation can exist without democracy, and consequently 
democracy without deliberation as Adolf Gundersen notes in The Environmental 
Promise of Democratic Deliberation (1995): `If democracy and deliberation are to be 
linked, either democracy must become deliberative or deliberation must become 
democratic' (Gundersen, 1995, p. 9). Combining the two will mean that all relevant 
actors should have an equal opportunity to participate directly (where possible) in a 
dialogical process of exchanging reasons to make collectively binding decisions. Cohen 
has devised a set of normative procedures that aims to achieve this: 
A) Participants should be bound by the decisions made from the deliberative process- 
B) Participants must offer reasons for their opinions and perspectives. 
C) Participants must be formal and substantively equal. 
D) Deliberation should aim a rationally motivated consensus (Cohen, 1991, p. 22-23). 
In Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (1990), Habermas has also offered 
a set of counterfactual procedures termed `the ideal speech situation. ' Here 
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communication is undistorted as all participants are free and equal with no power 
discrepancies and unconstrained from subjection, self-delusion and strategic activity. 
All views are aired in an unlimited discourse, creating open participation aimed at 
rational consensus (Habermas, 1990, pp. 56-58). The ideal speech situation is a utopia, 
unachievable in the real world, with its imperfections and huge spectrum of opinions 
and traditions. It is this ideal speech situation that should be employed to criticise and 
judge real life democratic arrangements. Habermas believes that communication 
naturally leans towards a shared understanding if it is geared towards genuine 
information and rationality, this means the ideal speech situation is anticipated in all 
communication, and so is not a theoretical creation (Habermas, 1990, pp. 86-94). 
I will argue in this chapter that the deliberative and democratic strands of the ideal will 
pull in the same direction and compliment each other. Ho%%vver. I will also suggest that 
they can conflict between each other and therefore trade-offs will need to be made 
between the democratic and the deliberative strands (Fishlin and Luskin, 2000, pp. 17- 
18). 
2.2. Deliberative Democracy and Autonomy 
2.2.1. Public Reason 
Habermas thinks public rationality will lead to the creation of political autonomy 
(Habermas, 1996a, pp. 118-131; see also McCarthy, 1994, p. 48). This is because 
political autonomy is `self-legislation through the public use of reason by free and equal 
citizens' (McCarthy, 1994, p. 55). In the previous chapter, the distinction between 
private and public decisions was made. It was suggested that because collective 
decisions are different to individual decisions autonomy cannot be viewed in the same 
way. For the autonomy of all to be cultivated it was argued that equal agency of all must 
be preserved, by allowing all to participate in making that decision, precisely because it 
is collective and 'will affect all. It was further argued that for a preference to be 
autonomous it must be based upon good reasons that the agent accepts. J. S Mill 
appreciated that this process also involved the consideration of alternative opinions and 
their justificatory reasons. Now this is even more imperative when making collective 
decisions because the decisions will affect all, all should hear the reasons for the 
preferences of others and have the opportunity to convince others about their 
preferences. 
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It is such arguments that prompted Elster, in `The Market and the Forum' (1997), to 
suggest that pure aggregation of preferences confuses the type of behaviour that is apt in 
the market place and the forum. In the market the consumer can be sovereign because 
the different choices will only affect the consumer. This though is not the case when 
making collective political decisions, as many of the citizens' preferences maybe 
defective (Elster, 1997, p. 10). In the market the individual is decisive, but in the forum 
and political sphere they are not as it depends on everybody else: `Consequently, the 
considerations that predominate in market choice cannot be presumed to predominate in 
electoral choice. Specifically, market behaviour reflects agent "interests" in a way that 
electoral behaviour does not' (Brennan and Lomasky, 1993, p. 15). In the market it 
does not matter why the agent has a certain preference, but in the political sphere this 
preference needs to be justified to the rest of the polity because the agent is not just 
deciding for them self (Brennan and Lomasky, 1993, pp. 33-34). 
This means that public reason is necessary to cultivate the autonomy of citizens in 
collective decision-making, and Bohman is in agreement. According to Bohman `there 
is increasing agreement that democracy is justified to the extent that it makes possible 
the public use of common practical reason' (Bohman, 1996, p. - ). This is because 
selecting an option through voting without prior deliberation, results in a lack of 
judgment in decision-making, there is no public reasoning and for this reason autonomy 
is not maintained. By `public', Bohman is not just referring to the people involved in 
deliberation, (although to be public, in Bohman's standards, no citizens can be excluded 
formally or actually excluded), but to the form of reasons given in debate. Neither is it 
the content of the issues that makes them public, as Bohman points out in 'Deliberative 
Democracy and Effective Social Freedom' (1997): `Whether something is a matter for 
collective concern is itself a deliberative issue' (Bohman, 1997, p. 38). It is the nature 
of the reasons offered, which must be public by being understandable and acceptable to 
all citizens or at least potentially so, which demonstrates a clear respect for the equal 
agency of the other participants: `Illegitimate political decisions, which often cause 
injury and disadvantage to many citizens are made precisely for non-public reasons and 
in non-public ways. They are not addressed to an audience of politically equal citizens' 
(Bohman, 1997, p. 26). Public reason then encourages citizens to find reasons for 
arrangements that will not `neglect the good of others' (Cohen, 1998, p. 197). This is in 
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accord with the equal agency in collective decisions requirement for autonomy, which 
entails the exchange of reasons, but furthermore, the consideration of the reasons of all. 
As Cohen notes public reason recognises citizens as being full members in the sense 
that they share in the sovereignty of exercising power (Cohen, 1998, p. 222). 
Cohen's claim is that the aim of deliberative democracy is to `tie the exercise of power 
to conditions of public reasoning and that reasons need to be acknowledged by all in 
order to be public' (Cohen, 1998, p. 186). This he terms the `principle of deliberative 
inclusion' (Cohen, 1998, p. 203). If this were the case then deliberative democracy 
would help cultivate autonomy in decision-making by inducing the use of public reason, 
which embodies the idea that decisions are collective more fully than pure models of 
aggregation. As Cohen explains public reason `requires that all who are governed by 
collective decisions, ... must find the bases of those decisions- the political values 
that 
support them- acceptable, even when they disagree with the details of the decision' 
(Cohen, 1998, p. 222). 
There are three reasons why it is thought a deliberative democracy would promote the 
use of public reason and therefore autonomy, which a comparison i , %th pure aggregation 
mechanisms will highlight. Firstly, democratic deliberation is reasoned in the sense that 
people offer reasons in support of their opinions and perspectives and hope they will 
prove convincing to others and expect these reasons, and these reasons alone to be the 
motivating force of people accepting them or not. By just having a preference or 
opinion we do not necessarily have reasons to support them and the preferences may 
therefore not be autonomous. Therefore unlike in pure aggregation mechanisms, the 
mere act of having a preference is not enough for people to take account of it, but rather 
the reasons that one offers, which should be aimed to be convincing to others, that 
effects whether or not ones arguments are taken up in the final decision. 
Secondly, democratic deliberation enhances public judgment by ensuring people at least 
consider options and reasons of others which they were previously ignorant of by 
ensuring the inclusion of all. Although critical of many aspects of deliberative 
democracy, Iris Marion Young in `Difference as a Resource for Democratic 
Communication' (1997), argues that this will help lead to `objective' decisions: 
`Judgement is objective in this sense when it situates one's own particular pet fives in a wider 
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context that takes other perspectives into account as well. Objectivity in this sense means only 
that judgement has taken account of the experience, knowledge, and interests of others. Such 
objectivity is possible only if those particular perspectives are expressed publicly to everyone' 
(Young, 1997, p. 402). 
Although pure aggregation mechanisms can provide the vote to all and so can include 
everyone in this sense, voting is simply a mark of consent to one option over others. 
Therefore judgment comes prior to the act of choosing as Benjamin Barher appreciated 
in Strong Democracy (1984): `What is crucial is not consent pure and simple, but the 
active consent of participating citizens who have imaginatively reconstructed their own 
values as public nouns through the process of identifying and empathizing with the 
values of others' (Barber, 1984, p. 137). 
It is true that using the resource of voting encourages people to privately deliberate and 
exercise judgment prior to making such a choice. Herman Lieb, believed that giving 
opportunities to citizens to participate in a referendum `will impress the voter with the 
solemn obligation he is assuming, as he becomes conscious of the fact that his vote 
might determine the fate of an important public measure' (Lieb in Cronin, 1989, pp. 60- 
61). There is certainly an element of truth in this, and it is this that distinguishes a vote 
from opinions expressed in an opinion poll, as the latter are ollen thought to be 
unconsidered opinions and treated with skepticism. Nevertheless this deliberation is 
usually private; it does not open people up to the arguments of others, or force people to 
defend their choice to others, therefore it does not encourage the same level of 
collective judgment that debate creates as Barber argues: `The secret ballot allows the 
voter to express himself, but not to be influenced by others or to have to account for his 
private choices in a public language' (Barber, 1984, p. 174). 
Thirdly, in a deliberative democracy, selfish reasons of the type It agree with this 
because it will really benefit me, but disadvantage others' will be unconvincing to the 
rest of the collective. Public deliberation will therefore encourage people to focus on 
public values if their discourse is to persuade people of the validity of their ideas: `In 
political debate it is pragmatically impossible to argue that a given solution should be 
chosen just because it is good for oneself. By the very act of engaging in a public 
debate- by arguing rather than bargaining- one has ruled out the possibility of invoking 
such reasons' (Elster, 1997, p. 12; Miller, 1993, p. 82; Benhabib, 1996, p- 72). Included 
in the process of public deliberation will be those who would be disadvantaged from 
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these selfish preferences, and so could not possibly justify their prejudices to these 
people. Unsubstantiated prejudices will then be laundered and the quality of the 
decisions will improve due to the fact that all interests included must be justified, unlike 
in pure aggregative models (Christiano, 1997, pp. 247-248; Miller, 1993, p. 82). As 
James Fearon points out, in `Deliberation as Discussion' (1998), `even majorities 
commonly justify their actions in terms of the general public good rather than the 
narrow interest of the voting majority' (Fearon, 1998, p. 54). In contrast, in private 
ballots `nothing stops the voter from voting on purely self-interested grounds, without 
any consideration for what would be a good decision for the collectivity' (Fearon, 1998, 
p. 53). Brennan and Lomasky think that public voting would lead to more consideration 
of the issues and that votes would be less likely to be based upon `dubious passions' 
(Brennan and Lomassly, 1993, p. 217). As they suggest `to vote publicly is to be 
answerable for one's vote' (Brennan and Lomasly, 1993, p. 219). Consequently, it is 
thought that such deliberation would be able to ensure that decisions are based upon 
reasoned analysis as opposed to traditional and inaccurate assumptions (Sunstein, 1984, 
p. 1702). In her investigation of `advisory councils' in Barcelona where interaction is 
based upon the deliberative model, Georgina Blakeley, in `Creating Spaces of 
Deliberation in Barcelona' (2000), reports how many of the participants: 
`stressed the educative experience gained from working together in the advisory councils not just 
in the narrower sense of personal enrichment, but also in the wider sense of learning to appreciate 
the wider picture, rather than their own narrow, sectoral point of view, of increasing their 
capacity for dialogue and their awareness of other people's reality' (Blakeley, 2000, p. 18)" 
A suitable application is provided by Gundersen (1995), Dryzek (1996,2000), Smith 
(2001), Eckersley (2000) who all perceive the environment as a public good and argue 
that democratic deliberation could lead to the promotion of this public good because it 
promotes public rationality. They accept that presently many citizens are not 
sufficiently concerned with the environment. Gundersen poses the problem as `either 
we narrow the political circle to the environmentally thoughtful, or we stimulate 
environmental thought among the broader public. ' He opts for the latter, the first being 
illegitimate on democratic grounds, so consequently argues that we should `create more 
opportunities for citizen deliberation about environmental issues in order to encourage 
more and better collective answers. ' This is based upon the assumption that `political 
deliberation enhances environment rationality' (Gundersen, 1995, pp. 4-5). Gundersen 
defines environmental rationality as `collective, holistic, and long term thinking' about 
the environment (Gundersen, 1995, p. 22). 
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Gundersen argues that: 
`When citizens deliberate about environmental protection, their beliefs will change or be altered - 
not randomly but in certain clearly definable ways. However variable, however unpredictable its 
effects, deliberation (if it has actually occurred can be counted upon to lead citizens to think 
about the environment in a more rational way, their environmental rationality will be enhanced or 
sharpened from the experience of deliberation. Environmental rationality then is the key product 
of environmental deliberation' (Gundersen, 1995, p. 22). 
As already argued democratic deliberation puts participants in a situation where they 
are encouraged to empathise with interests other than their own, and this can extend to 
the environment, whereby they connect their lives and roles with that of the 
environment and become aware of how they are interdependent. The basis of this is that 
people will reflect upon their pre-existing preferences in light of this. In `Deliberative 
Democracy, Ecological Representation and Risk' (2000), Robyn Eckersley suggests 
that in `public spirited political deliberation', citizens will learn more about their 
dependence upon each other and the environment' (Eckerlsey, 2000, p. 120; Sagoif 
1998). 
M, Sagoff in `Aggregation and Deliberation in Valuing Environmental Public Goods' 
(1998), also argues that participation in democratic deliberative decision-making will 
allow participants to focus upon public issues like the environment rather than just 
`individual subjective utilities': `In this context, individuals might be asked to 
deliberate not so much about the welfare effect of an environmental policy on them 
individually as about its appropriateness or desirability for society as a whole' (Sagoff; 
1998; p221). Gundersen has produced empirical evidence to suggest that participation 
in deliberative democracy does lead to more environmentally sensitive preferences. He 
conducted deliberative interviews with forty-six different citizens about environmental 
issues, most of who were not environmentally minded prior to participating in the 
deliberation. However, all of the citizens became more environmentally rational. 
Gundersen explains this: `Deliberation tended to improve these citizens' understanding 
of the social value of the environment and simultaneously improve the fit between their 
environmental aims and the means they chose of realising those aims. ' He concludes 
therefore that `given the opportunity to engage in political deliberation on 
environmental questions, citizens do learn. Hence expanding such opportunities holds 
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a very real promise for environmental solutions' (Gunderscn, 1995, p. 5). 2 If we 
consult citizens' jury experiments from the U. K. where norms of deliberative 
democracy have been introduced, for example the jury the establishment of wetland 
areas in the Fens and Waste management in Hertfordshire, we see that the 
recommendations resulting from these juries embrace ecological concerns to a greater 
degree than the present dominant methods of decision-making in liberal democracies. 
Furthermore, it demonstrates that citizens are capable of deliberating about complex 
environmental problems (Smith, 2001, p. 83). More evidence to suggest that this is the 
case comes from other citizen juries (Renn et al, 1995; Webler el at, 1995) and also 
from deliberative opinion polls in Texas (Ryan, 1999, pp. 6-7). 
One of the concerns with public reasoning is whether it is possible for reasons to seek 
the consent of all citizens as Cohen advocated, . vhich has led some commentators to 
conclude that this conception of public reasoning is too strong a demand. This is 
because there seems to be no element of deliberative democracy that will ensure that 
participants will offer reasons in line with the `common good' and that are convincing 
to all participants. Bernard Manin in his excellent discussion on legitimacy and 
Political Deliberation' (1987), notes the relativism of the deliberative process. `one 
starts by taking propositions one assumes are generally accepted by the audience being 
addressed In politics, one would argue by assuming certain common values as held by 
the public at a given moment. Arguementation is, therefore, always relative to its 
audience' (Manin, 1987, p. 353). This is because different people will be convinced of 
the same conclusion, by different reasons, due to pluralism and peoples' differing 
contexts and social positions. For example a committed environmentalist may offer 
differing arguments in favour of pollution control. She may try to convince a 
corporations' shareholders that it is more efficient, yet suggest to the trade union that 
the `risk' of the pollution is unevenly and unfairly distributed to the determent of the 
lowest social economic sectors of the community. Decisions, arguments, beliefs, 
preferences, ideas and interests expressed in democratic deliberation are therefore not 
true or false, but are either more or less convincing, depending upon the `force' of the 
reasons offered and the audience receiving them. Those who do not accept the reasons 
Z Gundersen's research method used here was deliberative interviews between himself and the interviewee on hypothetical issues. However, I have suggested that democratic deliberation involves 
collective decision-malting rather than the Socratic interviews employed by Gundcxscn- 
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will have reasons themselves for not doing so, and to deny them this would be to deny 
them autonomy; therefore `the force of an argumentation is always relative' (Mania, 
1987, p. 353; Dahl, 1994, p. 31). This is what Thomas Christiano, in `The Significance 
of Public Deliberation' (1997), means when he says that if rational arguments are to 
persuade an agent of a new belief, it must start by appealing to their present beliefs as 
`persons are not persuaded by arguments based on premises they do not believe' 
(Christiano, 1997, p. 260). 
Rather than offering reasons that are convincing to all, people may offer reasons that 
are aimed at a majority, or the largest minority. (This is of course dependent upon them 
being an established majority that is apparent to the participants and as preferences will 
change during deliberatively democratic debate, this majority may change during the 
process). This is a point that David Miller, in `Is Deliberative Democracy Unfair to 
Disadvantaged Groups' (2000), also accepts, but thinks this is an undesirable possibility 
of democratic deliberation. Instead good deliberation must lead to a result `that enjoys 
the widest possible support', not just majority support (Miller, 2000, p. 152). 1 think 
Miller is right that this should be the aim of public reason rather than finding reasons 
that all can accept, as this is too a stringent a demand, given the fact of pluralism. The 
danger that citizens will aim to convince the necessary numbers of people to pass a 
decision, rather than finding a result that gains the widest possible support still remains 
and is a danger to the normative claims of deliberative democracy made here. 
However, the fact that deliberative democracy will encourage the use of public reason 
and encourage participants to consider the opinions and interests of others %% ill help 
eliminate this occurrence, but not eliminate it and therefore make autonomous 
cultivating decisions more likely: 
`Although finally when a decision has to be reached there may still need to be a vote taken 
between two or more options, what participants are doing at that point is something like 
rendering a judgment or a verdict on the basis of what they have heard. They are expressing an 
opinion about which policy best meets the various claims that have been advanced, or represents 
the fairest compromise between the competing points of view that have been expre ssed' (Miller, 
1993, p. 76). 
2.2.2. Hearer Autonomy 
In the previous chapter, it was argued that the more relevant information a person has 
the greater their capacity for making autonomous choices and forming autonomous 
views, as their external rational requirements will be increased. Lipson reminds us: 
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`An autonomous choice by a citizen.. . can reflect more or 
less of his autonomous identity as a 
citizen, and will be more or less autonomous accordingly. in particular, te greater the amount of 
relevant information a citizen's vote is based on, the more autonomous it is' (Upson, 1995, p. 
2269). 
Citizens limit their autonomy if they do not receive all relevant information that 
is 
available. This is because `the effect of the information is its ability to permit the 
citizen to "put more of himself" into his deliberations, and hence to permit 
his 
preference to express himself fully' (Lipson, 1995, p. 22(A, my emphasis). 
3 In this sense 
they are not completely `authentic' preferences. 
Lipson argues, `available information' is information that is possessed by a citizen and 
would relay it to other citizens, given the chance (such as a new perspective or new 
data 
or personal information from experiences). Now this information is relevant if hearing 
it would affect the perspectives and convictions of another participant. it is not possible 
to judge before hand (within reason), if a piece of information is relevant, prior to 
it 
being expressed publicly, because it is relevant if and only if, it is supported by reasons 
that are convincing to the hearers. Hence it also makes sense to talk of relevance being 
a scalar value as information can be more or less relevant depending on the extent 
it 
affects people's preferences. Lipson warns that we cannot envisage `an ideal thinker' to 
judge relevance a priori, as `relevance is determined solely by what effects the receipt of 
information would have on citizens' deliberations' (Lipson, 1995, p. 2263). 
4 Now it 
seems impossible for all relevant and available information to be perfectly disseminated 
to all citizens in modem complex societies (although in the ideal speech situation this 
would be the case); and due to the exigency of time, decisions cannot be put on hold 
until all information has been disseminated. We therefore face the dilemma of Elster's 
3 Lipson considers the problem of saturation. This problem refers to those citizens who on receiving 
information are not effected by it because they have previously been manipulated, when without the 
manipulation they would have found it relevant. As Lipson notes `this claim raises deep and troubling 
problems about how to think about the citizen who does the deliberating... is the real citizen, i. e., the one 
that we imagine, shorn ofundue influences? Or is he the one who actually is before us? ' (Lipson, 1995, 
p. 2264). This combined with the idea that all peoples' identity is partly formed by their environment and 
social context, raises the question `is it possible for anyone to be autonomous? For surely all have been 
manipulated in some manner. ' . 4 Now this raises the problem of what is it that effects peoples' preferences on hearing new information, 
ideally it would be just the content of the information and the reasons given to support the claim, but so 
often people are influenced by who has provided the information and the manner it is provided 
i. e, 
illocutionary excellence. It is undoubtable that some people are better orators than others, but if discourse 
is to be rational this should not have an effect. 
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mushroom gatherer and of where the trade-off between gathering information and 
making the decision, should be made. 
The claim here is not that deliberative democracy will eliminate this trade-off all 
together, but that it makes relevant information more available than purely aggregative 
mechanisms of decision-making, which in turn will make the preferences of participants 
more autonomous. Following Manin, Sylia Benhabib, in `Toward a Deliberative Model 
of Democratic Legitimacy' (1996), outlines two ways that deliberatively democratic 
decision-making helps distribute information. Firstly, no one participant could predict 
what all participants' opinion would be and secondly, no one participant could know all 
the relevant information (Benhabib, 1996, p. 71). By participating in deliberatively 
democratic decision-making participants will hear the opinions of all others and here 
more relevant information leading to a cultivation of hearer autonomy that would not be 
present in purely aggregative mechanisms. 
The case that citizens presently do not have sufficient information still needs to be 
made. Lipson maintains, people do take account of information before they vote, but in 
what he terms the `deficiency scenario', there is information available that would affect 
people's convictions (even if just to confirm what they already believed), if they were to 
receive this information. However, if this information is not disseminated `it is not clear 
that the votes of the citizens' represented their own best judgment. It is as though no 
citizen had fully expressed himself in his vote, because there was a part of him that had 
been inactive, but that would have been active had he received the information' 
(Lipson, 1995, p. 2252). One of the major objections to giving citizens more direct 
powers in democracy, is the scepticism about the claim that people will be able to make 
informed decisions, but through debate, providing it is open and inclusive, participants 
are opened up to a wide range of information, perspectives and experiences, that they 
would be unaware of in the isolation of a voting booth. 
As Robert Goodin, in `Laundering Preferences' (1986), highlights, aggre¬ative 
mechanisms lump people together into homogenous groups, depending on which option 
was selected, therefore do not provide sufficient information. We have no A"'ay of 
knowing why people voted for the option they did or whether these were good reasons 
or not: 
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`Utility information can and should be seen to include information about why individuals want 
what they want, about other things they also want, about the interconnections between and 
implications of their various desires, etc. Obviously, this goes well beyond the sort of 
information social choice theorists ordinarily ask us to collect- or their models are capable of 
processing' (Goodin, 1986, p. 77). 
This makes it very difficult for those drawing up a law and applying it i. e. civil 
servants, to interpret the intent of the electorate. 
Furthermore, many voters' preferences are not informed or considered opinions (Ryan, 
1999, p. 3). Voters are often confused as to what their preferences arc, having not had 
the opportunity to test their views in public, or to hear a broad range of views to have 
formed firm opinions and resolve inconsistencies. The result of this is that when people 
come to vote, they vote against their stated preferences. Deborah and Carl Hensler's 
study of a 1976 vote on a nuclear energy initiative shows that 14% of the sample did 
this (Hensler, 1979, p. 106). Nor are participants' preferences full or complete. As 
James Fishkin in Democracy and Deliberation (1991) suggests, prior to deliberation 
they have only tentative, unsure and incomplete ideas on certain issues: `Citizens of 
mass publics show little in the way of knowledge, sophistication or consistency in their 
beliefs and opinions. On many issues about four out of five citizens do not have stable, 
non-random opinions; they have what the political psychologists call "non-attitudes" or 
"pseudo opinions"' (Fishkin, 1991, p. 83). Thomas Cronin cites survey data in Direct 
Democracy (1989), which indicates that as many as one-third to a majority of those 
voting claim they need needed more information to make a vote they were comfortable 
with (Cronin, 1989, p. 230; Hamilton, 1970, p. 126, shows that this is not a recent 
phenomena, through an investigation of citizens' votes in referenda). 
Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld and William Mcphee, in Voting (1954), admit that 
`the individual voter may not have a great deal of detailed information... ' but that `he 
usually has picked up the crucial general information' (Berelson ct at, 1954, p. 307). 
Berelson gives the example that American citizens know that Democrats are more 
liberal than Republicans and that this information is enough for them to make their 
3A good example is provided by a 1988 Australian court case (Kartinyeri Vs Commonwealth) known as 
the Hindmarsh bridge case. The case appealed against a 1967 referendum, which removed from 
parliament the powers to make special laws for people of any race `other than the Aboriginal race in any 
state. ' The referendum had, according to Bennet and Brennan, been `underpinned by a strong anti- 
discriminatory ethic', but the Nindmarsh case questioned whether this referendum had removed legal 
protection designed to benefit Aboriginal people (Bennet and Brennan, 1999, p. 13). 
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choice. Presumably they would agree that British voters know that the Labour party is 
more left wing than the Conservatives and could make a similar choice. However, it is 
my contention that much more information is required for citizens to form autonomous 
opinions. Citizens do not just care if a party is more liberal than another, but arc 
interested in the detail of a whole host of issues e. g. taxation, health care and education 
Benhabib consequently argues that decision-making procedures based purely on 
aggregation `proceeds from a methodological fiction' as it assumes incorrectly that a 
pre-political citizen will have an `ordered set of coherent preferences. ' When in fact 
democratic deliberation is required to produce this, as participants will engage in 
rational reflection (Benhabib, 1996, p. 71). The ideal of democratic deliberation aims to 
avoid this by guaranteeing the opportunity for all opinions to be expressed and for 
nobody to be excluded. Allowing people to question information and arguments put 
forth by partisan sources, and form and enter into debate with their own information and 
arguments. Hence as a decision-making process, it preserves the collective autonomy of 
citizens to a greater degree than voting as a process. 
Christiano accepts that democratic deliberation has the instrumental value off improving 
the quality of the decisions, due to a greater amount of information that is made 
available, which will mean decisions will be based upon `better knowledge of the 
important facts', but thinks this is the only advantage (Christiano, 1997, p. 248 & p. 
255). However, Christiano overlooks the fact that more information can lead to the 
formation of more autonomous preferences, as through the process of collective 
deliberation, people exchange opinions, experiences and information with the result that 
participants are made aware of perspectives and information that they were previously 
unaware, and can consequently revise their own preferences in light of this, as Manin 
argues: `In the process of exchanging evidence related to proposed solutions, 
individuals discover information they did not previously have. They learn of a given 
consequence, and if these consequences contradict the original objective they may be 
led to alter that objective' (Manin, 1987, p. 349). 
Participants `revealing private information' as Fearon, (1998, pp. 45-49), terms it, has 
several advantages: Firstly, the information provided in the discussion from the various 
participants may have some direct bearing on the outcomes from the various choices, 
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which could, would or should have an effect on what decision the collective makes. 
For example in a debate about pollution, local citizens to a polluting source can explain 
how and to what extent it has affected them. If preferences were just aggregated 
without a prior debate, this information would not have been known by many members 
of the collective and so would not have had a bearing on their preferences. Through 
deliberatively democratic decision-making, environmental information and the 
associated risks of decisions will be increased, allowing greater awareness of 
environmental risks, that there would be grater equality in exposure to risk (Mills and 
King, 2000, p. 142). This fits with Dryzek's assertion, in `Political and Ecological 
Communication' (1995), that deliberatively democratic arrangements enable citizens to 
provide `negative feedback' which is essential for the promotion of ecological values. 
Dryzek classifies negative feedback as `the ability to generate corrective movement 
when a natural system's equilibrium is distorted' (Dryzek, 1996, p. 16). The 
connection between negative feedback and deliberative democracy arises due to the 
latter's potential to increase and improve information flow between citizens, including 
those who directly experience the effects of environmental changes and risks 
distribution. 
It is important to note that democratic deliberation will only ever increase access to 
available information, consequently, deliberation must proceed with the understanding 
that information may come to light that could change the participants' preferences. 
Lipson raises a query about a situation of imperfect information, which seems 
inevitable, but is the resulting decision `an act of true collective determination', because 
it may not be a true expression of the collective feelings? He concludes, correctly I feel, 
that `one must answer in the affirmative, if the concept of true collective self- 
determination is to have any practical force at all' (Lipson, 1995, p. 2253). This is the 
right opinion providing that no citizen's information, opinions or perspectives are 
formally or systematically excluded. It is clear that decisions resulting from such a 
skewed deliberative situation would not be a true expression of collective self- 
determination. Deliberative democracy therefore cultivates autonomy by helping to 
fulfill the externalist rationality requirements. It helps overcome the practical problems 
of gaining that information, changes the nature of the information, and increases access 
to `available information. ' Preferences therefore become more autonomous. 
106 
2.2.3. Speaker Autonomy 
A speaker's autonomy is protected through her right to be able to say what she chooses. 
In a deliberative democracy participants get to express their feelings and opinions and 
justify their perspectives as well as trying to influence the listeners by offering reasons 
they imagine to be convincing to them. If all have equal chance to speak, then all have 
had an equal chance of influencing the outcome, and therefore autonomy is exercised. 
The argument is that debating allows the participants to have greater autonomy over 
what they state than voting does. 
By entering into a debate one can express the intensity of a preference. Voting does not 
measure the intensity of opinion, but simply accepts all opinions as equally valid. In 
deliberation one can express their opinion qualitatively, and can show their passion and 
commitment to an aim. Barber provides a pertinent example of this: 
`Martin Luther King could only cast one vote, but by moving the imagination of millions of 
whites he gave a voice to millions of blacks who had been silent; and in doing so he helped forge 
a new common will in the struggle against America's deeply ingrained racism' (Barber, 1984, p. 
206). 
The key to the cultivation of speaker autonomy is choice, as I have already argued, 
knowledge of acceptable alternatives is a requirement of autonomy. When peoples' 
preferences are aggregated the choices for them to choose from have already been set 
out for them and therefore, limits the choice available to the voter. None of the choices 
may reflect how the agent feels and this in turn limits her autonomy because it puts an 
external restriction on the preferences the voter can express. Barber makes this same 
pertinent point: `The problem with reducing decision-making to mere voting is that 
information is minimized and the paradoxes of fixed options are maximized. ' to 
Contrast: 
`Talk enables us to examine rank orders, commensurable scales, and the effect of time and place; 
it allows us to get at what we really want as individuals and as a community. Voting freezes us 
into rational dilemmas. It is not just that judges and citizens finally have to choose; it is that their 
choices are generally more coherent and less paradoxical than the logical dilemmas extrapolated 
from them, especially if the choices are informed by a process of strong democratic talk' 
(Barber, 1984, p. 205). 
This is why it is essential to the cultivation of autonomy, that aggregation is preceded 
by democratic debate. As E. E. Schattsneider argues, in his important work The Semi- 
Sovereign People (1975), political conflict is not like an intercollegiate debate in which 
the opponents agree in advance on the definition of the issues: `As a matter of fact, the 
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definition of the alternatives is the supreme instrument of power ... Hc who determines 
what politics is about runs the country, because the definition of the alternatives is the 
choice of conflicts, and the choice of conflicts allocates power' (Schatisneider, 1975, p. 
68; See also Barber, 1984, p. 180). Consequently the decision-making process is open 
to `subversion' (Barry, 1991, p. 51). What is considered a relevant issue can 
predetermine what decisions will be made. This is why democracy is never simply 
about the aggregation of preferences, as this presupposes that an agenda already exists, 
where in fact this agenda has to be `discovered' or `formed' though public delibemtion. 
When voting takes place after a process of democratic deliberation, people do vote for 
one of the available options open to them. However, these options are derived from the 
debate that proceeded. The options available will therefore reflect what people have felt 
and the opinions that have been expressed in the discussion. Deliberative democracy 
therefore gives the citizens themselves the power to select the choices making them 
more self-determining and therefore enhancing autonomy. 
Kathryn Abrams, in `liaising Politics Up' (1988), cites an example from a court case 
between Illinois State Board of Elections v Socialist Workers (1979). The court itself 
observed that `by limiting choices available to voters, the state impairs voters' ability to 
express their political preferences' (Abrams, 1988, p. 474). A pertinent example of this 
was the November 1999 Australian referenda upon two constitutional questions. The 
first was whether Australia should become a republic and the second whether a new 
preamble, honouring Aborigines as the nations first people, should be added to the 
constitution. Both these amendments were rejected, but the impression one received 
(admittedly through the mass media), was that neither was rejected due to the majority 
of citizens being against a republic or honouring Aborigines, but because the specific 
constitutional changes offered by the government were unpopular. Many in favour of 
becoming a republic felt the constitutional alternative to the monarch was impractical 
and those in favour of honouring the Aborigines were either unhappy with the wording 
of the preamble, or felt a preamble was insufficient If the public had the opportunity to 
participate in an open debate that formed the constitutional amendments, it seemed both 
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could have been accepted 6 Cronin is critical of the way referendums restrict the voters' 
options to express themselves: `The greatest deficiency of the referendum is its 
tendency to force voters to choose between only two alternatives: they must either 
approve or reject the measure referred. No opportunity exists for continuing discussion 
that will gain the widest acceptance' (Cronin, 1989, p. 163). 
Choices that would not have been made available without democratic deliberation can 
also be generated. Collective deliberation can improve the rationality of decisions by 
people coming up with an idea that would not have occurred to others. More 
pertinently through discussion and debate an idea can be collectively created that would 
not have occurred to any participants individually, a process Fearon terms 
`Brainstorming' (Fearon, 1998, p. 50). Pure aggregation of private preferences allows 
no process to collectively pool ideas; thoughts and skills preventing this collective 
rational process described occurring. 
Choices in a deliberatively democratic framework of decision-making then will be 
determined by the preceding debate and based upon reflective and more autonomous 
preferences. This means choices are more likely to be of an, `adequate range' and 
knowledge of the choices increased which is compatible with the requirements of 
autonomy. 
2.3. Challenges 
2.3.1 The Social Choice Critique 
The key distinction between social choice theory and deliberative democracy is the 
views on citizens' preferences, and whether they are exogenous or endogenous. 
Deliberative democrats believe preferences will change through social and political 
interaction, and social choice theorists argue that they do not, and tend to think that it is 
simply a change in the `choice set' (Miller, 1993, p. 90; Dryzek, 2000, p. 32). Cass 
Sunstein in `Preferences and Politics' (1991) bases much of his analysis on the idea that 
preferences are exogenous, meaning that they are not set or fixed, but change in 
6 Not all agendas for referendums are quite so centralised, Switzerland and California for example, have 
opportunities for referendum initiation e. g. a requisite number of signatures requesting a referendum. 
However, this does not mean that agenda setting is realistically open to all sectors of society and does not 
take away from the fact that the options available are fixed and not extracted from open public deliberation. 
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Hansen, 2001). The results from all these indicate preferences will change when 
citizens participate in democratic deliberation. As Issues Deliberation Australia states, 
`the resulting changes in opinion represent the conclusions the public would reach under 
ideal circumstances, that is, when it has an opportunity to become more informed and 
engaged by the issues and to work through the pros and cons of a variety of options' 
(Issues Deliberation Australia, 1999b, p. 1). Elsewhere Kotlcr's 1972 study of the 
Springfield Vermont town meeting showed that 27% of 875 citizens who participated 
changed their opinions due to the debate (Mansbridge, 1980, p. 273). In contrast 
Hamilton's review of open housing referenda, shows that without collective 
deliberation, preferences are unlikely to change during the campaign prior to 
aggregation (Hamilton, 1970, p. 129). This is certainly not conclusive empirical 
evidence, but the increasing volume of results from deliberative opinion polls and 
citizen juries does indicate that preferences are exogenous and social choice theory must 
provide counter empirical evidence to suggest differently. This though is only one 
aspect of the social choice theory critique. 
Kenneth Arrow in his seminal piece in social choice theory Social Choice and 
Individual Values (1963) raised the key problem of how to aggregate individual 
preferences to make a collective decision or social choice. His conclusion was that the 
only way to achieve this would be to restrict the range of preferences citizens could vote 
upon, a process termed `domain restriction'. Arrow saw this as unacceptable as it 
would violate `citizen authority'. 7 Arrow set out five conditions that must be met to 
ensure a rational social choice: 1) Collective rationality requires social orderings to be 
transitive if individuals' are. 2) The weak Pareto condition stipulates that if every 
individual ranks x above y then the collective decision should as well. 3) Non- 
dictatorship, indicates that if the majority prefer y to x, and the minority x toy the social 
ordering should not select x. 4) Universal domain, this requirement is that no 
preferences should be excluded from collective decisions. 5) Independence of irrelevant 
alternatives, suggests that if all individual's preferences are between x and y then the 
collective choice should be between only x and y (Arrow, 1963; see also McLean, 1991, 
p. 180; Dryzek, 2000, pp. 34-35). Social choice theory believes that it has proven that 
1 Riker agrees arguing domain restriction would be unfair and undemocratic (Riker, 1982, p. 117). 
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all these requirements cannot be satisfied at the same time through the same aggregative 
procedure. 
William Riker in his important work of social choice theory, Liberalism Against 
Populism (1982), sought to apply Arrow's conclusions further and has famously argued 
that all aggregation mechanisms are susceptible to instability and ambiguity, which 
allows for strategic manipulation. They are unstable in the sense that they spawn 
cyclical and intransitive social orderings and majorities, consequently voting paradoxes 
occur. Hannu Nurmi in `Voting Paradoxes and Referenda' (1998) characterises 
(admittedly loosely) a voting paradox as occurring `whenever the relationship between 
the voting and the voter preferences is counter-intuitive or unreasonable in some sense' 
(Nurmi, 1998, p. 335). Riker concludes from this that `populist' democracy was 
impossible to achieve because there is no such thing as the will of the people that should 
be reflected in decisions as popular will cannot be identified independently from the 
aggregative mechanism used to identify it, and the aggregative mechanism used to 
identify it will lead to drastically contrasting conceptions of the collective will. In short 
the social choice does not reflect the collective will, but instead the aggregation method 
used (Riker, 1982, p. 117-119; see also Dryzek, 2000, p. 35). The argument concludes 
that there is insufficient consistency in voting results to make a coherent claim as to 
what the `popular will' is and therefore `populism' must be abandoned `not because it is 
morally wrong, but merely because it is empty' (Riker, 1982, p. 239). 8 
Let us then consider the problems of transitivity, ambiguity and manipulation in turn 
and more closely in terms of their affect on autonomy. The problem of transitivity raises 
the question `do peoples choices really express their preferences? ' Arrow provides a 
famous demonstration of the problems of transitivity. If an agent prefers A to B, and B 
to C, does that necessarily mean they prefer A to C, it being in line with the laws of 
transitivity? Preferences can be incommensurable which means A maybe preferred to 
$ Cohen (1986b, p. 27) correctly points out that Riker goes onto suggest populism is morally wrong as 
well, but this argument does not need addressing here. A more significant problem for Riker's theory is 
that he still sees elections as having a role to remove elected officials from office. However, if all 
aggregative mechanisms are as random as each other then these elections will fail completely in removing 
officials who are unsuitable, as they as likely to be removed as suitable candidates, if this is the case why 
should elections be used as the method of constraining power and not `random assassinations' (Cohen, 
1986b, p. 30). In short how will elections provide an external check upon oligarchical political elites 
(Coleman and Ferejohn, 1986, make a similar point)? 
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B, B to C, and C to A. Even when individuals have transitive preferences they may lead 
to collective intransitive ones. If there are three voters and voter one ranks the available 
options as A, B, C in preference order; voter two ranks the options B, C, A in preference 
order, and voter three ranks them C, A, B. Then A will beat B, B will beat C and C will 
beat A, each winning by two votes to one. Here an option can win the vote without 
being the first choice of any voter. Arrows point is to demonstrate that individual 
preferences cannot be transferred into collective preferences and meet Arrow's 
conditions for rational social choice. Decision procedures that fail the transitivity 
requirement are cyclical and therefore are ambiguous. 
Ambiguity can occur because the final decisions are resultant upon the vote-counting 
process employed. This means that despite people's preferences being exactly the 
same, different methods of counting the vote will yield very different results. 
Furthermore, due to the ambiguity there is no way of judging which method of 
aggregation most accurately aggregates people's preferences, and so there is a sense of 
arbitrariness to the decisions that arise (Nurmi, 1998, p. 334). This restricts autonomy 
of all citizens because the final decision in no way reflects their collective preferences, 
so it is hard to say in what sense the citizens are self-determining. 
Manipulation can occur through strategic voting, agenda control and adding new 
options for voting (Riker, 1982, p. 237). According to Dryzek `situations are strategic 
when the outcome of an actor's choice depends on the choice(s) made by another actor 
or actors also pursuing goals and interests' (Dryzek, 2000, p. 31; see also Benoit and 
Kornhauser, 1994, p. 186). Strategic interaction is then always based upon instrumental 
rationality (Brennan and Lomasky, 1993, p. 121). Gerry Mackie in `All Men are Liars: 
Is Democracy Meaningless? ' (1998), is confident that it can be demonstrated that 
`simple majority voting can lead to any outcome in a space of issues if the agenda of 
voting is appropriately manipulated' (Mackie, 1998, p. 74; see also Miller, 1993, p. 79). 
James Johnson more importantly, in `Arguing for Deliberation' (1998), points out that it 
can be `quite difficult empirically to distinguish between a speaker who sincerely 
invokes some principle and one who does so because he deems such an appeal to be 
strategically advantageous' (Johnson, 1998, p. 171). If it is impossible to tell when 
manipulation has occurred and when it has not, then even when no one votes 
strategically and manipulation has not occurred preferences can still not be derived from 
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aggregative mechanisms. Now this applies equally to communication through debate as 
people can strategically misrepresent their preferences (Cohen, 1998, p. 198; Johnson, 
1998, p. 171). In this sense the force of the better argument will not be decisive. The 
greater the divergence of opinion the more likely actors will communicate strategically 
(Cohen, 1998, p. 198). As was argued in the previous chapter, manipulation of the 
decisions to be made is incompatible with a collective, making autonomous decisions 
and being self-determining. 
If the social choice theorists are right, then the link between self-government and 
democracy is broken and therefore the link between autonomy and democracy is 
broken. In fact the autonomous decision as I set it out in the first chapter is impossible. 
The social choice theory critique is then a very serious challenge to this argument. If 
differing decisions can arise from a deliberative process with exactly the same 
arguments, but different procedures, then as Knight and Johnson realise `the outcome of 
deliberation is hostage to precisely the sort of arbitrary factors for which aggregation 
has repeatedly been criticised' i. e. the problems of instability, ambiguity and 
manipulation (Knight and Johnson, 1997, p. 291 and 1994, p. 283; see also Weale, 
2000, p. 2). It is then a serious challenge to my argument; I will consider six possible 
ways for deliberative democracy to avoid the social choice critique. 
2.3.1.1 Consensus 
The discussion of Wolff and unanimous agreement demonstrated a clear way of 
reconciling authority with the autonomy of all citizens. If a citizen has autonomously 
agreed to a decision then she is autonomous when bound by that decision. Furthermore, 
if there is a consensus then there is no need for aggregation and the social choice 
critique is avoided. Cohen thinks that deliberatively democratic decision-making can 
lead to consensus. Cohen is committed to the regulative ideal of a consensus claiming 
that `ideal deliberation aims to arrive at a rationally motivated consensus, to find 
reasons that are persuasive to all' (Cohen, 1991, p. 23). Habermas has also made similar 
connection between deliberative democracy and consensus (Habermas, 1996a, pp. 17- 
19). Lindsay advocated a similar aim for discussion: `The purpose of discussion is to 
achieve a real unity of purpose out of differences' (Lindsay, 1929, p. 44). If 
deliberative democracy does lead to consensual decisions, then it will lead to autonomy 
for all participants. 
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There are three ways consensus can be achieved amongst deliberators. Firstly 
consensus is achieved if participants' personal interests are the same or similar. The 
second way is that deliberation increases empathy so people take another's interests as 
their own. Here interests do not coincide as in the first reason, but unify as a direct 
result of the collective deliberation. People become alerted to the interests and concerns 
of others for the first time, they become open to the subtleties of personal contact and 
become aware of the emotional and intellectual content of people's preferences. The 
third way consensus is reached is by people taking on board a common interest, instead 
of private or selfish interests. Cohen believes deliberation will encourage people to 
focus on the `common good' because reasons must be given for an idea or belief to be 
accepted by the collective. Appeals to selfish interests will not sway the other 
participants, so arguments must be made on how a certain proposal will be good for all 
and will encourage people to identify with each other and the collective as a whole, 
consequently participants will focus on the common interest (Cohen, 1991). 
There is a reason I want to raise to indicate why deliberative democracy will not lead to 
consensus and one reason why consensus is not desirable. Firstly, consensus may not be 
achieved due to pluralism. Jack Knight and James Johnson, in `Aggregation and 
Deliberation' (1994), appreciate that consensus may well be compromised or at least 
limited by the democratic aim of allowing all citizens free and equal access to the 
deliberative and decision-making forums and particularly the more demanding, 
deliberative democratic aim of `actively encouraging or soliciting previously excluded 
constituencies' (Knight and Johnson, 1994, p. 289; my emphasis). Simply because with 
more participants you expect more opinions especially if some of these are previously 
unheard, making agreement on the dimensions of political conflict harder to achieve. 
Moreover, debate can increase disagreement as well as reduce it. A collective could 
easily have a general agreement on some issue, but a debate could generate greater 
diversity of opinions on an issue as it is explored more extensively and deeply (Fearon, 
1998, p. 57; Knight and Johnson, 1994, p. 286; Christiano, 1997, p. 249; Weale, 2000, 
p. 2; Mansbridge, 1980, p. 65). 
Elster argues that even in the ideal speech situation, consensus could not be achieved 
because of a `plurality of ultimate values' people are too different and believe in totally 
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different ideas of `the good life' that agreement on ultimate values is impossible. 
People from very different cultures, which we have in modem cosmopolitan societies, 
are unlikely to come to agreement, especially as in the real world time for deliberation is 
limited (Elster, 1983, p. 38; McCarthy, 1994, p. 55; Christiano, 1996, p. 249; Weale, 
2000, p. 2). Furthermore, it is not just values that will be in conflict, but interests as 
well (Benhabib, 1996, p. 73). 
Dryzek accepts this argument from pluralism, and recognises that interpretations of the 
common good will vary, but insists that individuals can still aim for consensus on what 
to do, without achieving agreement on why. This type of consensus is achieved when 
there is mutual acceptance and understanding of differing opinions (Dryzek, 1990, pp. 
16-17 & pp. 42-43). Even failing this, consensus can still be generated through 
compromise providing `it is reached under communicatively rational conditions', i. e. 
within a deliberatively democratic arena (Dryzek, 1990, pp. 16-17). For Festenstein 
compromise is important as an attempt to ensure that all points of view are 
accommodated in the decision and is the logical result of all participants having to take 
each others' points of view seriously: `When others remain immune to your reasons, 
you eventually give up trying to convince them of these reasons' superiority and start 
trying to reach an accommodation with your fellow citizens, which reflects those good 
reasons as far as possible' (Festenstein, 2002, pp. 92-95). 1 think this is the case, but this 
compromise should only take place after the exchange of reasons, so that the 
compromise is based between discursively transformed preferences, rather than pre- 
political ones. 
This argument from pluralism is also accepted by the likes of Cohen and Habermas. 
Cohen himself acknowledges that people can have good reasons for failing to arrive at 
consensus (Cohen, 1998, p. 189) and that consensus will not be achieved even in `ideal 
conditions' (Cohen, 1998, p. 197; Habermas, 1996a, pp. 304-305 & 1996b, p. 18). 
However, both still maintain that consensus can exist on institutions and general 
principles on how to resolve disagreement: `Thus people living within institutions and a 
political culture shaped by certain ideas and principles are likely to come to understand 
those ideas and principles and to develop some attachment to them' (Cohen, 1998, p- 
189). Consequently for Cohen and Habermas, consensus should still remain the `ideal 
guiding discussion' (Miller, 1993, p. 81; Bohman, 1996, p. 35-36). 
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The reason why consensus should not be the aim of deliberative democracy is that it can 
be achieved due to acquiescence to power rather than being rationally motivated 
(Mansbridge, 1980, p. 32; Gambetta, 1998, p. 21). The danger of requiring consensus 
for legitimate decisions is that if some differences are irreconcilable, agreement may be 
achieved due to compliance or unequal power (Gould, 1988, p. 18). If this is the case, 
then this does not fit our conception of an autonomous preference change. Habcrmas 
himself warns the consensus achieved through communicative rationality is not the 
same as those achieved through asymmetries of power, the former being compatible 
with autonomy and the latter not. Rebel social choice theorists Geoffrey Brennan and 
Loren Lomasky agree arguing that: 
`even a strictly deontological construal of the authority of consent can discount its bindingness 
when the conditions under which consent is achieved involve unfairness, coercion, or some other 
feature that renders consent less than the fully voluntary act of an autonomous agent' (Brennan 
and Lomasky, 1993, p. 138). 
For a decision to be legitimate it is necessary for it to be achieved through free and 
equal deliberation or compromise and not due to tyrannical behaviour or coercion: 
`Non-tyranny ensures that decisions actually reflect the deliberative process, that no 
group automatically succeeds, and that no group must accept a decision for which it 
bears an exclusive burden' (Bohman, 1996, pp. 35-36). For this reason we must agree 
with Bohman that unanimity is an unnecessary and too demanding criterion for the 
outcome of deliberation (Bohman, 1996, p. 34). Manin has a similar position claiming 
that consensus is an, `exorbitant demand' and consequently unrealistic for `each 
individual decision'. Instead he suggests unanimity on the principles and rules from 
which these individual decisions flow would provide sufficient legitimacy (Manin, 
1987, p. 360). In which case it is apparent that deliberation can only ever support the 
aggregation of preferences and not replace it altogether (Dryzek, 2000, p. 38; 
Przeworski, 1998, p. 142; Johnson, 1998, p. 177). Nevertheless not all majority 
decisions will be legitimate: 
`A policy choice may be considered tyrannous if it imposes such deprivations when an 
alternative policy could have been chosen that would have imposed them on no one. The 
avoidance of tyranny can be considered a necessary condition for an acceptable form of democracy' (Fishkin, 1991, p. 34). 
This is why `institutions must be set up that will compel the majority to take the 
minority point of view into account, at least to a certain extent' (Manin, 1987, p. 360). 
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As Barry recognises `what matters is not to satisfy the preferences of a majority but to 
respect the interests of all' (Barry, 1991, p. 36). This is compatible with the cultivation 
for all which also fits the aim of seeking decisions `that enjoy the widest possible 
support' and the taking of others points of view seriously. The achievement of which 
should be made easier due to public reason. Consensus cannot and should not be the 
aim of deliberative democracy. We must look elsewhere therefor;, if the social choice 
theory critique is to be avoided. 
2.3.1.2 Choosing Mechanisms of Aggregation 
Although there is no guarantee that deliberative democracy will reduce disagreement, it 
can change the nature of this disagreement and make it clearer where exactly the 
disagreements lie and the extent of them. This will help reduce the misrepresentation of 
preferences through aggregative mechanisms (Miller, 1993, p. 81). From this 
knowledge of people's preferences and the nature of the disagreements between them, 
that would not have been known prior to deliberation, the most suitable method of 
aggregation and what options voters should choose from, can then be selected. This is 
possible because, as Miller explains, `issues under discussion amalgamate separate 
dimensions of choice to which different voters attach different weights' (Miller, 1993, 
p. 86; my emphasis; see also Fearon, 1998, p. 45). The social choice theory critique 
presumes the aggregative method is selected prior to knowing what peoples preferences 
are, without their formation and transformation through discussion, and therefore 
without knowing the nature, location and extent of the disagreements that exist. 
Therefore, the most suitable aggregative mechanism is not known, and is selected 
arbitrarily and therefore produces arbitrary collective decisions (Miller, 1993, pp. 85- 
88). 
2.3.1.3 Increase in Single Peaked Preferences 
Miller continues with a distinct, but related argument. Following Duncan Black it has 
become apparent that the problems of Arrow's theorem can be avoided if citizens 
preferences are `single-peaked' (Miller, 1993, p. 84). `Single-peakedness means that 
when the available options are arrayed on a continuum, the individuals preference must 
fall continuously on either side of the most preferred position' (Dryzek, 2000, p. 43; See 
Miller, 1993, p. 84, for a similar definition). It is thought that if preferences are single- 
peaked, there is a constraint on preference order structures, as it indicates that citizens 
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do share a common view, even if not the same judgments: 'When preferences arc 
single-peaked we know not only that a majority winner exists but we also know how to 
find it easily' (Barry, 1991, p. 32). This in turn reduces the dimension of disagreement 
and prevents cycling (Knight and Johnson, 1994, pp. 282-283; Miller, 1993, p. 84). 
Riker himself seems to admit that if deliberative democracy does not need to achieve 
consensus, but instead `a common view of the political dimension' (Riker, 1982, p. 128; 
see also Knight and Johnson, 1994, p. 283). 9 
There is a debate between deliberative democrats and social choice theorists as to 
whether single-peakedness is irreducible, but `to the extent non-single-peakedness is 
reducible, deliberation facilitates the explication of the dimensions that reduce it' 
(Dryzek, 2000, p. 43). These conditions are that through debate and the justification of 
reasons about preferences individuals may come to realize that their preferences do 
contradict each other and therefore are not `single-peaked. ' This is because it 
disamalgamates decisions that participants will place different orders of preference 
upon. Miller further argues that if deliberative democracy can help lead to single peaked 
preferences through the public justification of participants' preferences, the dimensions 
of disagreement will become apparent, allowing for the possibility that the original 
decision can `be split into components' (Miller, 1993, p. 85). The great advantage of 
this is that it can increase the chances of there being an option that can be identified as 
having majority support. However, Miller further recognizes that it may not be in the 
interest of some participants to have the decision broken into components, and so may 
try to strategically prevent this. Be also accepts that this can be avoided if the agenda is 
democratically formed (Miller, 1993, p. 86). In a deliberative democracy, if participants 
want to prevent the decisions being broken down into components then they will have 
to justify this with public reason, and whether they get their way or not would depend 
upon the quality of the reasons. As Miller himself claims `it would then be difficult to 
9 What I do not accept though is Knight and Johnson's further claim that this makes the preference 
transformative capacities of democratic deliberation irrelevant. The arguments made above that 
deliberative democracy transforms preferences in a way that makes them more compatible with autonomy 
still stands. Moreover, agreement on where disagreement lies will usually require preference 
transformation itself as there will be different ideas about what the source of disagreement is prior to 
deliberation. Furthermore, the fact that democratic deliberation can lead to preference transformation will 
mean that conflict and disagreement are transformed itself, In short the preference transforming capacity 
of deliberative democracy still holds. 
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make a public argument against the disaggregation of decisions where it was clear the 
original choice was multidimensional' (Miller, 1993, p. 86). 
2.3.1.4 Reduction ofStrategic Action 
It was mentioned earlier that although deliberative democracy encourages participants 
to make public arguments in order to convince the others, most preferences could be 
justified on public reason. Participants may then act strategically and offer public 
reasons for policies even though they are motivated by purely private reason. In short 
what is to stop people speaking in public on public interests, but then voting on selfish 
interests? (Miller, 1993, p. 76). There are several reasons to consider why this might 
not occur. 
Miller argues that human psychology requires cognitive dissonance reduction, so people 
would become convinced of the public reasons they offered eventually. Now this is 
probably not true in all cases, but I would suggest is a factor that would influence many 
people (Miller, 1993, pp. 82-83; Dryzek, 2000, pp. 47-48). As Johnson notes though, 
cognitive dissonance `does not so much generate a `reasoned agreement' as induce a 
conformity that is at once rather shallow and normatively suspect' (Johnson, 1998, p. 
172). Elster agrees suggesting that `the motive of inconsistency avoidance does not 
produce autonomous preferences' (Elster, 1997, p. 12). However, cognitive dissonance 
is not the only possible way strategic action can be reduced. 
The fact that in a deliberative democracy the options available to vote on will be drawn 
from the preceding discussion, participants may well be denied any opportunity to vote 
from purely selfish incentives as the options available may not represent their selfish 
interests (Fearon, 1998, p. 54). Alternatively by providing reasons for an option one 
may convince oneself of it because `by speaking with the voice of reason, one is also 
exposing oneself to reason' (Elster, 1997, p. 12). 
Mackie realizes that deliberatively democratic debate between citizens is likely to be 
public, recurrent, and be conducted between many speakers and many listeners, as 
opposed to a one off, private interaction between two people, that the social choice 
theory critique seems to rely upon, meaning participants will be concerned about their 
reputation and will not want to be seen to be acting strategically for fear of future 
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recriminations (Mackie, 1998, pp. 84-85). As Oster has suggested, strategic 
participants must abide by their arguments in public, even if they arc really motivated 
by self-interest, or be shown to be a hypocrite. Elster terms this 'the civilizing force of 
hypocrisy'. If people argue for one thing and vote for another (and the vote takes place 
in public) then they will lose credibility when they participate in future. Other 
participants will disregard the reasons of the hypocrite as insincere and they may even 
face public humiliation (Dryzek, 2000, p. 46; Brennan and Lomasky, 1993, p. 40). 
These considerations have led Brennan and Lomasky to conclude that 'the moral force 
of the charge of hypocrisy does, then, imply the desirability of congruence between 
expressive and instrumental behavior' (Brennan and Lomasky, 1993, p. 52). 
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factor can also be produced due to the fact that people want to 'think well of 
themselves. ' In this way people express themselves, not as they arc, but as they would 
like to be (Brennan and Lomasky, 1993, p. 40). 
The over reliance on deliberators acting strategically in social choice theory is based 
upon the presumption that the information shared is unverifiable and unprovable. It is 
the case that on occasions a certain participant will have a monopoly on information and 
use this information strategically. For example tobacco companies and therc own 
research into their products health risks. However, in most cases one source will not 
have a monopoly on information, and the way the tobacco industries information has 
been disproved shows that it is difficult for actors to maintain this monopoly. This is 
because there will be many participants in democratic deliberation and not just two, 
consequently contrasting information and reasons to support it will be provided from a 
plurality of sources (Mackie, 1998, pp. 85-86). 
2.3.1.5 Domain Restriction 
In his sceptical approach to deliberative democracy, Johnson notes that `the "notorious 
difficulties" that follow from the work of Arrow and other social choice theorists for 
any assessment of aggregative mechanisms, diminish considerably if we relax or lift the 
requirement of unrestricted domain' (Johnson, 1998, p. 164; Arrow, 1963, chapter 6-7). 
Dryzek sums up how deliberative democracy, despite entailing aggregation can avoid 
to Miller (1993, p. 83) cites evidence from juries, which indicate this to be the case: Davis, J; Stasson, M. 
Ono, K and Zimmerman, S (1988). He further cites evidence on prisoner dilemma situations, which 
shows how discussion can induce co-operation from 37.5 to 78.6 per cent: Orbell, J. M. Van Der Kragt, A 
and Dawes, R (1988). 
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the social choice critique: `Deliberative democrats can respond to the social choice 
critique by pointing to the capacity of deliberation to restrict the range of admissible 
preferences, and so limit the possibilities for cycling across alternatives' (Dryzek, 2000, 
p. 73). 1 1 
There are two different strategies to restrict the range of admissible prcfercnccs, based 
upon Robert Goodin's distinction (1986), between output filters and input filters. Output 
filters remove certain options from the realm of decision-making, while input filters 
prevent certain preferences from being considered and entered into the decision-making 
process (Goodin, 1986, p. 78). Following Rawls, Goodin, Amy Gutmann and Dennis 
Thompson, Miller and Blaug favour input filters. They follow Rawls in the sense that 
democratic deliberation should not adapt to pluralism as it stands, but to 'reasonable 
pluralism. ' In contrast Dryzek, Cohen, Sher and Barber take a Ilabcrmasian line and arc 
committed to output filters, believing reasonable pluralism can be achieved through the 
deliberative process itself. They follow Habermas in the sense that no views should be 
excluded prior to the deliberative process. 
Goodin argues that input filtering is a more efficient way of excluding irrational or 
misguided preferences entering than output filtering, as they do not enter the decision- 
making process and so they do not influence participants at any level of the decision- 
making process. Preferences would therefore be laundered by elites in the interests of 
those with whom they interfere (Goodin, 1986, p. 92). Howcver, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, such paternalism violates autonomy. 
Gutmann and Thompson, in Democracy anDisagreement (1996), arc also in favour of 
input filters to prevent the inclusion of preferences that challenge political equality e. g. 
racist arguments. Despite being committed to the deliberative model of democracy, 
Gutmann and Thompson want to achieve the value of publicity, prior to the deliberation 
process, obviously sceptical of its ability to ensure public reason though its internal 
processes of debate. 
't Dryzek also appreciates that domain restriction can also occur through the institutional context. This 
argument will be reviewed in the following chapters. 
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Miller and Blaug, likewise, believe that certain reasons e. g. racist arguments or violent 
and coercive threats should be excluded a priori, in order to be in line with the 
requirements of deliberation that require participants to be free and equal, and to further 
ensure the deliberative capacities of individuals arc not damaged through intimidation 
(Miller, 2000, p. 205; Blaug, 1999, pp. 148-149). 1 accept that threats of violence and 
coercion must be ruled out as this means it will not be the force of the better argument 
that is successful, but force itself. However, I do not accept that racist arguments should 
be discounted. I agree with Cohen when lie states that; `the deliberative conception holds 
that free expression is required for determining what advances the common good, 
because what is good is fixed by public deliberation and not prior to it' and 'for this 
reason the deliberative conception supports protection for the full range of expression, 
regardless of the content of that expression (Cohen, 1991, pp. 29-30; See also Bcnhabib, 
1996, p. 70). Sher agrees arguing that, `in our prior deliberations about which laws and 
policies to adopt, questions about how it is best to live may never simply be "taken off 
the agenda. " In public as well as private life, the operative distinction is not between 
legitimate and illegitimate reasons, but rather between good and bad ones. ' Not all 
reasons will carry the same force e. g. racist reasons are inadequate reasons. `Indeed, to 
show that a form of discrimination is illegitimate, the best strategy is publicly to 
consider, and decisively to refute, the best arguments advanced on its behalf' (Sher, 
1997, p. 5). 
Johnson rightly appreciates that input filtering makes the delibcrative resolution of 
certain key conflicts impossible and so such issues would actually be removed from the 
agenda a priori (Johnson, 1998, p. 168-170). 1 maintain that input filtering is both 
undemocratic and unnecessary. The essence of the argument in this chapter has been 
that deliberative democracy can transform preferences and make them more 
autonomous by being exposed to reason and new information and encouraging 
preferences to be justified to the rest of the collective as Barber appreciates: 
`Politics in the participatory mode does not choose between or merely ratify values whose 
legitimacy is a matter of prior record. It makes preferences and opinions cars legitimacy by 
forcing them to run the gauntlet of public deliberation and public judgment. They emerge not 
simply legitimized, but transformed by the process to which they have been subjected' (Barber, 
1984, p. 136). 
The domain of preferences are restricted through the process of deliberation itself: `The 
whole point of deliberation is to "restrict domain".., because deliberation in inducing 
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reflection on preferences and requiring that they be defended publicly eliminates 
preference orderings which cannot be so defended' (Dryzck, 2000, p. 43). 
Consequently, it is thought that deliberative democracy can reduce the scale of 
preference rankings, which will need to be aggregated (Miller, 1993, p. 81). As Dryzek 
rightly notes, it is this very possibility that makes deliberative democracy so 
normatively appealing: 
`Deliberation's real advantage over social choice theory in the domain restriction stakes is that 
deliberation has endogenous mechanisms for restricting the range of preferences and options, 
whereas social choice theory rules out such endogenous mechanisms because it is the prisoner of 
an assumption that sees preferences as unaffected by the political process' (Dryzek, 2000, p. 46). 
The argument is then that deliberatively democratic decision-making ensures that 
individual preferences are authentic. Through its internal process of preference 
laundering it also ensures that the preference domain is restricted and consequently that 
clear, unambiguous results can be produced. 
2.3.1.6 Abandonment of the 'independence of irrelevant alternatives' criteria 
Colin Bird, in his review of the 'Possibility of Self-Government' (2000), argues that not 
all of Arrow's five criteria are necessary for a coherent decision, and suggests that the 
'independence of irrelevant alternatives' is one such criterion. The basis of this 
argument is that social choice theory is ignorant of the fact that individuals can have 
preferences over their preferences, a point that was highlighted in the first chapter with 
the discussion of Dworkin. This means that it is possible for a second order preference 
to contradict first order preferences, and for the second order preferences to `win out' 
when making an individual decision. 12 In short when an individual is making a decision 
it may not rank its preferences in the manner social choice theorists predict. Bird offers 
an example of a spouse who is experiencing a reciprocated attraction with a work 
colleague. She is no longer in love with her husband and does not believe in the 
sanctity of marriage, nor is she sexually satisfied by him and believes that a relationship 
with her colleague would satisfy her. However, she stills refrains from cheating 
because she has a higher order preference that she does not want to have preferences 
t2 As the discussion in the previous chapter also indicated, this does not meant that higher order 
preferences are more autonomous than first order preferences, nor that the higher order preferences will 
be decisive. For a preference to be autonomous, it must meet the conditions of the acceptance of 
preference formation outlined in chapter one. 
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that would be dishonest. Bird therefore suggests that Arrow's criteria of indcpcndcncc 
of irrelevant alternatives can be abandoned because the agent makes a decision based 
upon alternatives that would be considered irrelevant to the decision in hand by these 
criteria. In short the fifth criterion demands that all preferences be ordinate, but this is 
not how individuals make collective decisions. Social choice theorists may try to 
defend their position by suggesting that the spouses' higher order preference, not to be 
dishonest, is just another preference that is attributed greater importance over her other 
preferences in this particular decision, and so is not an 'irrelevant alternative. ' Such a 
view would be mistaken because, it is not necessarily just a preference for x over y, it is 
a preference about the desirability of having preferences x and y. Therefore higher order 
`volitions cannot simply be assimilated without qualification to other first order 
rankings of the alternatives' (Bird, 2000, p. 573). 
With his artillery on board, Bird argues that not all of Arrow's five criteria arc necessary 
to make an individual decision or a collective decision. Be suggests that just as an 
individual may have higher order preferences, so might a collective if it wishes to act 
democratically and have higher order collective preferences about wanting decisions to 
be fair and inclusive (Bird, 2000, p. 575). If a collective is to operate like a democracy 
then this `automatically entails various restrictions on the range of motivations allowed 
to constitute its will' (Bird, 2000, p. 576). The problem for society is how to ensure that 
this democratic identity is in place, but I have argued above that the ideal of deliberative 
democracy aims at compromise, inclusion, debate and the filtering of preferences 
though public reason. 
To summarise, I have tried to argue that deliberative democracy has a more accurate 
perception of political reality than social choice theory because it sees preferences as 
exogenous, rather than endogenous, so preferences can be transformed and become 
more autonomous. I have further suggested that deliberative democracy can avoid the 
social choice critique that tried to break the link with autonomy and deliberative 
democracy, as it can aid in the selection of an appropriate agºregative mechanism, 
increase single-peaked preferences, reduce strategic action, restrict the domain of 
preferences and have further cast doubt over the validity of Arrow's `independence of 
irrelevant alternatives' criteria for making a coherent decision. 
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The fault at the heart of social choice theories such as Riker's is the reduction of 
democracy to voting, so that the role of participation in democracy is nothing more than 
a function to `organize voting into genuine choice' (Riker, 1982, p. 5). 1lopefully this 
discussion has demonstrated that this is not the case, and that the process through which 
preferences are (trans)formed is absolutely key to the coherency of that final social 
choice. This is why voting, although necessary, should not be the primary focus of 
democratic participation, but should in fact be the result of equality through 'public 
forum, discussion and participation' (Coleman and Ferejohn, 1986, p. 17). The act of 
voting following fair deliberation is different from aggregating preferences without a 
prior process of deliberation, and consequently the resulting decisions arc likely to be 
different. Voting after deliberation is more legitimate because `it is ascertained at the 
close of a deliberative process in which all the citizens... have participated' (Marin, 
1987, p. 360; see also Cohen, 1991, p. 23). 
Due to the implausibility and undesirability of consensus, voting is still an essential 
element in the deliberative process. It is due to the fact that participants will have a vote 
that deliberation is necessary and desirable, in order to persuade others, and to listen to 
them: `A citizen's incentive to listen to another's opinion with which he disagrees 
strongly diminishes when that other has no power' (Christiano, 1997, p. 251). Voting 
then is not only a fair mechanism to make a decision when agreement is not reached 
following a period of deliberation, but also provides motivation to participate in 
deliberation and listen to and convince other citizens. 
2.3.2. Difference and Equality 
In the first chapter, it was argued that democracy aids the cultivation of autonomy due 
to its commitment to equality, and this was seen as normatively correct as cach citizen's 
autonomy should be equally respected. One of the prominent criticisms against the 
ability of deliberative democracy to ensure this equality comes from `difference 
democrats. ' Dryzek succinctly defines this branch of democratic theory: `Dif'crcnce 
democrats are those who stress the need for democratic politics to concern itself first 
and foremost with the recognition of the legitimacy and validity of the particular 
perspectives of historically oppressed segments of the population' (Dryzek, 2000, p. 
57). The model of deliberative democracy is certainly formally inclusive in the sense 
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that it sccks the participation ofait, but that does not mean it is substantially inclusivc it 
the procedures and forms ofcommunication privilcgc ccrtain groups over others. 
Iris Marion Young, one of the principle theorists in this tradition, 
in 'Communication 
and the Other' (1996), is sceptical that even if current socio-economic 
inequalities wenn 
eliminated deliberatively democratic arenas could achieve equality 
among the 
deliberators because of social power, which derives not only 
from economic and 
political power, but also from ones' personal impression of one self, and 
the valuation 
of ones 'style of speech. ' Such powers affect the equality ofspeakcrs 
in a deliberative 
situation, and cannot be eliminated due to cultural and social 
differences. She argues 
that theorists of deliberative democracy falsely assume 
its norms arc neutral and 
universal, and offers a theory of 'communicative democracy', that 
is sensitive to social 
and cultural differences, in its place (Young, 1996, p. 123). Lynn Sanders, another 
prominent thinker in the difference democracy strand, criticises deliberative democracy 
in 'Against Deliberation' (1997), she presents a similar argument, but is even more 
critical of deliberative democracy, arguing that it necessarily favours dominant social 
groups over subordinate ones. 
If this is the case then the question arises `can disadvantaged groups present their 
arguments in a manner that will be convincing to others, given the particularity of their 
situation? ' Moreover if the reasons are not public reasons in the sense that all can 
accept, then once again the `the outcome cannot be described as rational in a sense that 
transcends group membership' (Miller, 2000, p. 144). As Miller appreciates this is a 
worrying and significant challenge as it: 
`Directly contests one of the main claims advanced in support of deliberative democracy, namely that it is capable of reaching decisions that are more socially just than those reached in existing liberal democracies, where the distribution of political power tends to reflect the distribution of 
wealth and other forms of social advantage' (Miller, 2000, p. 144). 
In short, it would mean that deliberative democracy could not cultivate the autonomy of 
all, but only dominant groups; its normative legitimacy would therefore be completely 
undermined. From the arguments of Young and Sanders three challenges to the 
normative validity of deliberative democracy can be identified. These arc that it will 
enable certain groups to participate more and therefore dominate decision-making, that 
rational argument cannot challenge present inequality and finally that the 
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communication favoured by the norms of deliberative democracy arc not neutral, but 
culturally specific. 
2.3.2.1 Some Groups Will Participate More than Others 
Sanders points to evidence from juries to demonstrate that it is not the quality of reasons 
that will persuade people in deliberative settings, but group dynamics and power 
structures. She argues that those who speak more gain more influence, and that those 
who speak the most are white males (Sanders, 1997, pp. 365-366). Sanders concludes 
that the wider distribution and greater equality of deliberative capabilities will not 
counter the dynamics of such groups: `To meet the concern of equal participation, 
democrats should explicitly attend to issues of group dynamics and try to develop ways 
to undercut the dominance of higher status individuals' (Sanders, 1997, p. 367). 
John Gastill, in Democracy in Small Groups (1993), is aware of the same danger as 
Sanders, claiming, `both overt and subtle power dynamics due to differences in class, 
ethnicity, culture, gender, etc can also distort member relationship and deliberation. ' 
For example stereotypes and patterns of socialisation in individual and group behaviour 
can go against democratic deliberation. He cites evidence from studies on university 
students that demonstrated males having more confidence in their ability to be able to 
persuade others, and were also more likely to use controlling behaviour (Gastill, 1993, 
p. 149). For Abrams, there is `the legacy of discrimination', which means minorities 
may wish to refrain from debating with non-minorities because they hold these 
responsible for past discrimination, or feel the audience will be unresponsive to their 
arguments and that the preference gap will be too great to be bridged by argumentation 
(Abrams, 1988, pp. 512-513). Sanders' evidence from juries also suggests that the 
dominant social group, white men, participate the most. In contrast Fishkin and Luskin 
cite evidence from deliberative opinion polls that suggest all social groups were able to 
participate equally (Fishkin and Luskin, 2000). 
All this demonstrates is that deliberative democratic decision-making requires 
procedures to ensure that all have an equal opportunity to participate. Sanders herself 
acknowledges her claims are dependent upon the verdict style of discussion employed 
in the juries. `Evidence-driven deliberation' is more inclusive than 'verdict-driven 
deliberation' it seems. Evidence-driven deliberation encourages all views to be 
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expressed and so more participants speak and this in turn causes more people to change 
their opinions. As Miller also appreciates these are the characteristics of 'good political 
deliberation. ' The 'verdict-driven' style approximates more closely the aggregative 
model of decision-making as it accepts the validity of pre-political preferences. This 
model is based upon trying to reach a collective solution that all arc happy with rather 
than ensure their initial preferences form the final decision. Sanders' argument 
therefore does not suggest that deliberative democracy favours certain social groups, 
but rather that when it is institutionalised the procedures used should approximate the 
evidence-driven model of deliberation (Miller, 2000, pp. 146-147). 
2.3.2.2 The Inadequacy of Reason 
Sanders also believes that `insidious prejudices may incline citizens to hear some 
arguments and not others. Importantly, this prejudice may be unrecognised by those 
citizens whose views are disregarded as well as by others' (Sanders, 1997, p. 353). This 
is a serious challenge to deliberative democracy, and the claims that it can lead to the 
equal cultivation of autonomy, because this is dependent on the fact that such prejudices 
can be counted by argument within the deliberative arena. However, if Sanders is right 
that since `disregard based in prejudice goes unrecognised by both those who arc 
subject to it and those who are prejudiced, prejudices cannot possibly be challenged' 
(Sanders, 1997, p. 353), then deliberative democracy may actually reinforce inequality. 
Sanders' argument is then dependent on prejudice not being open to argument and 
critique, but being `invisible' and not exposed to reason. This is really an empirical 
claim, and one that I am sceptical of. What is required though is more empirical 
research in this area to establish if prejudice is susceptible to r son, as the implications 
of this are huge. 
2.3.2.3 Cultural Specificity 
Another threat to the connection between deliberative democracy and autonomy is that 
the capabilities required for effective participation are not culturally neutral and will 
disadvantage certain groups from the offset. It is suggested that it would be even more 
difficult for the subordinate groups to challenge the established norms of the dominant 
groups, if the capabilities they needed to develop to be able to challenge these norms 
were in fact biased against them. For example the type of language expected could be 
interpreted as favouring white ethnic groups, the formality of the meetings are accused 
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of favouring the middle classes, and the rationalistic style of argument is criticised as 
being gender biased against women (Bohman, 1996, p. 116). 
Young, in Justice and the Politics of Difference (1990), believes that democratic 
deliberation requires neutral or universal language and premises, but that in multi- 
cultural societies, characterised by pluralism this is unobtainable. Young suggests that 
it is the discourse of liberal individualism that dominates American politics, and that it 
is impossible for `socialists, radical feminists, American Indian activists, Black 
activists, gay and lesbian activists' to define and describe the oppression they feel in this 
language (Young, 1990, p. 39). Sanders concurs arguing that `taking deliberation as a 
signal of democratic practice paradoxically works undemocratically, discrediting on 
seemingly democratic grounds the views of those who are less likely to present their 
arguments in ways that we recognise as characteristically deliberative. In our political 
culture, these citizens are likely to be those who are already underrepresented in formal 
political institutions and who are systematically materially disadvantaged, namely 
women; racial minorities... and poorer people' (Sanders, 1997, p. 349). The claim is 
then that a deliberative democracy would then favour the culturally specific language of 
dominant groups, which means that subordinate groups are unable to express their 
preferences and experiences in this particularistic language that the debate would 
require. Exactly why deliberative democracy favours the culturally specific language 
of dominant groups must be unpacked, and looked at in more detail. 
Specifically, Young claims that discourse in deliberative democracy is `assertive and 
confrontational', `formal and general' and `dispassionate and disembodied' (Young, 
1996, pp. 123-124). Sanders agrees, arguing that because democratic deliberation relies 
upon communication that is `rational, contained and oriented to a shared problem' 
rather than `impassioned, extreme, and the product of particular interests' it 
consequently discriminates against disadvantaged groups (Sanders, 1997, p. 370). 
These claims of Young will then be looked at in turn. 
The first claim by Young is that that in a deliberative democracy, `speech that is 
assertive and confrontational is here more valued than speech that is tentative, 
exploratory, or conciliatory. In most actual situations of discussion, this privileges male 
speaking styles over female' (Young, 1996, p. 123). It may well be the case that men 
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employ more confrontational speech, but I think it is wrong to conclude that this speech 
is more likely to achieve success in a deliberative situation. In fact I would suggest that 
this style of speech is less likely to achieve success. Young ignores the preference 
transformation potential of argumentation and I would suggest that speech that is 
`tentative, exploratory, or conciliatory' is more likely to achieve preference 
transformation than confrontational speech. As Diego Gambetta has noted in 
`Claro! '(1998), `to be fruitful, a conversation need not exclude the passions... people 
who are too cool, analytical, and impartial may generate distrust or may fail to rally 
people around issues' (Gambetta, 1998, p. 20). 
Young also seems to be under the misconception that the model of deliberative 
democracy is based upon competition with participants trying to win the argument. She 
argues that the force of the better argument equates to `conceding defeat' because one 
cannot provide a counterargument (Young, 1996, p. 123). However, this argument 
again seems ignorant of the preference transformation possible through argument. It is 
then not necessarily the case that people concede defeat, because they may actually 
agree with the argument that has been presented to them, yet Young acknowledges this 
type of preference transformation herself (Young, 1996, p. 125). 
In terms of the second claim that deliberation that is `formal and general', and excludes 
groups that need to highlight injustice in specific circumstances, I think deliberation still 
allows this. Groups can make appeals from the specific and relate it to general 
principles such as justice, a point that Young herself seems to accept (Miller, 2000, pp. 
153-154). For example disabled people claiming for easier access to buildings may 
build their argument from personal experience and refer to specific buildings before 
broadening the argument that this lack of easy access is unjust and applies to all public 
and commercial buildings. 
Finally, Miller rightly criticises Young's analysis of reason and emotion, which argues 
that it is dispassionate and disembodied, as this is based upon a false dichotomy: 'False 
in the sense that all political speech and argument must convey the feelings and 
commitments of the speaker, but also give reasons either positively for some proposal, 
or negatively against some alternative' (Miller, 2000, p. 153). There is nothing wrong 
with demonstrating emotion in debate, in fact it is important to show how strongly one 
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feels about something, but it cannot stand alone, reasons must be supplied to convince 
others. They will not simply be convinced by the fact that one holds a preference 
strongly, there are certain aggregation mechanisms, which allow people to place 
multiple votes for an option to demonstrate their passion, but these aº ºrcbativc 
mechanisms do not require the justification for one's reasons. Furthermore, I agree with 
Miller that the suggestion that women and ethnic minorities are less apt at employing 
reason is `rather insulting to disadvantaged groups to suggest that norms of 
argumentative rationality are loaded against them, because it implies that they cannot 
give coherent arguments for the changes they want to bring about' (Miller, 2000, p. 
153). 
Instead of deliberative democracy Young advocates `communicative democracy', which 
she suggests will differ from deliberative democracy by favouring greeting, rhetoric and 
storytelling over rational argument, which she suggests will make communication more 
compatible with pluralism because they are more amenable to the particularity of 
participants. `Greeting' deals with how participants provide recognition amongst each 
other. `Rhetoric' is the use of cultural symbols and values, which can provoke and 
motivate participants. Storytelling is the use of narratives personal or otherwise 
(Young, 1996). 13 Whether these forms of communication should be included in 
deliberative democracy needs to be considered and each will be addressed in turn. 
Greeting is important as it creates the right atmosphere for deliberation and can indicate 
a mutual respect, but it is hard to see how it could replace reasoned argument (Miller, 
2000, p. 155; Dryzek, 2000, p. 69). Moreover, greeting itself can be exclusive and 
confrontational (Dryzek, 2000, p. 69). 
Rhetoric can be factious as well as motivating: 'Because rhetoric conceals rather than 
reveals the grounds on which decisions are taken, it is less likely than reasoned 
argument to produce socially just policies' (Miller, 2000; p156). In this sense rhetoric 
seems to count against the cultivation of autonomy as people will be moved to accept a 
preference without there being sound information and reasoning behind it. It is such 
considerations that have led Simone Chambers, in Reasonable Democracy (1996), to 
13 Sanders also advocates the need for storytelling which she terms 'testimony. ' 
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claim that rhetoric is the same as coercion as it involves emotional manipulation 
(Chambers, 1996, pp. 151-152). Rhetoric will surely enter the deliberative arcna, but we 
must have faith that reasons employed by other participants can effectively counter it. 
However, Dryzek suggests that rhetoric can also be used to reach mutual understanding 
(Dryzek, 2000, p. 70). He provides the example of Martin Luther King, claiming he 
used the rhetoric of the `Declaration of Independence' and the 'United States 
Constitution' to appeal to white audiences. In this context he accepts that the rhetoric 
was supported by reasons, but argues that `without the emotional appeal the argument 
would have fallen upon deaf ears' (Dryzek, 2000, p. 52). Rhetoric supported by reason 
then can aid `mutual understanding of positions, but because emotion must be linked to 
reason if it is to avoid coercion reason cannot be replaced (Dryzek, 2000, pp. 52-53). 
For Dryzek, rhetoric can particularly play a key role in the transmission of opinions 
from the public sphere to those that are 'potentially unsympathetic' to this discourse e. g. 
the state and mass media (Dryzek, 2000, p. 54). Gutmann and Thompson also sec 
rhetoric as playing a key role in getting issues on the agenda and provide several 
examples e. g. the challenge of the U. S. Senate's usual routine renewal of the patent on 
the Confederate flag insignia in 1993 (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, p. 135). 
Storytelling is essential as people need to share their personal experiences to highlight 
and demonstrate their specific position and how present policies (or the absence of 
them) are adversely affecting them. In this sense storytelling `expands the horizons' of 
participants (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, p. 137). Young suggests that all stories 
will share equal weight in a communicative situation. However, they will all still be 
open to contestation and they need to highlight the situation of a broader group, not 
simply individuals (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, p. 137). This contestation over the 
accuracy and validity of storytelling leads to a `danger that such groups will require 
correct storylines, and punish incorrect ones which cannot easily withstand the 
normalising gaze of the group' (Dryzek; 2000; p68). This is why Gutmann and 
Thompson realise that without rational argument storytelling can only bring differences 
to the attention of participants, but it cannot resolve these conflicts (Gutmann and 
Thompson, 1996, p. 137). 
Dryzek effectively responds to both Young's and Sanders's arguments by highlighting 
the fact that greeting, rhetoric and storytelling are as hierarchical as the rational 
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deliberation they criticise. Just as some people arc better at forming, expressing and 
understanding rational argument than others, likewise some people will have more 
talent for greeting, rhetoric and storytelling. Moreover, the people who have talents for 
these things may be those from the same dominant social groups who arc talented 
arguers. If this is the case then Young's and Sanders's arguments arc undermined: 
`The validity of Young's claims about the degree to which these three forms of 
communication equalise across difference depends on the hierarchies within argument, 
greeting, rhetoric and storytelling compensating for, rather than reinforcing one another' 
(Dryzek, 2000, p. 67; see also Miller, 2000, pp. 156-157; Gutmann and Thompson, 
1996, p. 137). Benhabib makes a similar point, claiming that 'standards of impartiality 
and fairness' are equally applicable to Young's communicative democracy as to 
deliberative democracy in order to establish procedural fairness, and to evaluate whether 
genuine transformation of preferences has occurred or whether a process of bargaining 
or coercion has caused the simulation of preference change (ßenhabib, 1996, p. 82). 
Argument is the only form of communication capable of proving how all forms of 
communication is hierarchical `in itself, but also in testimony, l rccting and rhetoric. ' 
The other forms of communication can only highlight or challenge the failings of the 
same communication (Dryzek, 2000, p. 71). In conclusion, I fccl that Young is right to 
advocate the importance of greeting, rhetoric and storytelling, but as Dryzek appreciates 
they are additions to and not replacements for rational argument: 
'When it comes to the key question "what is to be done? " about communicative 
failures... argument always plays a central role. When it comes to 'what is to be done? ' in terms 
of collective action in response to a social problem, argument also must enter. Thus argument 
always has to be present in a deliberative democracy. The other forms can be present, and there 
are good reasons to welcome them, but their status is a bit different because they do not have to 
be present' (Dryzek, 2000, p. 7 1)" 
Hopefully, I have established that deliberative democracy can promote the autonomy of 
all social groups equally, and can provide subordinate groups with the chance to 
challenge inequality through reason as well as through the use of greeting, rhetoric and 
storytelling. However, I would warn that this is dependent upon how deliberative 
democracy is institutionalised. 
14 It is important to note, that Dryzek maintains, that this does not open the door to the social choice 
critique, because the fact that difference is accepted does not necessarily entail that the inclusion of 
difference can clear up what a specific social choice entails, and it also means that there are more 
positions that may not survive `deliberative scrutiny' (Dryzek, 2000, pp. 73-74). 
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2.3.3. Deliberative Obligations 
The final challenge against the claim that deliberative democracy can cultivate 
autonomous preferences and decisions conics from l±cstenstein. lie points out that 
participants in a deliberative democracy have `special obligations' to other participants 
(Festenstein, 2002, p. 89). The first obligation is to provide reasons that all can accept. 
As I have conceived deliberative democracy, this is an excessively strong demand. 
Instead of this requirement, I suggest that participants have an obligation to find reasons 
that most can accept. The second obligation is to listen and reply sincerely to all others. 
As Gundersen notes, none of the advantages of deliberative democracy outlined above 
will occur unless actors listen to each other (Gundcrscn, 2000, p. 97). Information will 
not be increased as people will not listen to others and hearer and speaker autonomy 
will then not be advanced and there will be no need to make public justifications if the 
public ignores one. The third and final obligation is to try to find a proposal that is 
acceptable to all through the modification of proposals in accordance with the reasons 
of others (Festenstein, 2002, p. 89). This means that participants should opt for the 
option that best accommodates all participants' preferences and make decisions that are 
not `tyrannical' to a specific group. 
The combination of all three of these obligations is specific to the deliberative model of 
democracy, and so can be classified as `deliberative obligations. ' These obligations arc 
also more demanding than many other models of democracy, for example a purely 
aggregative model where the only obligation is to vote. A problem arises because we 
cannot be sure that citizens will always abide by these obligations, as in certain 
circumstances it will not be in their interests to do so (Eestenstein, 2002, p. 89). If it is 
necessary for citizens to abide by these deliberative obligations in order for autonomy to 
be enhanced then this becomes a serious to challenge to the case outlined in the first half 
of this chapter, if these obligations cannot be derived from deliberative democracy 
itself. 
One attempt to counter this is if participation in deliberatively democratic decision- 
making enhances autonomy, and autonomy is an intrinsic value then citizens should 
want to participate and abide by the obligations in order to advance their autonomy. 
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Those who do not participate in deliberative democracy and cxcrcisc judgment over 
their preferences will then fail to cultivate their autonomy as Christiano cxplains: 
'A person whose conception of his interests and aims is more or less arbitrarily arrived at is at a 
disadvantage in relation to a person who has thought about lzcr aims and has sonic basis for 
pursuing the ends she does. The person who has a poorly reasoned unreflective conception of his 
or her aims is a person who is unlikely to achieve much of worth to himscll tic wilt be easily 
subject to confusion, arbitrary changes in opinion as well as manipulation by others' (Christian, 
1997, p. 257). 
However, just because it is in the interest of citizens to cultivate their own autonomy, 
does not mean that they will be interested in the autonomy of others, and so may well 
not abide by the obligations. 
Alternatively we can invoke some of the same arguments here, as we did against the 
social choice theorists, as a failure to abide by the obligations may be strategically 
motivated. In section 2.3.1.4, it was argued that deliberative democracy could reduce 
strategic behaviour. Although Festenstein accepts both these arguments he argues that 
they are insufficient to provide grounding for the deliberative obligations, as we can still 
imagine occasions when the costs of not abiding by them would be small. In this sense 
this approach ignores `the distinction between a pragmatic norm and an obligation' 
(Festenstein, 2002, p. 104). 
An alternative may be the participants will abide by the obligations because of 
instrumental reasons. As Miller suggests, if the same participants are involved in a 
number of decisions-making debates over a period of time, members of the majority on 
one decision may find themselves in the minority on another and hoping that this 
majority justify their decisions on public rather than private interests, listen to their 
arguments and take their interests into consideration and vote for the `policy outcome 
that enjoys the widest possible support' and accommodate minority interests where 
possible. If citizens do not abide by the deliberative obligations themselves when in the 
majority, then it would seem less likely that others will when they arc in the minority 
(Miller, 2000, p. 152). This is still then a pragmatic norm rather than an obligation and 
it may not always pertain as Festenstein notes. If people accept to abide by the norms 
of deliberative democracy for instrumental reasons, then they will abandon this 
commitment when it is in their interest to do so (Festenstein, 2002, pp. 97-98). This 
comment does seem to ignore the educative effects of debate that have been outlined, 
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whereby citizens accommodate the interests of others into their own, but Festcnstein 
still plausibly maintains that in certain circumstances transformation may not occur and 
deliberative obligations can therefore still go unfulfilled (Festenstein, 2002, p. 9k). 
Miller accepts that there are then deliberative obligations that are not grounded in 
deliberative democracy itself and suggests that there needs to be a shared identity that 
transcends all other identities, which can only be fulfilled by a national identity, to 
provide commitment to these obligations (Miller, 2000, p. 158). Even if we accept the 
argument that national identity generates special obligations between members, there is 
no guarantee that these will be deliberative in character. Furthermore, if the national 
identity is not deliberative, but still valuable, it is not its contribution to deliberative 
obligations that makes national identity valuable, and so it cannot be the grounding for 
these obligations as Festenstein explains: `If the argument is that the deliberative 
features of a national identity make it valuable to its members, it is not clear what the 
specifically national aspect of those characteristics adds, if we are seeking to derive the 
deliberative obligations' (Festenstein, 2002, p. 107). 
Consequently, Festenstein concludes that deliberative obligations cannot be derived 
from the deliberative process itself, but rather from a valuable relationship such as 
citizenship, providing that we accept that citizenship has intrinsic value (Festenstein, 
2002, p. 104). Festenstein correctly notes that this does not mean the incentive to 
participate should be non- instrumental, but rather that `there is a non-instrumental good 
in my being able to take part in this way in a community which makes decisions about 
its common affairs. ' If it is accepted that citizenship has an intrinsic value then citizens 
may well realise this value and appreciate that valuable relationships entails obligations 
to each other (Festenstein, 2002, p. 105). 
The argument that if deliberative democracy is to cultivate autonomy it requires citizens 
to abide by deliberative obligations does not then suggest that there is no connection 
between this model of democracy and autonomy. What it does suggest is that 
deliberative democracy has preconditions, one of which is a certain level of civic virtue 
whereby citizens gain some intrinsic value from the relationship. The problem then is 
how to ensure that this civic virtue is present and I would suggest that this is dependent 
upon the institutional situation, which will be considered in the following chapters. 
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2.4 Conclusion 
The intention of this chapter has been to argue that the deliberative model of democracy 
is the most suitable to ensure the cultivation of autonomy, as it was conceived in the 
previous chapter. 
Developing from the first chapter the argument that collcctive autonomy differs to 
individual autonomy and that citizens need to form their preferences with the 
consideration of the opinions of other citizens, if the equal cultivation of everyone's 
autonomy is to be ensured. It is argued that deliberative democracy encourages the use 
of public reason as preferences must be justified to all and this will encourage citizens 
to consider the opinions and interests of others. It was further claimed that deliberative 
democracy cultivates both hearer and speaker autonomy by increasing the availability of 
relevant information and allowing participants to express themselves freely. All three 
arguments are based upon the premise that preferences can be transformed and become 
more rational when reflected upon, which it was claimed is the defining mark of 
deliberative democracy. 
Three challenges were considered to this argument. The first, from social choice theory, 
claimed that because deliberative democracy would not achieve consensus, aggregation 
would be necessary, but that this meant decisions would be intransitive, ambiguous and 
open to suspect manipulation. This was countered as deliberative democracy can aid in 
the selection of an appropriate aggregative mechanism, increase single peaked 
preferences, reduce strategic action, restrict the domain of preferences and further cast 
doubt over the validity of `independence of irrelevancy' criteria, which avoids these 
negative aspects. The second challenge, from difference democracy, that deliberation 
would only benefit dominant groups at the expense of subordinate groups was 
countered as the arguments that subordinate groups participate less, that prejudice was 
not accessible to reason, and that rationality is culturally specific were not accepted. It 
was also suggested that deliberation could make room for greeting, rhetoric and 
storytelling. The third that deliberative democracy requires `deliberative obligations', 
that cannot be grounded in the model of decision-making itself was accepted, but civic 
virtue was seen as a possibility to provide a commitment to these obligations. Whether 
or not this civic virtue is present depends upon the institutional context, which brings us 
to one of the most serious critiques of the connection between deliberative democracy 
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and autonomy, but not its normative credentials, but rather practical applicability, which 
is suggested to be deeply suspect. Our attention must turn to whether dclibcrntivc 
democracy can be institutionalised effectively, and if' so what affects these institutional 
arrangements will have upon autonomy. 
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CHAPTER TiIREE: AUTONOM ' ANI)i)i; MOCRATICC 
ASSOCIATIONS 
3.0 Introduction 
In the previous two chapters, I have argued that deliberative democracy is the most 
appropriate decision-making process to enhance the autonomy of participants. 
However, we have yet to consider the critique of deliberative democracy that Miller 
mentions, that it is a utopian theory and a counterfactual ideal because it is unachievable 
in modem, large scale and complex societies (Miller, 2000, p. 143). If on a practical 
level, deliberative democracy cannot be institutionalised effectively then autonomy will 
not be best enhanced by this system of decision-making. To combat this, it is necessary 
to be more specific about possible locations for deliberative democracy to exist on a 
practical level. As Blaug argues, it is essential for deliberative democracy to suggest 
exactly `where' deliberatively democratic decision-making should take place: `Without 
a location, democracy remains merely utopian' (Blaug, 1996, p. 56). Following Mark 
Warren's Democracy and Association (2001), Piotr Pcrczynski's `Active Citizenship 
and Associative Democracy' (2000) and Joshua Cohen's `Deliberation and Democratic 
Legitimacy' (1997), 1 argue that deliberative democracy can be institutionalised and that 
associations will provide the most suitable location for deliberatively democratic 
participation and decision-making. Following the initial argument in Chapter One, I 
therefore advocate a perfectionist justification of associational democracy. 
However, in constructing a model it is important to refrain from designing a blueprint 
for the institutionalisation of deliberative democracy. The aim of the model outlined in 
the remaining chapters is to simply highlight some of the possible features that could be 
included, if an associational democracy was to approximate the norms of deliberative 
democracy. The participants themselves should decide the details of such a model, as 
this is most compatible with the enhancement of autonomy. Furthermore, I agree with 
Smith that `there is no single best design: different models will be useful in different 
circumstances, for different purposes at different levels and on different issues' (Smith, 
2001, p. 90). An associational model is then just one of these possibilities. 
It is my contention that voluntary associations provide suitable arenas for the location of 
deliberative democracy due to their scale and pluralism. Pluralism has been defined by 
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H. S. Kariel as the term referring to specific institutional arrangements for distributing 
and sharing governmental power, to the doctrinal defence ofthose arrangements, and to 
an approach for gaining understanding of political behaviour. Political pluralism is 
therefore a historical phenomenon, a normative doctrine, and a mode of analysis' 
(Kariel in Schwarzmantel, 1994, p. 48). 1 suggest that associations offer the opportunity 
for face-to-face deliberative exchange, based upon rational arguments amongst their 
members. For Cohen an advocate of deliberative democracy and associational 
democracy the two are combined in an `intuitive ideal-in which the justification of the 
terms and conditions of association proceeds through public argument and reasoning 
among equal citizens' (Cohen, 1997, p. 72; See also Pcrczynski, 2000, pp. 168.169; 
Warren, 2001, p. 8). It is argued that an enhanced associational system allows more 
deliberatively democratic participation from more citizens, over more decisions and in 
new spheres of public life, while enhancing the capacities for deliberation in those 
citizens who participate (Warren, 2001, p. 3). 
The advocacy of associations as key units for democratic participation is tamed 
`Associative Democracy'. Perczynski defines associative democracy as `a model of 
participatory democracy based on sclf-govcmance of intcmally democratic, voluntary 
and functional groups' (Perczynski, 2000, p. 163). For Warren, Alexis dc Tocqucvillc, 
in the classic Democracy in America (1945; first published in 1835), was the first to 
argue that associations could develop autonomy in their participants (Warren, 2001, p. 
70). For Tocqueville the potential of democracy was dependent upon the vitality of 
associational life. 
The ideas associated with this theory were dcvclopcd further by the English I'luralists 
GDH Cole in Guild Socialism Re-stated (1920a), Ilarold Laski in A Grammar of 
Politics (1925) and John Neville Figgis in Churches in the Modern State (1913). 
Nevertheless it would be a mistake to assume that associationalism has always had a 
strong link with democracy. There arc many diffcring models and theories within the 
history of the concept, and therefore varying relationships and connections to the ideas 
and practice of democracy. 
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Hirst distinguishes between American and English pluralism. For American Pluralists, 
organized interests aim to control government and cf cctivc competition, between these 
secondary associations, over state resources and legislature make the state democratic. 
In contrast English Pluralism is more a critique of the state, its structure, its legitimacy 
and its unlimited sovereignty and is therefore more normative, and argues that the state 
should distribute power with associations. This thesis is more in line with the English, 
normative strand of pluralism, but the American pluralist arguments will be considered 
in Chapter Six (Hirst, 1989, p. 3). The English pluralists were essentially challenging 
unlimited state sovereignty and centralism, rather than promoting a certain conception 
of democracy. However, it is certainly the case that they offered a critique of 
parliamentary democracy. 
As Hirst comments, the English pluralists central belief was in 'the vitality and the 
legitimacy of self-governing associations as a means of organising social life and the 
belief that political representation must respect the principle of function, recognising 
associations... In the pluralist scheme it is such associations that perform the basic tasks 
of social life' (Hirst, 1989, p. 2). Therefore, it is also important to distinguish these 
pluralist ideas with the undemocratic corporatism and associative thought within Italian 
fascism 'which compulsorily mobilizes social interests to provide legitimacy for an 
unreformed centralized sovereign state power' (Hirst, 1989, p. 2). 
Figgis was heavily influenced by Otto von Gicrkc, who had offered a history of political 
thought prior to the conception and reality of the modern nation state, and in doing so 
perceived associations as `real bodies with a life of their own which were not mere legal 
"fictions"', which meant a distinctive legal interpretation of associations (Ilirst, 1989, p. 
18). Figgis was primarily concerned with the danger state sovereignty posed toward 
voluntary associations, particularly religious ones such as the Anglican and Catholic 
Churches, but also trade unions. For Figgis, such associations required great 
commitment and loyalty from their members and could contribute to their self- 
development and therefore in many respects they resembled `public' agencies (llirst, 
1989, p. 19). 
Influenced by Figgis, Laski took a particularly cxtremc pluralist view, suggesting that 
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the nation-state had no more legitimate claim to sovereignty than any other association 
and he therefore `denies, ultimately the sovereignty of anything save right conduct' 
(Hirst, 1989, p. 13). Laski advocated a functionally dcccntraliscd federalist 
arrangement, where social interests, organised through associations, would govern. 
Cole also influenced by Figgis, adopted a radical anti statist position and advocated that 
society should be organised into self-governing associations of producers, where any 
central co-ordination and regulation would originate from the functional co-operation of 
these associations (Hirst, 1989, p. 28). For Cole there were many functions that did not 
require a comprehensive body such as the state to fulfil and was not therefore the most 
superior association. Cole was highly critical of representative government, and 
believed functional representation was `true representation' and would be best fulfilled 
by a plurality of associations (Cole, 1920b, 119). 
It should be apparent then that not all associational arrangements that have been 
advocated are seen as a method of deepening democracy. However, associational 
theories have always contributed to the critique of current practice in democracies and 
in Laski and Cole have offered distinctive models of representation and democratic 
participation. 
The ideas of associationalism have had a recent resurgence through the likes of Paul 
Hirst in Associative Democracy (1994) and Joshua Cohcn and Jocl Rogers in 
`Secondary Associations and Democratic Governance' (1995), with associations 
explicitly justified as possible mechanisms to deepen democracy. This resurgence of the 
theoretical advocacy of associations as venues for democratic participation has arisen in 
the context of the perceived failure of the nation-state in `post-industrial' societies: 
The era of the nation-state is not gone. But the forces and capacities distinctive of the state arc 
increasingly overlaid by numerous other forces and contingencies, so much so that the terrain of 
politics is no longer focused solely by state-centred institutions, organisations and movements' 
(Warren, 2001, p. 4; see also Cohen, 1999, p. 211). 
The British Social Attitudes Survey of 1996 indicates that citizens are now bccoming 
increasingly disillusioned with the state. Cohen and Rogers also cite reasons as to why 
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the state and its various institutions arc `clearly less suited than they once WCrc to ensure 
a reasonable fair society. ' These include economic factors such as increasing global 
competition and integration, increasing technological divcrsity and rapid change and 
increased dispersion of the labour market, which means that economic focus and 
interests have shifted (Cohen and Rogers, 1995, pp. 10-11; Birst, 1995, p. 109; Cohen, 
1999, p. 211). Lester Salamon and Helmut Anhcicr, in their empirical review of The 
Emerging Non-profit Sector (1996) across the world, have suggested that this has led to 
a new paradigm, in which `a major reappraisal of the role of the state, prompted by 
dissatisfaction with the cost and effectiveness of exclusive reliance on government to 
address the social welfare and developmental challenges of our time' (Salamon and 
Anhcier, 1996, p. 1). The conclusion drawn from these changing economic, political 
and cultural aspects of power is that the nation-state cannot remain as the key focus for 
political participation, which in turn raises questions about the nature of political 
participation (Kohler, 1993, p. 609). Consequently it is argued that associations could 
provide a location for direct political participation because they allow for non-statist 
planning, decision-malting, task fulfilment and interaction (Martell, 1992, p. 166). 
Associations would then become venues for self-governance, which would reduce the 
state's burden and provide channels for citizens entering into public discourse. It is 
hoped then that `democracy might, via its associative media, expand within and beyond 
its current state-centred venues' (Warren, 2001, p. 9). It is the potential of voluntary 
associations to achieve this that I intend to review in this chapter and discuss whether 
associations can supplement and complement present liberal democratic institutions of 
representative government, but also become democratic institutions in a distinct sense 
(Warnen, 2001, p. 181). 
Specifically, I want to review the potential of associations to cultivate citizen 
autonomy. ' I suggest that there arc two broad senses of how an associational model of 
democracy might achieve this. Firstly, associations enhance autonomy by providing a 
location for deliberatively democratic decision-making (the decision-making method 
most likely to promote autonomy), and secondly, associations can enhance autonomy in 
their own right by performing democratic functions that also contribute to autonomy. 
t Martell argues that the role of associations is not just to promote values like autonomy, but also equality, 
co-operation, solidarity and diversity as well (Martell, 1992, p. 169). Howevv-cr, it is my contention, as 
argued in the first chapter, that these values arc dependent upon, or at least contribute towards autonomy. 
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According to Gramwelt it is for this second reason that Dewey perceived democracy to 
be more synonymous with association than any other form of organisation (Gramwcll in 
Warren, 2001, p. 8). Following the earlier analysis on the normative core of democracy, 
associations can be judged to be democratic to the extent that they enhance equally the 
autonomy of their participants. 
Firstly in section 3.1 it is necessary to outline the criticism that deliberative democracy 
cannot be institutionalised so that it can be addressed directly and in section 3.21 define 
what I mean by associations. There arc four functions conducive to democracy that I 
suggest associations can perform: In section 3.3 1 will suggest that associations provide 
venues for subsidiarity. In section 3.4,1 will argue that associations can provide 
information and group representation. Section 3.5, considers associations as schools of 
democracy and finally in section 3.6 associations arc reviewed as locations of 
governance. This chapter will review each of these in light of their connections to 
autonomy and their relationship to deliberative democracy. 
3.1 The Institutional Requirements of Deliberative Democracy 
Despite the assertion that his ideal normative procedures of deliberative democracy are 
counterfactual, Cohen suggests that they should be approximated as closely as possible 
(Cohen, 1991, p. 26) and that institutional design is therefore essential and inevitable: 
`The institutions themselves must provide the framework for the formulation of the will; 
they determine whether there is equality, whether deliberation is free and reasoned, 
whether there is autonomy, and so on' (Cohen, 1991, p. 9). William Nelson in 'The 
Institutions of Deliberative Democracy' (2000), accepts the normative justifications of 
deliberative democracy, but warns that this does not mean it should be institutionalised 
if these institutional opportunities were not exercised in the right way. Consequently he 
rejects Cohen's theory of approximation, because `it is hard to say what institutions 
would come closest to realising the deliberative ideal in the world as we know it. 
Institutions that look the most "democratic" may not be appropriate at all' (Nelson, 
2000, p. 198). 1 take this to be an argument that we must look at associations in practice 
not just in theory to see if it is possible to ensure these associations can approximate the 
norms of deliberative democracy. 
and that autonomy is the primary political value in western libc ral democracies. 
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Moreover, Benhabib completely rejects any suggestion that deliberative democracy is a 
counterfactual idea, instead she suggests that `the deliberative theory of democracy is 
not a theory in search of practice; rather it is a theory that claims to elucidate some 
aspects of the logic of existing democratic practices better than others' (13enhabib, 1996, 
p. 84). Gambetta agrees arguing that `the question ofwhat the effects ofdeliberation arc 
should be cast against the imperfect deliberative models we have anyway. ' This 
becomes apparent if we consider the possibility of institutionalizing a purely 
aggregative model of democracy (Gambetta, 1998, p. 22). 
If we look at modern liberal democracies, there is debate going on in meetings, 
associations, at people's homes, in the pub, on the television, radio, on the internet, in 
newspapers and of course debate amongst representatives has been institutionalised and 
takes place in parliament and other legislative arenas. Robert Post in `Managing 
Deliberation' (1993), is aware of these debates, but maintains that current liberal 
democracies do not allow for enough open public deliberation, which provides 
opportunities for access to this debate for all. As Post remarks, commenting on liberal 
democracies, `the extent to which our public discourse actually functions to instil 
participation, legitimacy and identification is highly debatable' (Post, 1993, p. 667). 
What we have in liberal democracies in general is decision-makers vaguely consulting 
those they are meant to represent, but this process seems to take place aller parties have 
already decided upon their own policies. There is little opportunity for the public to 
contribute and help form these policies through debate, to comment upon which policies 
they like and why, and which ones they do not like and why, they must choose between 
a few parties' already formed manifestos. Citizens therefore have few opportunities to 
voice new and original ideas, to expand or change the agenda of parties or government, 
or to participate in the creative dialogical process of discussion. It is such 
considerations that provoked Congressman Richard Gephardt, a 1988 presidential 
candidate in the US, to comment that `voters seldom trust their politicians to respond to 
their legitimate concerns. They stay home on Election Day, but they would participate 
if they had a better way to make themselves heard' (Gephardt in Cronin, 1989, p. 3). 
Furthermore the debates that feature in civil society do not have a direct affect on public 
policy. They only affect this, if, through influencing public opinion, parties change 
their manifestos to reflect this change of opinion. This is a long and diluted process. 
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The reality is that most people only become aware of certain issues through their 
portrayal in the various (forms of) media, they do not themselves actively engage in 
democratic deliberation, and consequently when they vote, the preferences which 
motivate the choicc arc not necessarily (an) autonomous (choice). 
If public debate is occurring, (which it is), and this affects policy, (which it can do), then 
it is only fair that everyone should have equal participation in this debate. Debate 
proceeds, but despite their being no formal legal barriers stopping people participating 
due to the right of freedom of speech, many groups arc excluded from a chance to 
participate equally in this debate due to socio-economic inequalities. Fiere we sec the 
distinction between formal and substantive equality and influence, which demonstrates 
how a right to freedom of speech is not enough to ensure the norms of deliberative 
democracy; modern liberal democracies therefore need to institutionalize processes of 
open public deliberation prior to decision-making. However, is this possible given the 
complexity of modem liberal democracies? 
Accepting the arguments of Daniel Zolo, in Democracy and Complexity (1992), that 
modern democracies are plagued by the problems associated with complexity, Lohman 
(1996, pp. 2-3), suggests there arc three aspects of complexity which make deliberative 
democracy impractical and means it cannot be institutionalized, but rejects Zolo's 
conclusion that this makes democracy an impossibility. The first aspect is that modern 
societies are very plural, making deliberative democracy unlikely. as it decreases the 
chance of reaching consensus on a common good, due to `intractable conflicts'. Such 
an argument suggests then that deliberative democracy can only be institutionalised in 
comparatively homogenous groups. However, associations could be considered to be 
these relatively homogenous groups, as they involve people associating due to a shared 
identity, interest and belief. However, this does not solve the problem of broadening 
democratic deliberation between these associations (i3ohman, 1996, p. 2). 
The second aspect is that modern societies arc too big and involve too many people to 
make democratic deliberation possible (Bohman, 1996, p. 2). One of the key problems 
for participatory democracy is how to have mass participation in modern large, complex 
and advanced industrial societies. These problems are accentuated for models of 
deliberative democracy that require face-to-face discussion. To have all citizens meet 
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together and deliberate together seems to be an empirical impossibility and, even if all 
could gather, the situation would not be conducive to democratic deliberation with little 
opportunity for cffectivc participation, allowing for the domination of small groups, and 
decisions being led by `passion and intimidation' rather than public reason (Martell, 
1992, p. 164). 2 Martell's views also echo those of Adanaby who also appreciated the 
barrier the size of and number of people in modern states made for direct democracy, 
but also questioned the available time citizens had to participate and the complexity of 
modem issues (Adanaby in Schattsneidcr, 1975, p. xiv). These factors are intensified 
because modem decisions arc also thought to require high demands of expertise and 
present trends of increasing division of labour and new technologies has meant the 
citizens are incapable of participating directly in making decisions. Once again it seems 
that deliberative democracy is only possible in small organisations, such as associations 
(Bohman, 1996, pp. 151-152). The third and final aspect of complexity is inequality of 
deliberative skills, which could effectively mean rule by elites (ßohman, 1996, p. 3). 
All three of these aspects of complexity pluralism, size and inequality must then be 
addressed if it is to be demonstrated that the ideal of deliberative democracy can be 
effectively approximated and autonomy cultivated. 
3.2 fefininj Associations 
Due to the sheer diversity of associations, the definition of an `association' needs to be 
broad. However, I would suggest that GDII Cole's definition of association, in `Social 
Theory' (1920b), is too broad for our purposes here, although it does provide a useful 
staring point. He defines association as: 
'Any group of persons pursuing a common purpose or aggregation of purposes by a course of 
cooperative action extending beyond a single act, and, for this purpose, agreeing together upon 
certain methods and procedures and laying down, in however rudimentary a form, rules for 
common action. At least two things are fundamental and ncccs.. ary to any association: a common 
purpose and, to a certain extent, rules of common action' (Cole, 1920b, p. 37). 
More specifically I am referring to associations that are voluntary and secondary and 
located in civil society. 
2 As discussed in the previous chapter, Gundersen (2000, p. 98) favours a dyadic approach to democratic 
deliberation, and one of the reasons for this is that it is more realistic than collective deliberation because 
it is easier to institutionalise because of the problems of size. llowever, it was argued in the previous 
chapter that Gundcrscn's dyadic model misconceives the ideal of democratic deliberation and has a lack' 
of normative value. 
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Cohen and Arato conceive civil society as differentiated from the economy and the 
state. Only if this is the case in a market society could civil society develop a critical 
political power. The state incorporates the political sphere of parties, political 
organisations and parliament. The organisations of the economy arc those involved in 
production and distribution. Although they often arise from civil society and share 
similarities of organisation and communication and arc institutionalised through rights 
they seek to control and manage either the state or economy (Cohen and Arato, 1992, p. 
viii-ix). Consequently they define civil society as `a sphere of social interaction 
between economy and state, composed above all of the intimate sphere (especially the 
family), the sphere of associations (especially voluntary associations), social 
movements, and forms of public communication' (Cohen and Arato, 1992, p. ix). This 
sphere is reproduced through both independent action and institutionalised laws. This is 
not to say that anything that happens outside of the state and economy should be 
classified as civil society, but only conscious association building and associational life 
and institutionalised forms of communication. 
Warren, heavily influenced by Talcott Parsons, describes the differences bet een the 
three types of organization. States and market-orientated economic organisations arc 
distinct from associations because they arc dominated by the media of (legal and 
administrative) power and money. Associations, however, arc mainly constituted by 
common purposes or interests and the prime mechanism of organisation is influence 
(Warren, 2001, p. 54). The type of associations that arc located in civil society arc 
extensive and diverse e. g. trade unions, business and professional organisations, welfare 
and charity organisations, service clubs, community associations, recreational 
associations, environmental groups, educational organisations and cultural organisations 
and this list is not exhaustive (Van Dcth, 1997, p. 1). 
Like Warren correctly realises, not all associations will be able to fulfil all the functions 
that I attribute to them in this chapter. The fact that they are apt to fulfil one function 
may well mean they arc unsuitable to fulfil another. This is not essentially a problem 
as the great strength of associational life is its plurality, which means all the functions 
can still be fulfilled, providing there is a diversity of spccialiscd associations. This 
requirement Warren terms a `democratic ecology of associations' (Warren, 2001, p. 
12). Consequently we must acknowledge the diversity of associational types when 
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discussing their ability to fulfil democratic functions (Warren, 2001, p. 27-28), For 
Nancy Rosenblum in Membership-and-Morals (1998), this is exactly why associations 
are valuable (Rosenblum, 1998, pp. 36-4 t). There arc then a number of distinguishing 
factors, which affect the potential of associations to perform the above functions. 
Warren argues that there arc three dimensions, which will affect the potential and ability 
of associations to fulfil the different functions of associations. Thcsc arc: 
  The medium within which the association is embedded or to which it is orientated: 
According to Talcott Parsons' analysis, in the influential The Systcm of Modern 
Societies (1971), there arc three types of organisation: market, bureaucracy and 
association. This allows us to distinguish between `associational structure' and 
`associational relations'. Because associations exist alongside markets and states, 
the relations of markets and bureaucracy evident in these media also influence 
associations and can restrict their opportunities for democracy. In short there will 
be different combinations of the three types of organisational relation within 
different associations, and associational relations can exist outside associations 
within the market and the state. Warren uses this conceptual tool to understand 
what types of relation arc prevalent in different types of association and in turn 
what this will mean for the democratic effects of these associations (Warren, 2001, 
p. 54). For example the Arts and Business association will be influenced by the 
market media, but also uses forums as a decision-making process so has 
associational relationships as well. The National Park associations, which operate, 
as local government agencies, will therefore have a mixture of associational and 
bureaucratic relationships. 
The aims/ purposes/ goods of the association: Different associations have different 
goals. These goods are themselves distinguished by four factors: 1. Individual and 
social goods. Individual goods decline in significance the more broadly they are 
distributed e. g. food, shelter, clothing, love, friendship because they are finite. 
Social goods can only be achieved through more substantial social interaction. A 
strong sense of social identity e. g. as women, homosexuals or students and so must 
be shared and arc therefore more likely to induce civic virtue, communication and 
co-operation. In contrast individual goods are more likely to encourage bargaining, 
precisely because they are scarce and cannot be accessible to all. 2. inclusive and 
exclusive goods. Inclusive goods are available to all i. e. roads, parks, clean air and 
in general are achieved through collective action. Exclusive goods can obviously 
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be attaincd by a few and do not ncccssarily quire collcctive action. Associations 
sccking inclusivc goods arc likcly to cultivatc the circuinstanccs for the cultivation 
of civic virtues, political skills, critical skills, subsidiarity, communication and co- 
operation. Again exclusive goods arc more likely to induce bargaining. 3. Material 
and symbolic/psychological goods. Providing the symbolic/ psychological goods 
arc not exclusive i. e. sectarian identity, then associations seeking these arc more 
likely to generate civic capacities. 4. Scarce and unscarce goods. This afThcts the 
extent of conflict that will arise in pursuing goods. Associations pursuing unscarce 
goods are more likely to co-operate and communicate, whereas associations 
pursuing scarce goods ans likely to act strategically (Warren, 2001, pp. 94-126). 
The extent to which the associations arc voluntary, which influences the possibility 
and methods of dealing with diversity of prcfcrcnces: So far I have spoken of 
`voluntary associations', but there are different levels of voluntaryncss. To be 
voluntary an association's alliance must be formed and maintained by `chosen 
normative allegiance' as opposed to force, coercion, seduction or manipulation. The 
closer an association approximates Parson's ideal of associational relations the 
greater its voluntary nature. In general all secondary associations arc voluntary in 
nature as they rely on active consent to join. However, as with Iiirst, Rosenblum 
warns of making the libertarian error of classifying all associations as voluntary and 
further suggests that `there are always alternative understandings of an association's 
nature and purpose, and competing classifications'; voluntaryncss being one of 
these classifications (Rosenblum, 1998, p. 6). It is important to note that 
Associations arc imbedded in social structures e. g. biology, economics and law, 
which increase exit costs, they therefore foster non-voluntary effects (Warren, 
2001, p. 98). 3 
Michael Walze, r in `On Involuntary Association' (1988, ) takes a similar line to 
Warren, and outlines four ways an association can be classified nonvoluntary. 
Firstly there is association by birth e. g. family and religion, which can be exited in 
adult life but often with high costs. Secondly exit can be restricted by culture e. g. 
orthodox forms of marriage and religious belief. Walzar terms the third constraint 
' Warren cleverly distinguishes between involuntary, whcre cxit is prevented thmugh compulsion and 
nonvoluntary, which includes compulsion, but also includes other factors, which also inhibit exit (Warren, 2001, pp. 98-103). 
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`political' e. g. the state, or trade union membership. Fourthly exit can be 
constrained by a moral obligation to remain in an association (Waltzer, 1998, pp. 
64-74). As Warren appreciates, Walzer's factors of involuntary association are too 
extensive, making voluntary association almost impossibility. Especially if we 
consider moral obligation as a restriction of voluntary association, because as 
Warren argues this is precisely the normative commitment required by associative 
relations to be voluntary (Warren, 2001, p. 100). Furthermore, as discussed in 
chapter one, cultural traditions can be a resource to making an autonomous and 
voluntary choice, and it is impossible to be 'free' from cultural norms entirely. 
Hirst conceives 'voluntaryncss' of association as a principle of social provision 
opposed to state collectivism (Hirst, 1994, p. 4). For Hirst associations arc 
voluntary in the sense that the members get to choose which association would 
perform a function for them (Hirst, 1994, p. 24). As was discussed in chapter one 
on autonomy, for a choice to be genuinely voluntary it must be free in the positive 
and negative sense which requires there to be is an acceptable range of options in 
this case associations, knowledge of these associations, the choice must not be 
coerced and the preferences this choice arc based upon should not be the result of 
manipulation and seduction. An association can therefore be more or less voluntary 
depending to what extent it meets these criteria. 
Secondary associations by their very nature are diverse, not only embracing but 
also providing the opportunities for plural society due to the `dense social 
infrastructure' that they form. Consequently they offer a wide range of options for 
citizens to choose from. Moreover, in an associational democracy, associations 
would become the central location for political participation and service provision, 
and the likelihood is that more associations would be mobilised increasing the 
acceptability of these range of options. 
There may well not be sufficient knowledge of the array of associations amongst 
citizens. However, in an associational democracy, it is likely that citizens will make 
more of an effort to equate themselves with the available relevant associations, and 
that associations will make more of an effort to enure citizens arc aware of their 
existence and aims. This could be facilitated by the state, which could provide a 
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charter of all associations that mcct the required standards, for example an 
expansion of the present National Centro for Voluntary Organisations. 
However, voluntary membership is also dependent upon the individual and their 
capacities and inclinations with regard to changing membership and social contexts 
(Rosenblum, 1998, p. 350). It is difficult to ensure that the preferences that citizens 
base their choice ofassociations upon arc autonomous, however, over time, through 
participating in array of associations it could be the case that citizens develop more 
autonomous preferences over this, especially if the associations arc internally 
democratic and they have an opportunity to discuss their preferences with other 
members and more so if democratic communication between associations is 
fostered. 4 However, as Rosenblum appreciates not only are the type of associations 
diverse but also the motivations for joining them and the bases of perceived 
membership (Rosenblum, 1998, p. 5). Rosenblum further suggests that such 
dispositions are affected by `ghettoization' and `chronic unemployment', which 
results in people lacking the necessary resources to form their own associations and 
the opportunities to be recruited into present ones; `individuals do not simply "join" 
associations; they are recruited' (Rosenblum, 1998, p. 189). 
Once joined their `voluntary' status depends upon case of exit, which is largely 
dependent on the costs of exit. For example trade unions and housing associations 
have high exit costs because there is an economic dependency on the membership. 
In contrast a leisure association e. g. a chess club will generally be easier to exit, as 
no economic relationship of dependency exists. Exit will be afThcted in all cases by 
choice. For example, if a teacher is dissatisfied with her trade union e. g. National 
Union of Teachers (NUT), then she could opt for the Union of Women Teachers or 
the Association of Teachers and Lecturers. The greater the differences between 
these trade unions, the greater the choice, which in turn will case exit. However, 
individuals may well be placed under excessive peer pressure to join or remain in a 
particular union by colleagues (especially during an industrial dispute), making exit 
harder. Therefore, it is not just the nature and structure of the association itself or 
the range of associations that determines the extent of an association's 
These two issues will be discussed in more detail in chapters four and five respectively. 
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voluntaryncss, but the government itselr, especially in terns orexit. As Rosenblum 
suggests: `The grip associations have on their members is cxaccrbatcd by weak and 
inefFectivc public institutions. ' Consequently, public institutions must ensure that 
the `background conditions that make exit possible' arc in place as well as 
providing the necessary conditions to facilitate 'the ceaseless formation of new 
associations. ' Consequently she suggests that groups like the Amish must be forced 
to pay minimum wage to ensure that 'economic dependency does not make leaving 
inconceivable (Rosenblum, 1998, p. 60). It is apparent then that the extent to which 
an association is voluntary is therefore affected by a diversity or factors. 
In this chapter, while reviewing the democratic functions that associations can pcrform, 
I will also be commenting upon how these variables affect their performance, 
specifically concerning the potential to institutionalise deliberative democracy and 
cultivate autonomy. 
3.3 Venues for Subsidiarity 
'When self- rule might be better achieved in non-state venues, associations may provide the 
means for devolving collective decisions and actions or for co-ordinating among people in 
different sectors, regions or issue areas' (Warren, 200), p. 69). 
Associations offer the potential for greater levels of inclusiveness in collective decision- 
making, due to offering more small-scale scope for participation than do the alternatives 
of the state or markets structures (Warren, 2001, p. 196). This is because associations 
provide a convenient location for citizens to participate, as they operate at 'accessible 
decentralised levels... ' in 'which citizens can participate more fully and with greater 
knowledge of the affairs being discussed' (Martell, 1992, p. 166). Iris Marion Young 
understands that to enable democratic participation, institutions must be more localised 
than they are now, therefore she advocates decentralisation to regional assembles 
(Young, 1990, pp. 252-253). Gastill also acknowledges that a more radical version to 
his 'Fourth Branch of Government' would involve deccntralisation, again on a regional 
level (Gastill, 1993, p. 260). 
There is nothing inherently democratic about devolution as it can mean the restriction/ 
elimination of legitimate participants from participation in the decisions (Warren, 2001, 
p. 196). Environmental policy is an excellent example of this. For example, should 
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Northcrn European countries who suffer from acid ruin generated by pollution fro in 
British industry have the opportunity to participate in decisions that might restrict such 
pollution in the U. K? This example also shows that unless all decisions arc made at an 
international level, devolution is inevitable. Devolution alters the nature of participation, 
which inevitably changes the nature of political conflict as Schattsncidcr explains: 
'The first proposition is that the outcome of all conflict is determined by the scope of its 
contagion- The number of people involved in any conflict determined what happens; every 
change in the number of participants, every increase or reduction in the number of participants, 
affects the result' (Schattsneider, 1975, p. 2). 
He cites free enterprise, localism, privacy and economy in government as methods used 
to privatise conflict and restrict its scope. In contrast universal ideas of culture, 
equality, consistency, equal protection of law, justice, liberty, fr om of movement, 
freedom of speech, freedom of association and civil rights arc cited as justifications to 
socialise conflict. Decentralisation is only democratic then to the extent that it 
`socialises conflict. ' Devolution only increases democratic legitimacy if it links 
collective actions to collective justifications and includes all those affected, regardless 
of whether the state bypassed by the connection (Warren, 2001, pp. 201-202). 
Associations enable functional as well as regional devolution, but Bobbio claims that `it 
is debatable whether the functional representation of interests... is more democratic than 
territorial representation as carried out by those bodies for the aggregation of general 
interests which are the parties of today' (Bobbio, 1987, p. 8). In previous chapters it 
has already been discussed in great detail why the general interest cannot be established 
through the aggregation of interests without prior democratic debate, but the democratic 
credentials of territorial and functional representation must be discussed. Now an 
associational model of democracy need not and I think should not entirely replace 
territorial representation, but instead supplement it with functional representation and 
functional devolution. Nevertheless, Bobbio is sceptical of the democratic credentials 
of functional representation when dealing with non-technical spheres, like the interests 
of the citizenry as a whole. In Bobbio's analysis therefore, sectional representation 
must be restricted to decisions within a `clearly circumscribed and technical sphere' like 
a faculty committee, factory committee, or in this case a civic association. In such 
situations only organic representation is desirable (Bobbio, 1987, p. 9). 
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G. D. H. Cole advocated functional over regional devolution as he appreciated that 
communities are all encompassing in their purposes, whereas associations arc varied 
and divided, which means `power, decision-making and governance' can be devolved 
and pluraliscd (Warren, 2001, p. 43). The strength of participation through associations, 
rather than community is that it is a differentiated model. The great advantage of such 
an approach is outlined by Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, who claim it 'shins the core 
problematic of democratic theory away from descriptive and/or speculative models to 
the issue of the relation and channels of influence between civil and political society and 
between both and the state, on the one side, and to the institutional makeup and internal 
articulation of civil society itself on the other' (Cohen and Arato, 1992, p. 19). As I linst 
claims, associations are `communities of choice' and not `communities of fate (llirst, 
1994, pp. 49-56). In her analysis of Warren, Margaret Kohn, in `Panacea or j'rivi egc' 
(2002), provides a useful example of how the American Association of Retired People 
(AARP) can therefore effectively represent the elderly, as it excludes those with 
opposing interests in a way that communities cannot (Kohn, 2002, p. 231). Therefore, 
decentralisation to associations, and not communities, seems to suit our needs here 
because associations allow for citizens to be social and political without being 
dominated by an all encompassing shared way of life or community norm (Warren, 
2001, p. 45). Associations are then necessary as venues for deliberatively democratic 
participation: `A strong community is constituted in such a %%-ay that its practices and 
traditions are securely interconnected with its social functions, which arc in turn closely 
related and integrated with its members identities', explains Warren (Warren, 2001, p. 
46). Consequently communities are less capable of dealing with plurality of preferences 
through democratic debate, and force is invoked more often. 
Because exit is much easier in associations, force cannot be used so easily and this 
means debate is often more likely to be used to resolve conflict than force. Furthermore, 
associations allow participants to put aside djffcrcnccs like 'religion, nationality, 
occupation, ethnicity, and so on' and agree on single purposes: '[n contrast, in any 
complex and pluralistic society the (encompassing) communitarian impulse to connect 
every issue and identity tends to stop collective action in its tracks' (Warren. 2001, p. 
46). Young has admitted that each social group (especially subordinate ones) need the 
opportunity to form collective identities, preferences and interests prior to participation 
in decision-making processes. Due to the 'democratic ecology of associations', like 
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minded people can form an organisation around any shared theme e. g. occulation, 
hobby, identity, political interest, economic interest, ideology etc. Communities 
generally involve a variety of these themes. Regional assemblies do not oiler this 
opportunity and I can only see associations fulfilling this role (Young, 1990, p. 184). 
Consequently, associations are synonymous with what Sam Flcischakcr, in 
`Insignificant Communities' (1998), calls particle community, whereas community is 
synonymous with his version or solid community, the former t--eng the most compatible 
with liberalism. 
Devolution aids us in our attempt to overcome the problem of size and complexity by 
restricting the number of legitimate participants. Following Hegel, i3ohman argues that 
functional differentiation can aid a democracy to overcome some of the threats of 
complexity, as it does not require a `central co-ordinating mechanism': 'A functionally 
differentiated society is 'polyccntric'; that is, it has no single centre or apex from which 
to exercise control over all the differentiated subsystems' (ßohman, 1996, p. 156). The 
institutional framework of modern liberal democracy, for example systems of power 
separation, heightens the tensions caused by complexity. 
Associations also represent interests that arc not territorially based, and so arc very 
suitable for representing interests associated with identity. Associations can cqualisc 
representation as the commitment of its members is key, and this is more evenly 
distributed than money, which can be accumulated (Warren, 1997, p. 19). That is not to 
say that communities are entirely unsuitable as venues for decentralisation and generally 
all modern liberal democracies do decentralise to a certain degree on regional lines. I 
would in fact suggest that such decentralisation is essential and inevitable. All i am 
arguing is that, alone, this form of decentralisation is inadequate, especially if we want 
to move towards a deliberative democracy. To achieve this, decentralisation must take 
place on both a regional and functional level. It appears then that decentralisation is a 
necessary process to achieve the institutionalisation of deliberative democracy and the 
cultivation of autonomy, but it needs to be based upon a sound principle in order to 
provide guidance on what are the right circumstances for dcccntralisation c. g. 
decentralise to who, on what policy areas and how is it to be implemented. I think that 
principle is `subsidiarity', which legislates for both regional and functional 
decentralisation and originated from Catholic thought. Warren. I think rightly, 
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distinguishes between democratic devolution and subsidiurity. The two concepts arc 
without a doubt conncctcd but still distinct (Warrcn, 2001, p. 196). 
The Catholic dedication to subsidiarity was initially expressed in 1891 in ; tic clici 
Rerum Novarum and detailed further in Encyclica Ouadrakcsimo_Anno of 1931, where 
it received its name and first thorough outline, making recommendations for territorial 
and functional devolution (Kohler, 1993, p. 617). Pope Pius Xl, in 1931 in his 
Ouadragesimo Anno: On Reconstructing the Social Order, asserted the Catholic 
principle of subsidiarity: `it is an injustice and at the same time a brave evil and 
disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and higher association what lesser and 
subordinate organisations can do. ' Pope John Paul II in 1991 in his Centesimus Annas. 
again advanced the Catholic argument for subsidiarity, arguing that dccision"making 
must be located at the lowest level of society wherever possible, if the common good is 
to be advanced (Mylod, 1998, p. 1). He argues that the welfare state 'leads to a loss of 
human energies and an inordinate increase of public agencies which are dominated 
more by bureaucratic ways of thinking than by concern for serving their clients and 
which are accompanied by an enormous increase in spending' (Pope John Paul It in 
Bosnich, 1996, p. 1). 
Progressing from its roots in Catholicism, the principle of subsidiarity has been 
associated with justifications for limited government, a point cchocd by David I3osnich 
in `The Principle of Subsidiarity' (1996), who asserts that subsidiarity; 'is the bulwark 
of limited government and personal freedom' (Bosnich, 1996, p. 1). Its application in 
practice would require 'respect for the mechanisms of the free market and opposition to 
state intervention' (Bosnich, 1996, p. 3). Robert Siricio suggests subsidiarity is always 
invoked to limit power (Siricio in Hochschild, p. 4). 5 If this is the case, it might appear 
that subsidiarity is at odds with earlier connections made between deliberative 
s This is a (vastly over) simplistic view of power along the onc-dimensional lines of the pluralists. It 
limits the discussion of power to the relation between state and economy, ignoring how power exists 
between relationships within the free market. Moreover 'insofar as the classical liberal appropriation of 
the principle implies an uncritical attitude towards the power of market forccs... While on some level 
modem liberal institutions, and especially the market economy, both grow out of and contribute to human 
freedom, it is irresponsible to ignore the extent to which they have changed patterns of living and go 
unchecked by the resolve of responsible individuals, families, and communities, the modern market 
economy is not morally neutral; it tends to violate the principle of subsidiarity' (I Lochschild, (undated. P. 
16). 
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democracy and autonomy. However, Joshua I Lochschild in 'The Principle of 
Subsidiarity and the Agrarian Ideal', rightly points out that the libertarian use of 
subsidiarity is misplaced: 'It is a weakness of the "libertarian" appropriation of the 
principle of subsidiarity that it tends to ignore the fact that the principle can be applied 
to all relations of associations, not just to cases where the state is one of the associations' 
(Hochschild, p. 5). In the sense that I am applying the principle, it does apply to the 
state, however the concept is more variable than that. The idea behind subsidiarity is 
that there are various levels of association, of which the state is one, but that there are 
functions that society wishes to pursue and there is an apt and relevant level of 
association for each function. Only if the function cannot be achieved at the lower level 
should it then be passed up to the higher level, and only due to this general principle do 
we get to the conclusion that the state should not fulfil certain functions. It is then not 
about limiting power per se, but finding the right level for that power to be exercised 
Furthermore, Hochschild criticises libertarians for placing the onus of responsibility on 
the higher level of the association, or specifically the state, to avoid interference with 
the lower associations. However, there is a corresponding responsibility of lower 
associations not to relinquish their powers and functions (Ilochschild, p. 5). It is then 
not about limiting power, but providing the relevant level of association with the 
appropriate powers and resources to exercise their rights and fulfil the necessary 
functions. Subsidiarity is then not achieved through the limitation of collective power 
as in the pursuit of the free market. In fact such a trend is at odds with it, as Thomas 
Kohler appreciates: The strong tendency of modern capitalism to overwhelm and 
eventually to dissolve the discrete, the local, the particular ... the places where the 
habits 
of self-rule are practised and learned', in short the arenas where collective action can be 
fulfilled through democratic participation (Kohler in Hochschild, p. 9). Susidiarity has 
become an important trend in Northern Ireland with the Single Programming Document 
for Northern Ireland (Oliver, 2003, p. 2). 
Subsidiarity then does not necessarily protect against centralist intervention, but can at 
times legitimise it if it is seen to be the required level to fulfil a necessary function, 
however, it does place the onus of justification upon the centralists. Overall the 
principle's guiding idea is that `decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen' 
(Follesdal, 1999, p. 3). This guiding idea is pursued in three main ways: either through 
limiting central intervention or relinquishing functions towards the centre, the 
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distribution of powers and the scope and method of their exercise to various levels of 
association, or to the removal of certain areas from collective decision-making 
(Follesdal; 1999; p11). Subsidiarity and its relationship to central authorities can then 
be proscriptive and negatively conceived denying the input of central authority, or 
prescriptive in the positive sense of recommending central unit input (Follesdal, 1998, 
p. 195). 
It is the case that subsidiarity is based around the individual and that institutions should 
be based around the individual, hence if all individuals can perform a task themselves 
they should be left to do so. However, in turn this means that the state should perform 
the tasks that individuals or secondary associations cannot adequately perform (Kohler, 
1993, p. 615). Following Komonchak, Thomas Kohler, in `Lessons from the Social 
Charter' (1993), argues that the principle of subsidiarity is based around the idea of that 
there is plural individuals taking responsibility for their own actions. The conception of 
the individual here is one that is naturally social and acknowledges that the individual 
requires society to achieve its goals, and recognises that society plays a significant role 
in providing the conditions for the formation of the individual's preferences and 
identity. It therefore accepts individuals as situated beings. Society then provides the 
conditions for individuals to achieve self-responsibility, but this is best achieved 
through subsidiarity which stipulates the principles of how society's organisations are to 
ensure self-responsibility, by ensuring higher organisations do not usurp the functions 
that can be achieved by a lower level of organisation: `Intervention... is only appropriate 
as helping people help themselves' (Kohler, 1993, pp. 615-619). If we replace the idea 
of self-responsibility with that of autonomy, because as established previously self- 
responsibility requires autonomy, then we can sec the strong connection between ideas 
of autonomy and subsidiarity. If there is a function, the individuals could fulfil 
themselves or through participating in a more immediate association, a higher 
association is denying autonomy by taking away control. Subsidiarity therefore sets the 
conditions for individual autonomy, but also assumes the capability and the desirability 
of the individual to be autonomous, given the right conditions: `Subsidiarity seeks to 
enhance the full development of human personality by promoting conditions in 
organisations of every sort that give individuals the greatest possible opportunity to 
6 As should be the case following the discussion of communitarianism and autonomy in Chapter One. 
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reflect, choose, and act for themselves, and to take responsibility for the outcomes. The 
principle is in the best sense democratic. It exposes the actions and the rationale of 
individuals and institutions alike to the widest possible discussion and examination' 
(Kohler, 1993, p. 619). 
The principle of subsidiarity is then in accord with both the concepts of autonomy and 
deliberative democracy outlined in previous chapters, as Kohler's analysis 
demonstrates: 
`The continuous and active involvement of those directly affected in an ongoing discourse about 
the way their lives should be ordered is a key feature of subsidiarity, as is the policy of 
encouraging the shift of responsibility to the lowest grass-roots lcvcl possible' (Kohler, 1993, p. 
622). 
The key connection here is not just the acceptance of individuals as capable of rational 
choice and preference formation, and therefore capable of autonomy, but also that this 
rationality requires participation in democratic debate as advocated by deliberative 
democracy. It seems then that the principle of subsidiarity stipulates the criteria, for the 
institutionalisation for deliberative democracy, to achieve individual autonomy. 
Subsidiarity then requires democracy, and even if democracy does not necessarily 
require subsidiarity the joining of the two can lead to a deepening of democracy, a point 
on which Follesdal concurs: 
`The principle (of subsidiarity) seems to reflect the same normative ideals as democracy: 
Policies must be controlled by those affected, to ensure that institutions and laws reflect the 
interests of the individuals under conditions where all count as equals. Only when these 
considerations counsel joint action, is central authority warranted' (Follesdal, 1999, p. 2). 
The level of collective action required depends upon the function that is to be fulfilled. 
There are three arguments for holding that subsidiarity supports deliberative democracy: 
Reduction of Size: Smaller units, in this case associations are more suitable than larger 
units (communities/ nations) to both develop shared interests through deliberation and 
to secure their representation. This is particularly the case if `geography, resources, 
culture or other features make for similar interests and policy choices among members 
of the sub-units' (Follesdal, 1999, p. 15). Secondary associations provide these shared 
features by their very nature. This will provide the basis for members of the 
associations to assess the performance of existing policies, identify new issues for the 
agenda and suggest solutions to these problems through deliberatively democratic 
discussion. It is my contention that the arguments that deliberative democracy is 
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counterfactual because it cannot be implemented on a large scale, do not prove the 
impracticality of deliberative democracy, but rather demonstrate the necessity for the 
units of decision-making to be reduced. Subsidiarity is the most coherent principle to 
achieve this and hence deliberative democracy is unlikely to be achieved without it. 
Reduction c fDomination: Subsidiarity reduces exterior domination over the preferences 
of the members of the association as it specifically prescribes the justifiable grounds for 
`exterior' intervention. It therefore provides the `institutional space' necessary for 
democratic preference formation based upon collective deliberation (Follesdal, 1999, p. 
15). The argument in the thesis to date has been that autonomous preference formation 
is an intrinsic good, and that deliberatively democratic decision-making is essential to 
achieve this, particularly for preferences that arc to be included in collective decision- 
making. Institutional space is essential if the preferences are not to be seduced, coerced 
or manipulated. Subsidiarity is an effective method to ensure this and therefore not only 
the institutionalisation of deliberative democracy, but enabling it to achieve its 
normative justification of autonomy cultivation. 
Reduction of Agenda: `A reduction of issues on the agenda and parties to agreements 
serve to reduce the risk of information overload, and foster joint pins' (Follesdal, 1992, 
p. 15). Participants are therefore better able to understand what the available choices 
are and what these entail on any specific issue, which in turn will make their preferences 
more autonomous and addresses some of the dangers of complexity. This argument is 
coherent with Schattsneider's (1975, p. 2) argument that the number of participants 
automatically changes the nature of the agenda. Information and knowledge of available 
options have been advocated as conditions for autonomy. Reduction of agenda can also 
help counter the social choice theory critique outlined in the first chapter, as it was 
suggested that agenda reduction of amalgamated issues can reduce preference domain. 
Subsidiarity therefore helps deliberative democracy achieve its normative justification. 
There are some problems with the principle of subsidiarity. One of these dangers is that 
it allows associations greater control over resources, so if they function like factions this 
could lead to the destruction of the public interest. This is a particular problem in a 
deliberative democracy that aims at promoting the common good, and will be addressed 
in detail in Chapter Six. 
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A further problem is that not all associations will be equally suitable for decentralisation 
based upon subsidiarity. For example the principle of subsidiarity only outlines the idea 
that functions must be fulfilled at the lowest possible level of association. It does not 
mean this is the case whatever the type or nature of that association. Warren argues that 
associations will be more suitable for subsidiarity if their aims arc not contested. This 
then is enhanced by a low cost of exit. If exit is easy members arc more likely to leave 
if there is substantial dispute than to stay and contest. If associations e. g. Society of 
Chemical Industry, are vested in their media (in this case the economy), then it will 
have control over the resources required to fulfil the function. He also claims that 
politically orientated associations are poor arenas for subsidiarity because they aim to 
influence the state rather than aim for self-organisation e. g. Greenpeace. However, I 
would dispute this as politically orientated associations often address the state in order 
for more power to be devolved so that they can self-organise e. g. Environment Council; 
in short they do seek to perform collective actions. Nevertheless, Warren is right to 
point out that associations that do not aim to perform collective functions will be 
unsuitable for subsidiarity (Warren, 2001, pp. 191-193). The types of association that 
fit the criteria required for subsidiarity, are those that aim to preserve/ foster cultural 
traditions e. g. The Drum, which aims to promote African and Caribbean arts and 
culture; civic and environmental associations e. g. Friends of the Earth and Living 
Streets; recreational associations e. g. DANCE and British Climbing Association 
(BMC); educational associations e. g. Education Extra, Basic Skills Agency and 
Community Education Development Centre; co-operatives e. g. Co-operative Union, 
Plunkett Foundation and Mondragon; self-help economic associations e. g. New Roots, 
Lionheart and CLOUDS; professional associations e. g. British Medical Association 
(BMA), AMICUS and Association of Accounting Technicians (AAT); unions e. g. Fire 
Brigade Union (FBU), NUT and ATL, business lobbies e. g. Central Business Institute, 
Blue Shield and Business Roundtable and ethnic, religious and lifestyle associations e. g. 
Ming-Ai, Association of Vineyard Churches and HOPE. 
Finally, although subsidiarity offers us a basis for judging what powers should be 
decentralised to what levels of organisation, it is not always apparent if the lower 
associations are able to fulfil certain tasks and direct powers effectively or if it is 
necessary for such functions to be abdicated to higher associations. Such questions will 
be contested subjects and probably be the subject of deliberatively democratic decision- 
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making themselves. The debate so far should have demonstrated how the location of 
decision-making affects available choices and opportunities for participation and hcncc 
autonomy so such issues are vital and complex. 
3.4 Provision of Information and Group Representation 
`Associations are often pivotal as "members" of public dialogs in multiplying the voice of 
individuals, distilling messages, reacting and putting together responses to new developments, 
and proposing policies... associations are central to this dynamic, especially if they lack 
resources of power and money: silence serves the wealthy and powerful well, and public 
argument is a primary means through which poorer and weaker members of society can have 
influence' (Warren, 1998, p. 150). 
The second justification is that secondary associations also fulfil the function of 
forming, collecting, organising and representing information to other citizens and to the 
state: `By sharpening policy instruments and enabling them to be applied with greater 
precision, groups promote the capacity of the people to achieve their aims' (Cohen and 
Rogers, 1995, p. 65). These are essential to democracy, as already argued, more and 
better quality information can lead to greater autonomy. With this information it will be 
much easier to see what the problems and concerns of the people are, and also with the 
information and ideas generated through democratic debate the solutions will be more 
effective in solving these problems and meeting the concerns of the people. Moreover, 
if preferences are socially constructed, it is important that people are open to a wide 
range of opinions and information and they hear the experiences of others. Without 
this, peoples' preferences will merely represent dominant views, and not what they may 
come to think if they had heard all the relevant information (Phillips, 1995, p. 45). 
Associations bring new ideas, discourses, issues and values to the public sphere (See 
chapter five for a full discussion of the public sphere) (Cohen and Arato, 1992, p. 20). 
This information can be based upon members' needs and concerns, but also on their 
preferences on existing laws and proposed legislation. Due to their close involvement 
with the members, associations can provide information that would otherwise be 
unavailable to the distant state (Cohen and Rogers, 1995, p. 43). Such information helps 
associations hold government officials and institutions accountable. The information 
will be a more accurate indication of the autonomous collective preferences of the 
members, if they have collectively deliberated upon the issue in question. Legislation 
based upon this information is potentially more rational, providing the information is 
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accurate and inclusive. The more relevant information gained, the more rational the 
decisions will be, which is why all associations must be included. As argued above, 
associations provide a location where deliberative democracy is potentially possible. 
Associations are particularly useful at forming and organising infonnation due to the 
fact that they specialise in certain areas that is of particular relevance to their members. 
Furthermore, associations allow for a division of labour in the collection and 
organisation of information, achieving economies of scale that enable citizens to acquire 
levels of information that they would be unable to obtain by themselves (Warren, 2001, 
pp. 71-72; Cohen and Rogers, 1995, pp. 42-43; Hirst, 1994, pp. 34-40). 
Associations that are externally orientated will have a greater chance of affecting policy, 
by influencing public debate e. g. Countryside Alliance and Stop the War. Such groups 
will be able to `give voice to social problems, make broad demands, articulate public 
interests, and thus attempt to influence the political process more from normative points 
of view than from the standpoint of particular interests' (Habermas, 1996a, p. 355). 
Associations provide an arena for the discussion of interests and can communicate these 
interests both within the public sphere and from the public sphere to the state. 
Providing associations are both run by and close to individual participants they can be a 
particularly sensitive mechanism to new problems, solutions and ideas from citizens. 
According to Habermas, they communicate these through language, where the state and 
market often communicate through power and money (Habermas, 1996a, p. 359). It is 
then because they are separate from the state and market that makes them well placed to 
communicate on such aspects such as needs on welfare and communicate on the impact 
of social policies and other policies in general e. g. Race on the Agenda in London, 
Design Options for a Versatile Environment (DOVE) in Hampshire and Age Concern. 
Following Habermas' analysis we can see that an association's internal structure will 
affect the information that is to be represented as well. The more democratic the 
association, the more likely the information will represent the `true' preferences of the 
association's members. If the association's decision-making structure is based upon 
deliberatively democratic practices, then the greater the possibility the group will 
discover its `true' autonomous preferences and the less likely the information will be 
distorted, as it will not be based on private experiences and preferences (Offe, 1995, p. 
118). Associations are then ideally located for the gathering of information, however, 
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once gathered the information must be represented externally, but there arc dangers of 
equality here. 
American pluralist theorists have seen associations as the primary resource for citizens 
to represent their interests to the state. Citizens without adequate resources for political 
mobilisation can combine their resources and so increase their potential political 
influence. Furthermore, they represent interests that are not territorially based which 
would go un(der)-represented through party politics and therefore can overcome the 
restrictions and limitations of territorial representation (Warren, 2001, p. 83). 
In a democracy it is unfair for dominant groups to monopolise representation, as this is 
not consistent with the cultivation of autonomy for all. One of the reasons for certain 
groups being under-represented is due to greater obstacles faced by them in trying to 
occupy political positions compared to those who come from the dominant groups. If 
this were not the case, we would expect there to be a more or less equal number of 
women in parliament as men, and there to be more Asians and Blacks in parliament. In 
reality we see, in the House Of Commons for example, a disproportionate number of 
white upper middle class men, many of whom derive from Oxbridge, to other groups in 
society. It appears then that disadvantaged groups are being denied the same 
opportunities open to other groups in society. Consequently, these groups have looked 
towards associations to provide representation as Rosenblum explains: 
`Historically, it has been the resource of groups without the vote; before they achieved suf rage, 
women successfully fought for legislative protection for children and other social policies 
through their associations. It is the critical resource for those who lack inf uencc based on 
economic resources, cultural hegemony, prestige, and so on' (Rosenblum, 1998, p. 208). 
Such an argument is dependent upon social groups having distinct interests, which I 
think it is possible to establish. For example, Anne Phillips suggests, in The Politics of 
Presence (1995), that women `occupy a distinct position in society' (Phillips, 1995, p. 
64). They fill a large percentage of lower paid jobs and fulfil the main roles of unpaid 
carers in society, and generally are excluded from both the political and economic 
power centre. This is not true of all women, but the fact that all women do not have 
children does not prevent issues like child bearing and abortion not being of equal 
importance to men and women. Obviously some interests that women have will overlap 
with those of men. For example both lowly paid men and women will want higher pay, 
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but it is women who receive lower pay as a social group; in general, women are more 
dependent on public transport, but many men are also reliant on it, and/or believe in its 
importance and will therefore share an interest in its improvement (Phillips, 1995, pp. 
68-70). 
Afro-Caribbeans, although they may not have unified interests, do have distinct interests 
to whites. Their history of slavery, and higher risks of discrimination and police 
brutality, unemployment and poverty, coupled with geographical separation, makes 
these interests more pertinent than to whites. Disabled people arc separated by 
characteristics such as class, age, gender and race but have distinct interests to able- 
bodied people on issues such as disabled benefits, work opportunities, access facilities 
to buildings and public facilities and issues of care. These and many other social groups 
require more representation, because of interests that derive from being a member of 
that group. It is not to say that they have the same interests as each other, but will often 
share some interests that differentiate them from other social groups. Without more 
authentic representation they will not have these interests expressed significantly 
enough in the present decision making assemblies. 
Young however goes too far, believing that only social groups should receive rights of 
special representation, but not other groups or associations e. g. interest groups and 
ideological groups. In her analysis social groups differ from others in the sense that they 
do not just share some interest, but have 'affinity' with each other due to shared 
`practices or way of life', and can be `differentiated' from other groups (Young, 1990, 
p. 186). Young accepts that a democracy should not formally exclude any interests or 
opinions, but just argues that we should not guarantee the specific representation of 
them. Apparently then, only subordinate groups need specific representation. 
However, what about opinions and interests that are constantly excluded from decision- 
making processes, but not associated with or represented by social groups? For 
example, cannabis users, those against war on Iraq or aspects of globalisation and those 
living near to nuclear power plants, to mention just a few examples. Surely these 
opinions (if democratically formed) must be included for decision-making processes to 
be truly democratic. Furthermore, Young argues that dominant groups do not need 
specific representation as they are already represented, but if decisions arc going to be 
made by deliberatively democratic methods then it is the inclusion of all views and 
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identities in the deliberative forums that is essential to ensure that all participants hear 
the full range of views and supporting reasons. As argued previously, the more relevant 
information people hear, the more rational and autonomous their resulting preferences 
will be. Because there is no way of judging whether the information is relevant to a 
person until they hear it, all views must be included in the deliberative forum to enhance 
autonomy, even those of dominant groups. 
Young believes that social groups should formulate shared interests, opinions and 
preferences through collective debate. In such a debate, a diverse range of people from 
a social group can air their opinions and interests, to see their similarities, to try and 
reconcile their differences and draw something from their experiences as members of 
that social group. The representatives will then have discussions on which to base their 
campaigns, information and ideas, and thus can be held accountable to the collective if 
they ignore or deviate too greatly from the shared opinions and preferences that were 
produced by collective deliberation: 
`Group representation avoids most of the pitfalls in appealing to shared experiences as an 
automatic guarantee. It makes no claims to essential unities or characteristics; it recognises the 
potential diversity and disagreement within any social group, and it provides some basis for the 
accountability of representatives to those they might claim to represent' (Young, 1990, p. 54). 
Here we see how important debate is in the formation of group identities, preferences 
and in the realisation of group needs and why venues such as voluntary associations arc 
necessary for members of a social group to be able to assemble and debate. 
In general, secondary associations provide an opportunity for detailed representation of 
a diversity of groups, including minorities. This greater representation of subordinate 
groups could lead to policies more sensitive to equality and therefore create an upward 
spiral for equality, which would improve democracy's potential to create equal 
autonomy for all. The plurality and flexibility of associations means that collections of 
people from these social groups can form autonomous associations in order to form and 
represent their interests and preferences. Therefore associations can give voice to 
groups excluded by present institutional mechanisms and their media of power and 
money. Associations offer the opportunity for groups to make their concerns, claims and 
grievances public, and to participate in the wider public sphere, with the idea that they 
can justify their arguments to other groups within the public sphere and convince them 
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of their validity: `A truly democratic society fosters and protects such associative bonds 
as a requirement for a vibrant public sphere capable of correcting its own inadequacies' 
(Bohman, 1996, p. 138). 
This is because they enable those with similar beliefs, preferences and needs to combine 
their voice and therefore increase the chance that they will be heard: `Associations 
empower citizens by enabling the collective actions necessary to resist, cause mischief, 
organise votes, initiate lawsuits, withdraw support or resources and engage in other 
tactics that increase the force of the message within strategic contexts of power' 
(Warren, 2001, p. 69). Again we see why associations are suitable arrangements for 
sub-ordinate groups to voice their concerns and needs. However, associations also 
enable dominant groups to voice their concerns and can increase their power in strategic 
contexts. Associations can represent difference and can bring new issues to the agenda 
that would otherwise be ignored, but associations representing dominant groups can also 
prevent this from happening. In sum, associations bring in new speakers to public 
debate and change the parameters of debate. This means that decisions become more 
democratic as they include the preferences of all citizens and not just those from 
dominant groups. The autonomy of all those from subordinate groups then is enhanced 
as they have opportunities to affect collective decisions. 
Secondary associations, once formed, do contribute to political equality by enabling 
sub-ordinate groups, excluded by territorial forms of representation, routes and means to 
have their voice heard. However, there are key problems of inequality that need to be 
overcome in the formation of associations in the first place. For example, Michael 
Walzer, in `Multiculturalism and Individualism' (1994), argues that currently 
associations in the USA are too weak to achieve this equality, resulting in `disorganised, 
powerless and demoralised men and women', who are spoken for, but do not have a 
chance to make their own claims (Walzer, 1994, p. 187). The associational network is 
similarly weak in Britain. The opportunities to form associations and gain political 
mobilisation are not evenly spread, some citizens' interests by their nature arc greatly 
dispersed, for example, firefighters' interests in higher wages and restricting the 
government's proposal of `modernisation'. Some interests are difficult to organise 
because they are high in number e. g. public sector workers, making political 
organisation more difficult and increasing the cost of organisation Once some groups 
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have gained an advantage of political mobilisation, they then reap the benefits from the 
state, and therefore the inequality of the situation may increase. This is particularly the 
case in areas of policy which deal with distribution of targeted benefits and dispersed 
costs i. e. social policy. There are also regional inequalities, which are not 
accommodated through functional equality (Cohen and Rogers, 1995, p. 41; Achterberg, 
1996, p. 169-70). It has been suggested that the North South divide in Britain provides 
such an example. Equality of representation will never be entirely achieved though, 
even if socio-economic inequalities were eliminated (a utopia in itself), there are still the 
inequalities in potential for organisation. Some interests (e. g. consumers), are harder to 
co-ordinate than others. Some political perspectives, e. g. anarchists, may not want to 
organise in associations at all. However, the associational system seems much more 
equal and inclusive than any other democratic system. 
Warren asserts that associations that are vested in their respective media, are less 
suitable for representing differences, because they have something to lose if that 
`difference' becomes an issue, as such groups generally benefit from the status quo, 
keeping new issues off the agenda e. g. CBI and BMA. Consequently, groups that arc 
not vested are essential for democratic deliberation, to represent difference, to bring new 
issues to the agenda: `Without them (associations representing difference), deliberation 
will be limited to the agendas of those who already have a seat at the table, and 
whatever consensus emerges will be exclusive' (Warren, 2001, p. 171). What Warren is 
arguing then is that vested associations will not be good at representing differences, as 
this involves providing opposition which involves the association sacrificing some of its 
established interests and relationships to other associations or the state. Moreover, if 
they are attaining benefits for their members they do not want this to be highlighted and 
become a public issue. In fact they usually operate to keep such issues off the public 
agenda. As Schattsneider (1975, p. 2) argues, increasing participants on an issue 
changes the whole dynamics and the available political options for the issue. 
Consequently such associations highlight commonalities rather than differences, which 
has some positive and negative dimensions for deliberation. Positive in the sense it will 
help groups move towards consensus upon a common good, but negative in the sense 
that it excludes certain groups from this deliberation (Warren, 2001, p. 173). Those 
associations that will be suitable for representing differences include welfare and health 
advocacy associations, e. g. Action on Disability and Development, Age Concern and 
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others, and rationally forming and expressing ones own prefcrcnccs in light of available 
information, in a manner that will be persuasive to others. 
Civic capacities are essential to the equal autonomy of all, as they increase the chances 
of citizens to empathise with the concerns of others and consider their argument with an 
open mind. It is obviously necessary for autonomy, for others to be able and inclined to 
appreciate ones' situation and needs if there is any hope of ones' claims being accepted 
or having influence. Deliberative skills are necessary to participate in collective debate 
effectively, and deliberative democracy will enhance the autonomy of its participants 
only if all have sufficient deliberative skills. It is then important to democracy that 
these skills be distributed widely and fairly equally. In the previous chapter, I defended 
deliberative democracy against the claim that these capacities arc necessarily culturally 
specific to dominant groups. However, the claim that all social groups do not have the 
equal opportunity to develop these capacities still stands. It has been argued by a 
succession of democratic theorists that secondary associations can act as schools of 
democracy to cultivate these skills. Evans and Boyte in Free Spaces (1992), provide a 
famous example and argue that associations can provide the necessary `free spaces' 
whereby `people are able to learn a new self respect, a deeper and more assertive group 
identity, public skills and values of co-operation and civic virtue ... These arc in the 
main, voluntary forms of associations' (Evans and Boyte, 1992, pp. 17-18; Sec also 
Walzer, 1994, p. 189; Galston, 2000a; Putnam, 1993, pp. 89-90; Blakely, 2000, p. 18; 
the latter two both provide empirical evidence to support this argument). 
Participating in associations then can provide people with a sense of responsibility and 
provide them with a sense of `enlightened self-interest' as they become aware of their 
mutual dependency with members of other associations and appreciate the relevance of 
their interests, needs and preferences. If co-operation and mutuality are increased 
through participation, then Wouter Achterberg, in `Sustainability and Associative 
Democracy' (1996), argues that common goods such as environmental sustainability 
could be achieved (Achterberg, 1996, p. 172-173). This phenomenon is likely to be 
enhanced if the relationships between associations and their members are based upon 
deliberatively democratic communication. This is because collective deliberation 
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encourages people to offer public justifications for their preferences, and to listen to the 
opinions of others. Moreover, if Putnam is right then participation in associations may 
also provide the sense of citizenship that Festenstein (2002) has suggested is necessary 
to ground deliberative obligations. 
It was de Tocqueville who most famously outlined the educative function of 
associations: `Feelings are recruited, the heart is enlarged, and the human mind is 
developed only by the reciprocal influence of men on one another', and under 
democratic conditions this influence can `only be accomplished by associations' (de 
Tocqueville, 1945, vol. 2, p. 117). It is thought then that associations can foster the civic 
consciousness and trust that allow for collective action, an argument that has been 
accepted and developed by many democratic theorists (Barber, 1984; 1 labermas; 1996a; 
Mansbridge; 1995; Warren, 2001, p. 73; Putnam, 1993). These civic virtues, de 
Tocqueville argued, would allow for more democratic and horizontal relations rather 
than the vertical and hierarchical relations dominant in Europe at the time (Warren, 
2001, p. 29). Putnam has argued that once these capacities of trust and civic virtue have 
developed then citizens can co-operate to solve collective problems, which in turn helps 
develop trust and civic virtue even further so a `virtuous cycle' is developed (Putnam, 
1993). De Tocqueville claimed that associations can develop these capacities because 
people are encouraged to form bonds with people away from the primary associations of 
family and friends, which in turn enables people to become aware of the consequences 
of their actions on others and therefore their interdependency. Compared with market 
and state relationships which are based on inequality, hierarchy and compulsion; 
associational relationships are more voluntary and equal. Consequently the 
relationships are based upon consent, which deepens the civic capacities (Warren, 2001, 
p. 42). 
Mancur Olsen, in `Social Participation and Voting Turnout' (1972), provides three 
reasons why participation in associations can produce civic virtue: 
1) Individuals' interests are broadened and become more public in orientation. 
2) The contact between individuals is increased drawing them into political 
participation. 
3) Information is increased, and the skills necessary to effectively use this information 
are developed (Olsen, 1972, p. 318). 
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Moreover he claims this is the case no matter what the nature if the association. (01sen, 
1972, p. 319) Van Deth (1997, p. 14) cites an extcnsivc list of empirical evidence that 
seems to indicate that this is the case. 
The argument is also supported by the empirical work of Verba and Nie in 
`Participation in America (1972), that suggests that participation in associations begets 
political participation i. e. the more people who participate in associations the, more that 
they will participate in general i. e. voting, as they develop the necessary skills required 
for decision-making (Verba and Nie, 1972, p. 186). More recently a study in Konrad 
Eisdon et at Voluntary Organisations (1995) provides further empirical evidence that 
supports this. In contrast Van Deth cites recent evidence by Leighly from 1992 that 
provides empirical evidence that challenges these claims and even suggests the 
relationship is reversed (Van Deth, 1997, p. 13). Van Deth attributes this to the fact that 
participating in associations takes time, which reduces time available for other types of 
participation. However he accepts that Hirschman's study is probably more accurate in 
that the relationship is between a discontinuity between subjective experience and 
expectations of how much time participation will involve (Van Deth, 1997, p. 10). As 
well as empiricists like Leighly, there are theorists who suggest why we should be 
sceptical about the positive connection between associational participation and civic 
virtue. 
In reviewing the extent to which associations can develop civic virtues, it is important to 
note Theda Skocpol's argument in `Associations Without Members' (1999), that to date 
associations actually mirror socio-economic inequalities in the sense that the greater the 
socio-economic level, the greater the level of associational participation and this 
therefore will reduce the potential of associations for instilling civic virtues throughout 
the citizenry (Skocpol, 1999). Gutmann is also sceptical of the potential of associations 
offer for the development of civic virtues in their members (Gutmann, 1998). 
A central part of Dahl's `strong principle of equality' is that all participants in a 
democracy have the necessary qualities to participate or at least that all have sufficient 
skills so that no members `are so definitely better qualified than the others that they 
should be entrusted with making the... decisions' (Dahl in Gastill, 1993, p. 22). 
However, the skills required for participating in a deliberative democratic decision- 
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making process are perhaps more demanding than just voting. It has been suggested that 
it is the democratic skill of reasoning that democracy, and in this case deliberative 
democracy requires. It has also been suggested that it is active and equal participation 
in the institutions of civil society create the conditions that make democracy possible, 
where the skills of articulation and listening are learnt (Warren, 2001, p. 61). Although 
Gastill accepts that through participation, people will learn both deliberative skills and 
democratic values, he argues that prior to this learning he warns that the decision- 
making process can be subverted. Consequently he suggests that new members should 
operate as advisers or observers, and become full participants once the skills have been 
learnt (Gastill, 1993, pp. 9-10). This seems to ignore the fact that the learning of 
deliberation is mostly in the doing, not the watching, and moreover offers no solution to 
the problem of what should be done when an association is first set-up or first 
incorporates deliberatively democratic decision-making processes, and the participants 
all need to develop these skills. Once again though, because current participation in 
associations mirrors socio-economic inequalities the potential for an `associational 
democracy', to reduce the inequality in deliberative skills is offset. It seems as though 
we are caught up in a vicious cycle of inequality. This problem will be addressed in 
more detail in Chapter Five. 
The main focus of Jean Cohen's critique of Putnam in `Trust, Voluntary Association 
and Workable Democracy' (1999) is that he fails to explain adequately how trust and 
civic virtue generated within an association can become generalised across society 
between associations: `How does intergroup trust become trust of strangers outside the 
group? Why does the willingness to act together for mutual benefit in a small group 
such as a choral society translate into willingness to act for the common good or to 
become politically engaged at all? ' She is further sceptical that `the interpersonal trust 
generated in face-to-face interactions (is) the same thing as "generalised trust"' (Cohen, 
1999, pp. 219-220). Interpersonal trust is by its very nature specific to its context and 
reciprication is directly experienced: `Interpersonal trust generated in face-to-face 
relationships is not an instance of a more general impersonal phenomenon. Nor can it 
simply be transferred to others or to other contexts' (Cohen, 1999, p. 221). Rosenblum, 
agrees that all associations will contribute to internal co-operation amongst the 
members, but that this will not extend to civic virtue between associations, as they are 
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by their nature exclusionary and competitive. Consequently associations at best provide 
the location for `shining involvements' of individuals (Rosenblum, 1998). 
However, I think Joshua Cohen and Rogers' more minimal claims are accurate when 
they argue associations can promote a `civic consciousness', which they dcfinc as a 
recognition and commitment to democratic procedures and norms as the basis for social 
co-operation and trust in the commitment of others to do the same and therefore ground 
deliberative obligations (Cohen and Rogers, 1995, pp. 43-44; See also Warren, 2001, p. 
7; Rosenblum, 1998, p. 59). It possible that this commitment to democracy and trust in 
others could be the platform for the development of other civic virtues at least in some 
cases, for example where associations aim to achieve common tasks they bulil on trust 
and make common tasks possible. However, other types of association will break down 
trust (Warren, 2001, pp74-75; see also Putnam, 1993, chapter 6; Bell 1998). 
I agree that, despite Olsen's claim, not all associations will be able to contribute in the 
same way to this development. Warren argues that deliberative skills will be enhanced 
by any association that deals with collective action, and not just specifically politically 
orientated associations (Warren, 2001, p. 72) and Rosenblum concurs (1998, p. 206). 
Associations involved in conflicts are generally more likely to enhance deliberative 
skills, whether this conflict be internal or external, due to the increased opportunity for 
such skills to be used. Those associations that are politically orientated will also present 
more opportunities for participants to develop these aspects e. g. Abortion Law Reform 
association and Electoral Reform association; welfare and health rights advocacy groups 
e. g. The Care Forum, Association of Young People with ME and Action on Disability 
and Development; ethnic, racial and religious advocacy groups e. g. Latin American's 
Women Rights Service, Bristol Muslim Cultural Society and Ming-Ai; environmental 
advocacy organisations e. g. Forest Re-cycling Project and Friends of the Earth; civic 
and human rights advocacy associations e. g. New Politics and Birmingham Race Action 
Partnership and new social movements e. g. American Feminist Movement (Warren, 
2001, p143). The fewer opportunities for easy and low cost exit from the association 
the greater the chance of developing political skills as this encourages them to 
internalise political conflict, which again will provide opportunities to develop their 
members' political skills like neighbourhood associations e. g. 1066 Housing 
Association in Hastings & St. Leonards. However, groups with high opportunities for 
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exit can still develop members political skills providing they aim for public material 
goods and inclusive social goods as they can only be achieved through co-operation e. g. 
welfare rights like the Black Elderly Group in Southwark, health advocacy groups like 
Agewell in Sheffield and Age Concern, religious, ethnic or racial advocacy groups e. g. 
Bangladesh Women's Association in Haringey, Jewish Deaf Association, new social 
movements and environmental advocacy groups. Such groups will also be those most 
likely to enhance civic virtues by demonstrating the need for co-operation and mutual 
dependency. Such factors are strengthened if the association is embedded in social 
media, as this focuses the association on commonalities rather than conflict, which in 
turn is concentrated if opportunity for exit is high (Warren, 2001, p. 152). 
Furthermore, Warren suggests that associations that internalise conflict and encourage 
members to deal with other organisations are more likely to enhance them. Those 
circumstances that specifically develop skills for democratic deliberation are more 
specific, and require opportunities for `plus-sum' conflict resolution. Following Arendt, 
Warren argues that such associations will allow members to `distance' themselves from 
their private identities and preferences allowing for judgement (Warren, 2001, p. 156). 
Associations that restrict opportunities for exit will internalise conflict, especially those 
that are also vested, forcing associations to pursue their goals while dealing with 
internal conflict e. g. civic and environmental associations, mutual aid associations like 
Brighton and Hove Community and Voluntary Sector Forum Furness Carers, human 
rights advocacy associations e. g. Latin American Women's Rights. Exit is less likely in 
vested associations even if the costs of exit are low like in the National Rifle 
Association (NRA) (Warren, 2001, p. 159). However, some non vested associations 
like those involved with new social movements e. g. CND, due to the fact that they are 
conscious-raising, in the sense that they require deliberation to help form a collective 
identity and analyse existing identities. Other non-vested associations are encouraged to 
provide reasons amongst themselves and to others to justify their claims by the situation 
they find themselves in as they do not however money and power to use e. g. welfare 
rights associations and environmental advocacy associations (Warren, 2001, p. 162). 
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3.6 Locations of Governance 
In light of the failures of the modem welfare-capitalist nation state, outlined above, new 
locations for governance have been sought and new venues for the distribution of 
services i. e. welfare and environmental maintenance have been tried. This section 
argues that if sufficient power is devolved, associations can remedy these failures and 
defects and provide an alternative location for governance that is distinct from the state 
and the market. This role is different from the role of representation and providing 
information, as it requires associations implementing legislation and fulfilling `quasi- 
public functions' in support or in place of the state (Cohen and Rogers, 1995, p. 44). It 
is strongly connected however, to the idea of subsidiarity as it is suggesting that the 
most suitable level of organisation for the distribution of services and for locations of 
governance is secondary ' associations and therefore combats complexity in a similar 
way. It is still different though to the argument that subsidiarity is essential to the 
institutionalisation of deliberative democracy. It should be apparent from the discussion 
of subsidiarity above that we cannot generalise about what function/ decisions should be 
made at what level, but need to look at specific cases. Consequently for the purpose of 
this chapter, I will focus upon social policy as a suitable example for both a policy area 
on which associations could govern and a service, which they could distribute. ' lt is 
obviously essential that in order to achieve this, associations would have to be devolved 
the necessary powers. It does then go hand in hand with the first function outlined in 
this chapter. 
When bureaucrats determine welfare provision, it is unlikely that all needs, will be met. 
Young argues that the welfare capitalist state has led to the depoliticisation of many 
issues by restricting conflict to issues of distribution and consequently `issues of the 
organisation of production, public and private decision-making structures, and the social 
meanings that confer status or reinforce disadvantage go unraised' (Young, 1990, p. 
66). The agenda is then restricted non deliberatively, which as previously argued entails 
the restriction of autonomy of those unable to influence this agenda, which in general 
are subordinate groups. Citizens are not viewed as such, their participation is not valued 
or encouraged, but instead are perceived as consumers. Roger Hadley and Stephen 
Hatch in Social Welfare and the Future of the State (1981) claim a more suitable 
9 Environmental policy will also be referred to, but in less detail. 
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method for distributing welfare are voluntary citizen associations, which would avoid 
the inefficient bureaucracy of the state welfare provision and allow for more 
decentralisation of power and citizen participation. These voluntary associations would 
take much of the responsibility for welfare provision, reducing the role of the state 
based upon the principle of subsidiarity. Altering the locus of governance in this manner 
is conducive to the principle of subsidiarity outlined above as subsidiarity conflicts with 
the centralisation and bureaucracy that characterises the present welfare state (i3osnich, 
1996, p. 1). These associations would be more flexible and responsive to the needs of 
those who require welfare and if combined with a deliberative democratic model of 
decision-making, would meet the considered needs of recipients even better. 
It is important to distinguish this argument from the aims of certain political parties to 
reduce service and welfare provision, and to redirect the focus for provision to the 
market, family and charity. Associations would still require public resources to 
establish the associations and to enable them to ensure adequate levels of welfare 
(Young, 1990, p. 85). However, this does demonstrate that the issue of who provides 
welfare has become increasingly central, but I am not advocating what Newt Gingrich 
calls `replacing the welfare state with an opportunity society', which is essentially 
focusing the supply of welfare upon the market (Gingrich in Cohen, 1999, p. 229). In 
terms of social policy, associations in the USA and the U. K. have mainly been used as a 
substitute for social welfare spending (Salamon and Anheier, 1996, p. 2). The USA is 
said to have the largest associational culture both actually and relatively, but that this 
has actually meant that social welfare provision has been severely restricted (Salamon 
and Anheier, 1996, p. 98). The recent trends in the USA have gone against its tradition, 
started in the 1960s, where the government provided funding for associations to provide 
services. 
On the UK, Salamon and Anheier note that `it has been importantly shaped by the 
content of government social policy, which relegated this sector to a relatively limited 
role in much of the postwar period, but has since thrust it into unaccustomed 
prominence over the past decade' (Salamon and Anheier, 2000, p. 96). Since the reign 
of the `New Right' and continuing with the `Third Way', there has been an increasing 
market role for provision, which has been part of a growing trend in social policy 
provision to reduce the role of the state. It is in the areas of education, culture, 
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recreation and social services (especially housing) that dominate the British 
associational system, and are relatively poor in health care (Salamon and Anhcicr, 2000, 
p. 96). Consequently the Conservative Government introduced the `Citizen's Charter' in 
1991. The present Labour government has established the more promising mechanism 
of `Primary Care Units' in the NHS. These have been devolved powers to distribute 
welfare in a manner that will enable increased citizen participation. It is my contention 
however, that these units are not sufficient to achieve these tasks and have generally 
resulted in increased citizen consultation, rather than participation. Citizens then are 
therefore used as a source of information, rather than being given the decision-making 
powers that are retained by elites, required to cultivate their autonomy. Although 
Primary Care Units are new locations of governance, that help reduce the gap between 
state and citizen, they presently do not ensure the cultivation of citizens' autonomy in 
the manner I have advocated is decisive. Part of this is due to their being invested in 
state media, which imposes bureaucracy upon the units. 
Warren argues that their has been a recent `explosion' of associations with devolved 
powers to fulfil government contracts in the USA, in an attempt to increase flexibility 
(Warren, 2001, p. 191 & 33; see also Mylod, 1998, p. 2). However, this does not mean 
such a trend has lead to increased democratisation: 
'In the last couple of decades in the United States subsidiarity has often been pursued in highly 
irresponsible ways from a democratic perspective: public functions have been 'privatised' 
simply to reduce government spending and employment, an action motivated by the simplistic 
creed that less government is always more efficient. Often the results are anti-democratic: 
opportunities for patronage-based corruption are increased while public accountability is 
reduced' (Warren, 2001, p. 194). 
This demonstrates how the associations must be democratic themselves allowing for 
membership participation. It also highlights the fact that subsidiarity in the US, as in 
the UK, has been to private Firms which are not conducive to democracy as they provide 
no opportunities for voice and citizen participation in their decision-making structure. 
Furthermore they are accountable to their shareholders! owners, not the public, but also 
the necessity of regulation that comes with the principle of subsidiarity. 
In contrast, in France, associations have aided considerably in the inclusion of the poor 
(Salamon and Anheier, 1996, p. 2). These associations have come to the fore in social 
service delivery as the government has sought to decentralise, which goes against the 
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French statist tradition and is a very recent, but rapid trend that is dominated by social 
services and educational associations (Salamon and Anheier, 1996, p. 82). Cecile 
Blatrix in `Associational Engagement and Participatory Democracy in France' (2000), 
informs us that since the 1990s there has been a trend towards an associational network, 
fostering active citizenship and partnership. In general it has been due to mobilisation 
against specific policies e. g. nuclear programs and infrastructure plans (Blatrix, 2000, 
pp. 2-3). The Municipal Action Groups (Groupes d'Action Municipale, GAM) have 
tried to respond to housing, nursery and open space shortages that have been ignored by 
the state (Blatrix, 2000, p. 6). In Germany an associational system has been `highly 
institutionalised and integrated into the fabric of the German social welfare 
system... reflecting a rich tradition of subsidiarity, self-governance and 
decentralisation. ' Moreover, this sector continues to grow, especially in terms of health 
and social services encouraged by substantial public funding (Slalmon and Anheier, 
1996, pp. 85-89). All this has occurred because it is thought that such associations 
provide suitable venues for participation and can achieve `assisted self-reliance' 
(Salamon and Anheier, 1996, p. 2). In Ireland the National Anti-Poverty Strategy has 
produced a Green Paper entitled Community and Voluntary Sector and its Relationship 
with the State (1997), which sought to elevate `this area of social activity to a new level 
of importance in public discourse' and to create an active civil society (Powell and 
Guerin, 1997, p. 9). The intention of the paper has been to `create a culture and society 
which respects the autonomy of the individual. In such a society, individuals arc given 
the opportunity to realise their potential and to take potential for themselves and others. 
This means creating a climate which supports individuals and groups to make things 
happen rather than have things happen to them. ' This involves ensuring that all are 
`facilitated to participate in dialogue about problems, policy solutions and programme 
implementation' (Irish Department of Social Welafre in Powell and Guerin, 1997, p. 
50). 
Blakeley cites Pindado, who reports upon such associations in Barcelona, and agrees 
that they are more efficient and rapid in the response to citizens' need in comparison to 
the available statist bureaucratic structures and consequently concludes that 'if 
associations did not exist, the social cost would be extremely significant' (Pindado in 
Blakeley, 2000, p. 10). It does seem the case that it has become accepted that 
subsidiarity can bring collective actions and decisions closer to the citizens they effect 
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and therefore aid self governance (Warren, 2001, p. 191). As Healey argues, `if you are 
excluded it means your opinion is not sought and it doesn't count. In fact you are not 
expected to have an opinion, rather you are encouraged to trust the opinion of the 
shapers of society' (Healy in Powell and Guerin, 1997, p. 56). 
Another area that has been specifically set out as an area where co-operation among 
associations will be more efficient and democratic to state run bureaucracy is in 
environmental policy. The directive of Local Agenda 21 that emerged from the Rio 
summit states that `by 1996, most local authorities in each country should have 
undertaken a consultative process with their population and achieved a consensus on a 
`Local Agenda 21' in their community' (Agenda 21, paragraph 28.2). It is hoped that 
this will aid in the achievement of integrated sustainable planning and development in 
the environment and has opened up participation in environmental planning to many 
secondary associations. Cohen and Rogers for example claim that environmental policy 
is limited due to the problems that state has with `command, control and co-operation' 
in establishing environmental public standards in the face of diversity of sites, enforcing 
compliance to the standards, and gaining co-operation setting standards. Greater co- 
operation from a plurality of associations could lead more relevant and detailed 
specialist information about environmental damage and costs of environmental 
protection. They can provide co-operation from members to agreed environmental 
legislation and in the implementation of environmental protection methods. 
Associations can further help in the process of dissemination of knowledge and 
information about the new measures to other groups such as consumers. As Cohen and 
Rogers conclude, `it is simply implausible to think that state administrators will be able, 
even in the best of circumstances to perform this range of tasks. Associations, including 
associations at the national level, are needed' (Cohen and Rogers, 1995, p. 58). 
Achterberg provides a note of caution, pointing out that there is no necessary connection 
between sustainability and associative democracy, just as there is no necessary 
connection between sustainability and deliberative democracy. The adoption of a 
certain set of decision-making procedures does not necessitate the promotion of a 
certain issue, neither does the adoption of a certain institutional arrangements 
(Achterberg, 1996). However, certain institutional arrangements such as associative 
democracy can be more conducive to deliberatively democratic decision-making, which 
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in turn can make the promotion of a certain issue like environmental sustainability more 
likely than current arrangements. 
It seems that much of the grounding behind the assertion that secondary associations 
could be used as alternative locations for governance comes from the perception that 
they could help solve some of the failings of the capitalist welfare state. Both Warren 
and Hirst certainly consider the possibilities of associations as locations for democratic 
participation as being attractive due to the failings of the nation-state, which 'by its very 
nature, tends to be inflexible (owing to accountability through universal rules) and 
sometimes arbitrary (as when universal rules produce different results under different 
circumstances). Because of their distance from social actors, states often have to resort 
to complex systems of inducements and monitoring to achieve results' (Warren, 2001, 
p. 88). Associations are in closer proximity to the members and have the advantage that 
trust and the commitment to democratic processes that can be cultivated by this 
participation means stringent regulation and monitoring is not necessary: 'The delivery 
of welfare services through voluntary agencies effects a separation between the service 
provider and the state as the "governor of governors', whereas the state is in the 
contradictory position of providing services through its bureaucratic agencies and also 
acting as the guarantor of the standard of those services' (Hirst, 1994, p. 169). Primary 
Care Units are an example of this type of bureaucratic agency. An associative 
democracy pursuing subsidiarity overcomes these contradictions, and I will suggest 
helps reduce the failings of the nation-state, of which there appears to be two in terms of 
social policy. Section 3.6.1, will consider the first failing of inflexible/ universal 
provision and section 3.6.2, will consider the second failing that it is too distant from 
the receivers. I will also consider two criticisms from Marc Stears in `Needs, Welfare 
and the Limits of Associationalism' (1999), who is sceptical that 'needs' do differ much 
across society, and also doubts that citizens could, should and would accurately define 
their needs and the best methods to fulfil them. 
3.6.1 Inflexibility and Universal Provision of the Welfare State 
Associations are much more fluid and adaptable than the state, and can operate at many 
different levels. The same association can fulfil functions at international, national, 
regional and local level. They would offer a much more varied programme of welfare: 
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`Again the fact that such associations are "on the ground" means that they know more about the 
needs of the intended recipients of those services than do government officials, and the fact that 
they are integrated into communities and local economies leaves them better equipped to see the 
connections, for individuals, of different policy initiatives' (Cohen and Roger 1995, p. 60). 
It is thought that associations can specialise in certain fields especially social services 
and are more likely to be responsive to local and varying factors. 
As the welfare state can only offer universal social service provision, it is suggested by 
difference democrats (Young, 1990) that it actually excludes those who need it most, 
the subordinate social groups in society: 
`Today the exclusion of dependent persons from equal citizenship rights is only barely hidden 
beneath the surface. Because they depend on bureaucratic institutions for support services, the 
old, the poor and the mentally or physically disabled are subject to patronising, punitive, 
demeaning, and arbitrary treatment by the policies and people associated with welfare 
bureaucracies. Being a dependent in our society implies being legitimately subject to the often 
arbitrary and invasive authority of social service providers and other public and private 
administrators, who enforce rules with which the marginal must comply, and otherwise exercise 
power over the conditions of their lives' (Young, 1990, p. 54). 
What is needed then is a more flexible and less universal and arbitrary social service 
provision that is sensitive to different needs, that emerge due to peoples' different 
situations and relationships to power. If peoples' needs are not met they will not be able 
to be autonomous and this is why it is such an important issue. 
It is possible participatory associations could provide this inclusive version of welfare. 
A good example of the need for differentiated welfare provision comes from feminist 
theory (Pascall, 1997; Young, 1990; Fraser, 1992). Traditionally it has been argued that 
the state has taken on the responsibility of ensuring the welfare of the family, but this is 
not the case; much welfare is still provided domestically out of the sphere of social 
policy, and usually by women. Associations, if delegated powers of welfare provision 
from the state, could connect women and other groups more integrally to the decision- 
making that precedes provision. Associations are better able to cross the divide between 
the public and private, and eradicate differences between genders in relation to the 
public private distinction by allowing women, through organised associations to put 
these previously `private' issues into the `public sphere' and assert their needs to fill the 
gap between family and economy. Everingham and Young argue that women are 
already forming voluntary informal groups to achieve this. Cited are groups that 
socialise caring tasks in playgroups and parent and carer groups e. g. Furness Carers and 
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The Care Forum, and protection against violence and rape ccntres c. g. South Essex 
Rape and Incest Crisis Centre (Everingham in Pascal], 1997, p. 27; Young, 1990, pp. 
85-86). 
However, Stears rejects the arguments about difference accepting that individuals needs 
will differ only between society and society (Stears, 1999, p. 583). He further claims 
that a move away from uniform welfare provision would also lead to inequality of 
service owing to the fact that some associations would be better than others due to 
having more resources such as money and staid This will occur even if they start on a 
level playing field because associations will vary in their provision (Stearn, 1999, p. 
584). For Stears then needs are defined objectively or at least quasi-objectively and 
therefore the state is the best mechanism to decide what these needs are and to provide 
the service to fulfil them. Although different groups most certainly have many needs, 
which will be similar or the same, because there are distinct groups, there are usually 
some distinct needs, and the members of the groups know best what these arc (Young, 
1990, p. 185). 
However, needs are open to interpretation, and there is conflict over what are `needs'. 
For example, Nancy Fraser comments about feminist theory, that there are needs that 
fall between family and official economy. These are social needs, which are defined as 
`a site of discourse about people's needs. Specifically about those needs that have 
broken out of the domestic and/or official economic spheres that earlier contained them 
as "private matters"' (Fraser, 1992, p. 156). Associations can operate between family 
and official economy, socialising domestic tasks e. g. playgroups, parent groups, carer 
groups, rape centres, domestic violence centres. The formation of women's refuges, all 
women clinics and health centres, self-help groups and counselling services have 
allowed women to acquire information about their bodies, and challenge patriarchal 
assumptions about sexuality, that also enabled decentralised provision of social welfare, 
within which women have been able to participate. Furthermore, it is not clear how 
Stears thinks bureaucrats will be best placed to interpret peoples' needs. 
Gillain Pascal], in Social Policy (1997), informs us that feminist writers such as Wilson, 
Enrenreich and English have highlighted the fact that there is social control in defining 
`welfare needs. ' Through the use of experts, women have been excluded from dcfining 
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their needs, `subverting women's own expertise' and consequently `dominating their 
lives': 
`Seeing the social as an arena of contest between different interpretations of need allows us to 
understand the contradictory impact of welfare services on women. Neither state agencies nor 
feminist groups have a consistent definition of needs, and all policies are a product of historical 
struggles to define need and contain or extend the satisfaction of needs. Some outcomes have 
clearly been favourable to women in terms of redistributing resources in favour of social 
reproduction; others have had costs, in terms of social control and stigmatization' (Pascall, 1997, 
p. 27). 
The ideal of deliberative democracy aims to democratise this conflict by allowing open 
participation and public discourse to decide and form what these needs are, believing 
that the understanding of needs, is best established through open dialogue in which all 
can participate. As Follesdal suggested earlier subsidiarity reduces exterior domination 
over the preferences of the members of the association as it specifically prescribes the 
justifiable grounds for `exterior' intervention. It therefore provides the `institutional 
space' necessary for democratic preference formation, based upon collective 
deliberation (Follesdal, 1999, p. 15). Gould concurs and argues that in order for 
difference to be recognized, what is necessary is not exactly the same treatment for 
each, but `equivalent conditions differentiated by need' (Gould, 1996, p. 180). For 
Gould this requires participation in the discourse of the public sphere within and 
between associations. Participation is essential for the expression of and recognition of 
difference as it can be directly represented. Participation in decision-making also means 
that resulting decisions can take effective action to deal with difference and means that 
associations will continue to recognize and articulate their differences (Gould, 1996, p. 
181). For example, the flexibility of associations means that there exists the Black 
Elderly Group in Southwark, the Jewish Deaf Association and Women's Psychotherapy 
Centre, all of which involve provision of services to groups with specific identities. 
Owing to the fact that many more women are now participating in the workplace, many 
functions of social policy and welfare, once provided by the free household labour of 
women, are now going unmet, or seen as private responsibility. Cohen and Rogers 
suggest that `movements into and out of social services and between services at any 
given moment or over a life course are as a consequence greater' (Cohen and Rogers, 
1995, p. 54). This has also led to great changes in the family unit, as it has been 
traditionally known, with much greater pluralism now existing. It is associations with 
their flexibility than can provide and meet the demands of a more plural society: `In 
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this context, effective policy needs to be especially attentive to variation across cases, to 
the interdependence of different categories of need among individuals, and to the 
integration of welfare delivery into plausible career programs for recipients' (Cohen and 
Rogers, 1995, p. 61). Associations can offer flexible decentralised units for the 
provision of welfare. Welfare neglect can be avoided by state monitoring and other 
associations will also check and hold others accountable (Warren, 2001, p. 194). 
It seems that Stears' system where the state interprets people's needs, just involves the 
imposition of factitious `objective' and `homogenous' needs regardless of what citizens 
want (Martell, 1992, p. 159): 
'It disenfranchises citizens from deciding together what their interests could be and how a 
settlement could be reached amongst them all. ' lt is based upon a belief that 'the state can 
somehow express, represent and execute externally and from above plural needs as one unified 
will' (Martell, 1992, p. 170). 
As Young argues, oppression and injustice for certain groups is often 'unconscious' and 
often resulting from 'well meaning people'. However, stereotypes generated and 
maintained by media and culture and bureaucratic hierarchies and market mechanisms. 
The centralised definition of needs by the welfare state can lead to such oppression, 
therefore new institutions for the provision are required if all are to have their needs 
met. As Young argues herself, 'we cannot eliminate this structural oppression by 
getting rid of the rulers or making some new laws, because oppressions arc 
systematically reproduced in major economic, political and cultural institutions' 
(Young, 1990, p. 41). Secondary associations can be these new institutions, if devolved 
the necessary powers they can provide inclusive and flexible social service provision, 
that enables citizens to participate in the understanding of their needs and in how those 
needs are to be met. 
Stears' critique that some associations will be better than others at supplying welfare 
services has greater validity and the consequences of this are that the autonomy of some 
will be cultivated to a greater degree than others. Although I accept this argument and 
realised it is undesirable, it does not support the conclusion that Stears makes, i. e. that 
the provision of welfare should remain state centred. Government league tables suggest 
state agencies themselves suffer from regional inequalities in service provision. His 
own proposal then suffers from his own criticism. If associations were state funded 
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then it would not necessarily be the case that some associations had more money 
person, although I do accept that associations with higher memberships would have a 
greater total income and could achieve greater economies of scale as a result. Hirst 
thinks that this inequality can be avoided as an associative democracy can approximate 
elements of free market competition. Citizens would then be attracted to what they 
perceived to be the better associations meaning the `worse' associations would have to 
improve or lose their members. There are however, problems with this. Firstly, if 
associations are internally democratic and are poor at meeting member's needs, this will 
be because of the decisions the citizens have made themselves. Secondly, if certain 
efficient associations are more efficient and therefore attract more members this will 
potentially reduce their capacity for internal democracy, based upon the norms of 
deliberative democracy. This might in turn make the association less efficient at 
meeting member's needs. Thirdly, it is questionable to what extent an associative 
democracy can approximate the free market. As already agued, different associations 
have different opportunities for exit, which can restrict `market competition. ' 
The devolution of powers to associations based upon the principle of subsidiarity also 
means; `the locus of decisions is devolved' and consequently relieving some normative 
pressures of legitimation away from the state. This point is especially poignant in terms 
of the distribution of welfare, due to the fact that increases in welfare provision have 
been accompanied by increasing demands for welfare, which raises the demands upon 
the state to achieve legitimacy (Habermas, 1975). This tension has been heightened by 
the increasing differentiation between citizens and their demands, meaning the nation- 
state has become an inadequate institution to meet the diverse needs, which has meant a 
trend of declining legitimacy. Associations could redirect expectation away from the 
state making it easier for the institution to meet standards of legitimacy, and due to their 
potentials for `subsidiarity, co-ordination and co-operation' they appear to be the most 
suitable organisational framework to meet the ever growing differentiated needs and 
demands of citizens (Warren, 2001, p. 92). Hirst is a strong advocate of this, arguing 
that associations, as service providers, would relieve the state of the burden, freeing up 
the government's time and resources to concentrate on what Hirst describes as their 
main functions; `to provide society with a framework of basic laws to guide social 
actors; to oversee forms of public service provision to hold public officials accountable; 
and to protect the rights and interests of citizens' (Hirst in Percynski, 2000, p. 164). 
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3.6.2 Distance from Citizens 
`The exclusion of the underclass should be addressed by the development of participatory 
democratic structures at grass-roots community level, which empower the poor. Unless there is a 
sense of involvement in decision-making, the alienation of the underclass will continue to fester' 
(Powell and Guerin, 1997, p. 63). 
Stears rejects the argument that individuals will know how to fulfil their own welfare 
needs, because these issues are so complicated, and experts are therefore needed. Uc 
also believes people aim to achieve immediate goods over future goods, meaning the 
long term interests and needs of people will not be secured: 
'It is not difficult to envision, therefore, how a radical associational system of reform that 
empowered individuals to choose their own welfare services could result in a situation where 
individuals' choices negatively impacted on the fulfilment of their needs even as they understood 
them' (Stears, 1999, p. 577). 
I still maintain that people know their own needs best, due to the arguments given 
above, although I do accept that mistakes will be made, but not as many as when 
bureaucrats and politicians define people's needs for them. One of the core tenets of 
deliberative democracy is that `the force of the better argument' will prevail. If long 
term needs can be rationally proven to be superior to short term ones, then deliberative 
democracy, with its exchange of reasons will be better situated to encourage people to 
focus on long-term rather than short term needs. Furthermore, in the deliberative 
situation information and arguments will be available from experts and many of the 
members will become experts themselves if they are the paid officials who act as 
`permanent members of the association' or as representatives of that association. This 
will help overcome the problem of complexity. 
Stears distinguishes between preferences and needs, and argues that if a mistake about 
needs is made this is more serious than mistakes about people's preferences. Needs are 
independent of individual choice and cannot be changed, whereas preferences can. 
Moreover, needs have to be met if people are going to be able to form autonomous 
preferences: `An individual with needs that are unsatisfied cannot live a life in which 
she can actively choose or pursue a range of lifestyles. Without that standard range of 
capabilities it is simply not possible to make of ective choices' (Stears, 1999, p. 579). 
The implications of this argument are central to the relationship between deliberative 
democracy and social policy, because if social policies do not meet the needs of people 
189 
then this affects people's chances of participating effectively in future decision-making 
processes. It is imperative then that people's needs are met. I accept that needs and 
preferences are different, and that needs do not change as do preferences, through 
rational argumentation. Moreover, it is more important for needs to be met than 
preferences to ensure autonomy, although both are important. If needs are not met then 
it will effect peoples preferences and chance to participate autonomously. This does not 
mean that people's perception of their own and others' needs cannot be improved 
through rational argument. Posner has indicated that welfare as `preference satisfaction' 
is in fact logically equivalent, because welfare is inevitably based upon what citizens are 
willing to pay (Posner in Sagoff, 1998, p. 220). Sagoff goes as far to suggest that this 
`cannot be refuted because it expresses a stipulated identity' and requires citizens to 
`identify the trade-offs individuals would make between what they want for themselves 
and for society as a whole' (Sagoff, 1998, p. 220). Habermas is also confident that 
democratic deliberation can and must include an interpretation of needs (Habermas, 
1996a, pp. 305-306). 
Furthermore, I do not accept that any of these points are incompatible with democratic 
deliberative associations providing welfare. In fact it fits completely with the capability 
requirement for people to participate equally in deliberative democracy. Stears 
however, also believes that people are likely to make mistakes if left to decide upon 
their own needs: `An individual may... feel that she recognises a need when, in 
actuality, she only feels particularly enthusiastic about a particular preference' (Stears, 
1999, p. 579). He also indicates that because the associational system allows 
individuals to define their own needs, from a subjective point of view, then they will 
claim much more than they actually `need' and such a welfare process will be unfair. In 
response to the first argument, Stears' claim could equally be made about state 
representatives' interpreting needs. 
In terms of the second, in a deliberative decision-making framework though, it would 
not be enough for one person to claim a preference is a need to have this met, because 
they must convince others that it is a need as well. The decision of what are needs and 
how they are to be met are then not individual but collective decisions, where each 
person will be one voice in the deliberative arena. Welfare advocacy groups will fulfil 
the role of representing difference, but will also appeal to commonality, in the sense 
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they will appeal to universal conceptions of justice. However, all groups will tend to 
highlight common justifications for their ideas, needs, demands etc, but it is how 
persuasive the reasons are, as to whether these will be accepted or not (Young, 1990, p. 
185-186; Sunstein, 1985, p. 1588). 
Stears thinks such an argument just undermines the normative claims of participatory 
associations: `If, therefore, associationalists accept that subjective preferences should 
not be the determining feature in shaping welfare provision then they are left without 
their claim against the structure of current arrangements' i. e. that they are uniform and 
inflexible (Stears, 1999, p. 581). Again Stears seems to have missed the heart of the 
associationalist's arguments. It is not because welfare provision should be based upon 
subjective preferences that the welfare state's universal provision is inadequate, but 
because different people have different needs. The centralised welfare state is too 
distant from citizens to consult them and find out what their needs are and it is too 
inflexible to be able to supply a genuinely differentiated service. Moreover, the current 
mechanisms that exist are inadequate for citizens to participate in democratic debate 
about what their needs are and how they can be best met. The needs of each individual 
citizen may well be objective unlike preferences. However this does not mean that a 
citizens' own interpretation of her needs is necessarily accurate, prior to being involved 
in a process of collective deliberation where new information, perspectives and 
experiences of other citizens who are similarly socially situated, whereby they can gain 
a clearer understanding of what their needs are. Deliberative democracy can provide a 
range of ideas of how to meet differing needs, and associations offer the flexibility to 
deliver a genuinely differentiated provision of welfare and social services in general. 
It seems then that associations can provide flexible social service provision and suitable 
locations for the participation of citizens into making social policy providing that they 
are devolved the necessary powers and have an internal democratic system based upon 
deliberative democracy. Therefore allowing an increase in autonomy as participants 
have the opportunity to democratically understand their needs, form a plan to meet and 
even aid in the practical fulfilment in some cases. In many ways then associations 
become primary associations, as they provide locations for both democratic governance 
and the provision of essential services: `A self-governing civil society thus becomes the 
primary feature of society' (Achterberg, 1996, p. 168). The state becomes the secondary 
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association, because its role is reduced to law enforcement, protection of individual 
rights and the provision of public finance to the associations (Hirst, 1994, pp. 25-56). It 
therefore enables citizens to actualise their collective decisions and therefore enhances 
autonomy. 
Sigrid Roßteutscher, in `Associative Democracy' (2000), questions the democratic 
credentials of secondary associations. RoBteutscher argues that associative democracy is 
`not primarily a democratic theory. On the contrary its main interest is to enhance 
government competence and improve economic performance' (Roßteutscher, 2000; 
p175). He questions their democratic credentials, because they require compulsory 
participation. If associations are to provide essential services and be locations for 
governance, then people have no choice, but to become members. Likewise, if 
associations are to become the main source of citizen representation, I have argued that 
choice is essential to the cultivation of autonomy, and that associations promote choice 
by being voluntary. If this is not the case then the democratic credentials of associations 
are seriously undermined. However, there are several ways that Roßteutscher's 
argument can be countered. Firstly, as Warren points out all associations will have 
varying levels of exit cost. Some will then be more voluntary than others; a point 
Roßteutscher fails to appreciate. Secondly, associational democracy is only intended to 
supplement present liberal democratic institutions, not replace them all together. 
Therefore, although parties will have less importance, they will still play a role of 
representation, and if people are satisfied with that, then they may not want an 
association to represent them, which would be their choice. 1° Even if we accept that in 
an `associative democracy' it will be necessary for all citizens to be members of at least 
one association, therefore rendering `associational membership' compulsory in effect, 
citizens will still have a choice of a myriad of associations to choose from. Therefore it 
will not be compulsory to be a member of any particular association. Thirdly, I will 
argue that it is essential for associations to have an internal democratic structure 
ensuring members enjoy excellent opportunities to participate in the decisions that the 
associations would make, but Roßteutscher does not seem to rate opportunities for 
participation as an important democratic credential. 
10 I certainly think associational democracy provides more choice for representation than the rigid 
structure of regional representation presently dominant in liberal democracies. 
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There are some other threats to the effectiveness of such an `associative system'. 
Warren warns of the potential pitfalls of subsidiarity. If associations are to become key 
locations for participation and governance in an associative democracy then the current 
socio-economic inequalities that plague associations, as much as other modes of 
participation, must be addressed. This is of increasing importance if associations are to 
play a central role in the provision of social services to meet needs in society. It would 
be a disaster for democracy and the enhancement of autonomy, if welfare provision is 
not provided sufficiently for those who most require it. As one of the aims of welfare is 
redistribution as those who pay are not the same as those who receive (Warren, 2001, p. 
88). There is then a `chicken and egg' problem here, as participation is undermined by 
inequality, but there is no understanding of what equality consists of without 
participation. Whether this vicious circle can be broken, will be reviewed in chapter 
five. 
3.7 Conclusion 
The possibility of secondary associations being locations for deliberatively democratic 
participation has been reviewed. It could achieve this because of four democratic 
functions that associations have the potential to help fulfil: Firstly, they provide smaller 
scale units that allow citizens direct participation in democratic debate in the formation 
of preferences, needs and information. This is consistent with the principle of 
subsidiarity, which legislates for decisions to be taken at the lowest appropriate level to 
allow for those affected to participate and fulfil the task. Following Kohler's (1993) 
suggestion that subsidiarity is based upon democratic principles and that participation 
should be in debate, which will increase the autonomy of those participants. Secondly, 
as well as contributing to the democratic formation of information on preferences, 
associations provide useful vehicles to voice and represent this information. By 
producing economies of scale, achieved through the pooling of resources and due to the 
flexibility of being able to operate at international, national, regional and local level by 
territory, or in a plurality of functions they enable those usually excluded by territorial 
representative institutions, representation. Thirdly, they can act as schools of 
democracy, cultivating the democratic attributes necessary for effective participation in 
deliberative democracy. Fourthly, they can be locations for governance, whereby 
citizens can participate in the formation of policy like social policy, but also its 
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distribution and fulfilment. It is important to note that not all secondary associations 
could fulfil all the functions. The extent the membership was voluntary, the media the 
association was orientated and whether it was vested and the type of goal affected the 
potential of any particular association of performing a democratic function. 
The obstacles of complexity, prevalent in modem societies, that were meant to prevent 
the institutionalisation of deliberative democracy, can also be overcome to some degree. 
Through decentralisation based upon the principle of subsidiarity, the problem of size is 
countered. Associations are flexible and diverse so help overcome plurality and 
deliberative democracy and associations can overcome some features of inequality by 
making inequalities be justified by reason, by allowing excluded groups to participate in 
the understanding of their needs and by acting as schools of democracy to enable those 
without the relevant democratic capabilities to gain them. 
From the discussion, we also learned that to achieve these functions of associations to 
the greatest extent, they must be internally deliberatively democratic. The relevant 
powers must also be devolved and present levels of socio-economic inequality endanger 
the chances of an `associative democracy' enabling equal fulfilment of any of these 
functions. Although it is thought an `associative system' based upon deliberatively 
democratic decision-making could lead to greater equality, present equalities endanger 
this potential. Neither is it clear what needs to be achieved first to enable the 
achievement of the other. In the following chapters I address these three issues: How 
can associations be made internally democratic and allow democratic debate? How will 
the relationships between the associations be made democratic? How will powers be 
best devolved to associations to make them consistent with deliberative democracy's 
norms? How will the problem of socio-economic inequalities be addressed in the 
transition to such a system? 
